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Land grabbing refers to the acquisition of large-scale tracks of land in opaque 
circumstances, usually in developing countries and by (trans)national capital with the 
purpose of food or agrofuel production and speculation. The phenomenon increased 
dramatically after the Global Food Crisis in 2007-2008. This investigation analyses the 
phenomenon in the regions of Morogoro and Pwani in Tanzania and the impact that it has 
on land dispossession for rural villagers and their land rights. The overall aim is to assess 
what processes of dispossession are in place in these regions, the conflicts they trigger, 
and which groups are more excluded and marginalised in decisions about land. The 
research explored four villages in two districts of the two regions in the East of Tanzania 
during a period of four and a half months of fieldwork. 74 interviews were conducted 
with villagers, and 132 were carried out with leaders, practitioners and investors. A total 
of five focus groups were also carried out during the fieldwork. A number of different 
debates have been explored, including different understandings of land, dispossession, 
processes of negotiation and the role of different stakeholders in regard to their influence 
and power. In this respect this research provides three main contributions: firstly, the 
imperative to include small-scale land deals in the debate over land dispossession by land 
grabbing. Secondly, this imperative helps with a wider analysis of the role of different 
stakeholders and their negotiation positions, with a particular focus on the different local 
land owners and users. Finally, the research contributes to the debate on transitions of 
land uses and the formalisation of land by stating that the implementation of land use 
management is an important topic in the context of the different understandings of land 
that exist nowadays. This thesis concludes that there is a significant scramble and 
reshuffling of land control globally that needs to be appropriately addressed by a 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
Researchers and policy makers alike have raised concerned about the massive scale of 
land deals since the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 (Scoones 2018). And Africa has 
become the land grabbing ‘hot point’ (Crina and Petrescu-Mag 2017). According to The 
Oakland Institute, 56 million hectares of land were sold during that period, an area bigger 
than Spain; 70% of these deals took place in Africa (The Oakland Institute 2011a). 
Oxfam has expanded on this figure, stating that “227 million hectares have been sold or 
leased” (Edelman 2013). In 2011, the World Bank released a report entitled Rising 
Global Interest in Farmland (Deininger et al. 2011). The report targeted available land 
for agricultural development in several developing countries, mainly Africa. The report 
considers that there are between “445 million and 1.7 billion hectares worldwide of 
potentially ‘suitable’ lands” for agriculture (Peters 2013, 558).  
This renewed and ongoing interest in farmland investment hampers rural citizens’ land 
rights and has caused dispossession and exclusion from the land in favour of large-scale 
agriculture, usually promoted by foreign capital (Cotula 2012, Hall et al. 2015). 
Researchers, scholars and activists1 suggest that land grabbing has contributed to the 
eviction and denial of rights of many rural people in African countries. In some of these 
countries the land belongs to the state and the community. Local people “own” land on 
the legitimate basis of decades of utilization. Unsurprisingly, in this context land 
grabbing has intensified social conflict and tensions between communities, the state and 
investors at both the domestic and local levels (Rahmato 2011, Grajales 2015, 
Dell’Angelo et al. 2017).  
This situation has raised increasing global concerns about: the politics of agriculture, the 
environment and access to land; fostering political, academic and practitioner dialogues,2 
debates and disagreements about the implications of land grabbing for food security 
(HLPE 2011); human rights, such as the right to adequate food and housing (UN Special 
Rapporteur on the right to food 2009, FIAN 2010); tenure security (Magigi and Drescher 
                                                 
1 These include the World Bank, FAO, Human Rights Watch, Oxfam, The Oakland Institute, The Forum for Social Science Ethiopia, 
International Land Coalition, Farm Africa, FIAN, and GRAIN, among others. 
2Ife has claimed that discourses of difference, often exacerbated by the social science literature, “emphasise the things that divide us 
and ignore the things that unite us” (Ife 2010, 130). Following on from this, the scholar also argues that Western modernity is 
underpinned by debate instead of dialogue: engaged "with […] deliberative participation and building of a community of rights and 
responsibilities, dialogue is essential” (Ife 2010, 137). 
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2010, O’Brien 2011, Locher et al. 2012); and the environment (Benjaminsen and 
Bryceson 2012, GRAIN 2012, Neville and Dauvergne 2012).  
The figures regarding the amount of land included in land grabbing deals have also been 
contested and the validity of some data has been criticized (Edelman 2013, Oya 2013). 
However, it seems clear and there is an overall consensus that land grabbing is a 
widespread phenomenon across the globe (Holmes 2014, Li 2014a, Grajales 2015, 
Mamonova 2015, Scoones 2018). As Edelman (2013) stated: “[a]n accelerated process of 
dispossession is clearly in motion” (Edelman 2013, 488).  
De Maria (2019) points out the relevance and magnitude of the phenomenon succinctly: 
In the last decade, international investors unexpectedly expressed an interest in land, with its 
demand brusquely rising at an unprecedented pace, especially after the 2008 commodity 
bubble. According to Deininger [7, in De Maria 2019], in 2009 alone, the demand for land 
targeting Sub-Saharan Africa, which was fed by a strong large scale acquisitions-component, 
equaled 20 times its historical average. To get a sense of the global magnitude of this 
phenomenon, the Land Matrix [8, in De Maria 2019], which is widely recognized as the most 
comprehensive and up-to-date database on large-scale land transactions, collects information 
on over 2800 deals since the beginning of the new millennium, corresponding in aggregate to 
just above 100 million hectares (ha) of land (De Maria 2019, 2 emphasis added) 
Based on this phenomenon, this research aims to investigate the impact of land grabbing 
on rural villagers in Tanzania. Land grabbing has fostered a debate about land tenure 
systems (Smalley and Corbera 2012, Lawry et al. 2017). On the one hand, the property 
rights school has long been claiming that formalisation of land titles increases tenure 
security, and therefore promotes foreign investment and economic growth. On the other 
hand, competing narratives argue that land reforms and individualisation of land rights in 
developing countries trigger damage to communities’ rights and increase tensions 
between the state and its population, especially in those societies where land access is a 
highly valuable asset for livelihoods. For instance, in 2000, small farmers occupied large-
scale farms in Zimbabwe, and, in just two months, “a third of the country’s large-scale 
commercial farms had been seized” (The New York Times, in Berry 2002). 
This grievance regarding their rights has led communities to mobilise to contest the 
current wave of land grabbing using a different array of strategies (Vom Hau and Wilde 
2010, Sikor 2012, Borras Jr. and Franco 2013, Mamonova 2015, Kandel 2016). Such 
mobilisations have informed advocacy groups and NGOs, which in its turn have informed 
local struggles. This work aims to bring into focus the visions and influence of those more 
14 
 
marginalized and excluded in the evolution of development projects, institutions, and 
laws.  
1.2. International drivers for the new interest in agriculture after the Global Food 
Crisis 
The global land grab, land rush or land grabbing is a concept that scholars understand as 
“large-scale acquisitions of land or land-related rights and resources by corporate 
(business, non-profit or public) entities” (White et al. 2012, 619), mainly in developing 
countries. This phenomenon or concept is not new3 (e.g. Berry 2002); however, it has 
been fuelled by the global context and its challenges. As Cotula (2012) states: “private 
sector expectations of higher agricultural commodity prices and government concerns 
about longer-term food and energy security underpin much recent land acquisition for 
agricultural investments” (p. 649). 
It is considered that three main drivers have fuelled the interest in farmland: how to feed 
an increasingly wealthier and more populated world (Thurow 2010, Planeta en venta 
2010, Agarwal 2014); carbon fuel depletion and its substitution by agrifuels and global 
warming (Eeden and Koppen 2016, Thurlow et al. 2016); and financial speculation 
regarding agricultural and land markets (McMichael 2012, 2013, McDonald and Freitas 
2018). 
1.1.1.1. Rise in food prices 
The consequences of these drivers include increased international food prices during the 
Global Food Crisis in 2007-2008, while dry countries such as areas in the Horn of Africa 
and the Sahel suffered rain shortfall during the planting season between the years 2005-
2006, which led to food shortages (UNDP 2012). Increasing global warming in arid zones 
of the globe puts pressure on the available fertile land. This has triggered a renovated 
Malthusian concern informed by demographic pressures, climate change and biodiversity 
erosion (FAO 2011, 2012). There is an increasing worry about food availability to feed 
an increasingly wealthier and growing world population (Thurow 2010, Agarwal 2014). 
The world’s population growth and the improved mean income of Asian countries have 
also been boosting global food demand and, as a consequence, food prices have increased. 
This expansion of food needs and shifting dietary patterns –e.g. consuming more meat as 
developing countries’ incomes rise- has also increased pressure on farmland around the 
                                                 
3 For instance, in her analysis of land accumulation in the Sub-Saharan continent, Berry states that: “officials and politicians are 
complicit in land grabbing by the rich and influential” (Berry, 2002:662). 
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globe. As Thurow (2010, 102–3) states: “With the world’s population is expected to 
expand to more than nine billion by 2050 and much of that growth occurring in China, 
India, and other countries where living standards are rising fast, global food production 
will need to increase by 70-100 percent in order to keep pace and feed the already 
chronically hungry”. 
One of the consequences of the dramatic increase in food prices during 2007 was the  
stirring up of protests about food prices in many countries, especially in those where food 
is highly subsidised by the state, such as many North African and Middle East countries. 
The increase in prices and the incapacity of the governments to cope with it was one of 
the issues that led to the so-called Arab Spring, together with the suicide of two young 
men (Moreno 2011).  
After the Global Food Crisis many Gulf countries started to increase their foreign 
investment in Agriculture in ‘fraternal countries’. Saudi Arabia, which has tried to 
achieve self-sufficiency in food through irrigating the dessert, started to realise that its 
underground water reserves had started to deplete, and launched a process to farm in 
neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia, where, in 2008, it chaired a summit about 
agriculture investment (Planeta en venta 2010). On the other hand, Asian countries such 
as India have reached self-sufficiency in food production due to the Green Revolution. 
Other Asian countries have suffered from shortages due to climate conditions and a 
decrease in their production (Oakland Institute, 2011, Al Jazeera, 2011).  
In 2008, the UN established the United Nations High-Level Task Force on the Global 
Food Security Crisis (HLPE 2011, FAO 2014). The HLTF developed the Comprehensive 
Framework for Action (CFA), the aim of which was to: “address the current threats and 
opportunities resulting from food price rises; create policy changes to avoid future food 
crises, and contribute to country, regional and global food and nutritional security” 
(UNCTAD 2009, xxxi). 
Thus, the increase in food prices led to the Global Food Crisis, and to an increasing 
concern about food security. Some scholars and practitioners, however, have pointed out 
that such a phenomenon has been exacerbated by two other drivers that have pushed FDI 
in agriculture: the increasing depletion of fossil oil reserves and investment revenues in 
food stock markets. (The Oakland Institute 2011a, Cotula 2012, McMichael 2012). 
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1.1.1.2. The role of agrifuels  
The international community's commitment to cut down CO2 emissions has also had an 
impact on food prices, especially for crops that are agrifuel inputs (The Oakland Institute 
2011a) such as jatropha and sugarcane. 
As a consequence of fossil fuel depletion, and to avoid dependence on oil prices and 
producers, the international community has increased its commitment to renewable 
energies. For instance, the EU has set the target that 20% of its energy consumption 
should come from renewable sources by 2020, and that for each of its state members this 
figure should be 10% at least; this will be fulfilled, in part, by biofuel production (The 
Oakland Institute 2011b). Land is paramount for the production of this kind of energy 
(Awudu and Zhang 2012, 1366). 
It has also been argued that agrifuels are an opportunity for economic development in 
impoverished areas that are mainly rural, but in many cases the urgent need for land for 
this industry has resulted in an opaque process of land acquisition and economic 
development policies that exclude those more affected by poverty. This has direct 
implications for the right to adequate food and housing and the development of such 
people, thereby affecting civil and political rights as well. 
Mwakaje (2012) has conducted research on Tanzania’s agrifuel development plans and 
highlights that despite the fact that the country could become one of the main producers 
of this type of energy, the development plans rely on vertical integration industries agreed 
between the government and international agribusiness companies. Deals between these 
two parties avoid the inclusion of the decision making capacity of the locals about their 
future and their land and exclude them from agriculture. Vertical integration does not 
support local farmers or the creation of a value-added industry for agrifuel production in 
African countries, but intends to apply industrial agricultural techniques such as large-
scale mechanised farms, chemical fertilisers and genetically modified seeds. The process 
of vertical integration involves exporting the raw material to be processed in foreign 
countries, which might result in a null or negative impact for rural areas (Mwakaje 2012). 
Similarly, scholars have argued that large-scale development plans create pressures on 
land and smallholders, as mentioned previously.  
The relevance of agriculture production as a growing sector due to food security and 
energy security has led to a rising interest in land acquisition by investment funds 
(Deininger et.al. 2011, in Cotula 2012). Historically, investment in global agribusiness 
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was concentrated in the more profitable upstream and downstream agricultural sectors, 
rather than in the acquisition of land, relying on out-grower schemes and avoiding the 
risks of primary production (Amanor 2012a, Cotula 2012, 661). However, Amanor states 
that the evolution of agribusiness has triggered an interest in land and agriculture through 
“financialisation and hedge fund portfolio investments” (Amanor 2012a, 732). 
 
1.1.1.3. Speculative investments in food and land markets  
Food and land prices are increasing and will continue to increase in the medium and long 
term due to “the growing potential of domestic food and energy markets as a key 
consideration in land-based investments” (Cotula 2012, 664). This phenomenon has 
attracted the attention of financial investors who are seeking increasing returns from land 
and agricultural markets (McDonald and Freitas 2018). Holt-Gimenez (2007, in 
McMichael 2012) states that “venture capital investment in biofuels increase[d] by 800 
percent between 2004-2007” (p.689). 
But the Global Food Crisis is not the only cause of the rising interest in farmland in Africa. 
Increasing stability due to the end of the violent conflicts post-independence has also 
played a major role in such ventures on the continent (Olukoshi 2005, UNDP 2012). The 
fact that the December 2011 edition of The Economist was called Africa Rising (The 
Economist 2011) and the GDP growth figures since 2004 in many African countries, such 
as Ethiopia, Tanzania, Senegal or Ghana among others, are clear examples of the 
changing perception of the continent as being safer for investment than in the past, mainly 
in the primary sector and tourism, including farming, and therefore land (UNDP 2012). 
Furthermore, the land law reforms initiated at the end of the 1990s across the continent 
adapted the legislation to international standards with the aim to promote investment in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Alden Wily 2003a, Pedersen 2012, 2016). 
Finally, it is important to consider that African land is the cheapest in the world (Planeta 
en venta 2010, AlJazeera 2011, Rahmato 2011, Thurlow et al. 2016). In some cases, 
African governments’ need for investment and development can even make it free (Li 
2011, Peters 2013). For instance, the price paid in Ethiopia in 2011 for a hectare of land 
varied from 0.70$ - 7.00$ (Rahmato 2011). This attracted increasing capital to the region, 
despite the institutional risks (Cotula 2012, 667). Global land grabbing is a complex 
phenomenon “that reflect[s] fundamental shifts in economic and geopolitical relations” 
(Cotula 2012, 649), which makes this research project relevant. As Peters puts it: “perhaps 
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more than at any other time since the first colonial occupation of Africa, struggles to 
control land are central to social, political and economic processes” (Peters 2013, 561). 
1.3. Rational for the project 
1.1.1.1.  Land grabbing 
“The transfer of effective control over land is the core problem of land grabbing, where control 
is understood as control over the nature, pace, extent, and direction of surplus production, 
distribution, and disposition (Borras, 2007; Borras and Franco, 2012). Therefore, it imposes 
the necessity to put forward transparent, coherent, and national protective solutions” (Crina and 
Petrescu-Mag 2017, 183).  
As mentioned previously, in 2011 the World Bank released its report Rising Global 
Interest in Farmland (Deininger et al. 2011). The report targeted available land for 
agricultural development in several developing countries, mainly Africa, and stated the 
positive outcomes that this would have for poor communities in such countries (Li 2011); 
it considered land underutilised, idle or vacant. This consideration led to critiques from 
scholars, local and global peasants’ associations and communities, and other resistance 
movements against global agribusiness,4 who understood the phenomenon as a new wave 
of land accumulation by dispossession (e.g. La Via Campesina 2011, The Oakland 
Institute 2011b, Amanor 2012a, Borras Jr. and Franco 2012, GRAIN 2012, Berry 2013). 
Reports by Human Rights Watch (2012) and The Oakland Institute (2011c, 2011a, 2011b) 
and scholars such as Cotula (2011), Hall et al. (2015) and Pedersen (2016) provide 
empirical evidence of the phenomenon and its consequences for local people. Cotula 
(2011) assessed twelve of the contracts of land deals in Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique and Sudan. The case of Madagascar, for instance, 
involved the South Korean company Daewoo Ltd. and the Malagasy government who 
signed a deal in 2009. The parties agreed to the leasing of 1.3 million hectares of arable 
land in the island-country, which equates to about half of its fertile land (Christoff 2011). 
The magnitude of this deal led to massive demonstrations and the rejection of the contract 
by citizens, who were able to overturn the government for this reason.  
In Ethiopia, on the other hand, one of the poorest and hungriest countries in the world, 
Indian and Saudi Arabian countries, among others, have agreed on large-scale agricultural 
developments with the government, (The Oakland Institute 2011a, Human Rights Watch 
                                                 
4 Agribusiness refers to “global agri-food chains” that technically develop “large-scale estates to gain increasing foothold through 
technically advanced production [high levels of mechanization, chemical fertilizers and GMO seeds] and the organization of logistical 
chains [vertical or horizontal integration] and economies of scale” (Amanor 2012a) 
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2012). 45% of the land in Ethiopia is arable land, and the government states that only 
12% of it is being harvested. Despite the fact that it is a weak country and unable to 
produce enough food, Indian companies such as Karuturi Global see Ethiopian land as 
very fertile and suitable for profits (Planeta en venta 2010). This company has its biggest 
farm in Ethiopia, accounting for 300,000 ha, which produces rice and palm oil (Rahmato 
2011). “Since 2008 Ethiopia has leased out at least 3.6 million hectares of land nationally 
to foreign and domestic investors, an area the size of the Netherlands. An additional 2.1 
million hectares of land is available through the federal government’s land bank for 
agricultural investment” (Human Rights Watch 2012).   
Land grabbing has also triggered violence against staff of the new agribusiness 
companies. For instance, in Senegal a “young man attacked a plantation worker with a 
sword; a local council meeting descended into violence, buildings were burned and two 
people died as villagers fought each other with sticks and machetes” (Wild 2011). In 
Ethiopia, at least ten people were killed in an attack on a new agribusiness farm 
(Ethiopiamedia 2012), a fact that was announced by those who had been evicted from 
their land (Planeta en venta 2010). Others have taken formal action, such as entering 
court pleas or sending letters to their local governments (Rahmato 2011). 
One of the features of the wave of land concentration has been the opacity of the land 
deals (Cotula 2011). This has led to misunderstandings in regard to the figures related to 
land dealings that were -and still are being transacted, and has even led to some scholars 
criticising the lack of rigour when assessing the phenomenon (e.g.: Edelman, 2013; Oya, 
2013). Public databases such as farmland.org by GRAIN or the Land Matrix of the 
International Land Coalition have provided information about land transactions that in 
some cases has not been real (Oya 2013). For this reason, it is necessary to be cautious 
about the phenomenon and the related figures, although the phenomenon has been widely 
accepted (Peluso and Lund 2011, Eeden and Koppen 2016, Dell’Angelo et al. 2017, 
McDonald and Freitas 2018). 
As Peters (2013) points out, the new land deals are considered by some as an “agriculture 
investment” and by others as a “land grab”. The first group consider these new 
investments in agriculture as an opportunity for growth and development in Africa (World 
Bank 2008, UNDP 2012). Others are less positive about the consequences of such a 
phenomenon. For advocates of land accumulation into big farms the positive outcome is 
the development and modernisation of agriculture, the integration of the locals in a more 
profitable activity, through jobs or out-grower schemes, the development of 
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infrastructure, and the provision of social services such as education and healthcare. The 
above-mentioned WB report states that through large-scale farming poverty can be 
overcome “through three main mechanisms: the generation of employment for waged 
workers, new opportunities for contract farmers, and payments for the lease or purchase 
of land” (Li 2011, 581). 
Conversely, it has also been argued that poverty alleviation is not evidenced with large-
scale farming, although it is one of the rationales for land grabbing by foreign actors 
(Bernstein 2010, Li 2011, Amanor 2012a, Hall et al. 2015). What is more, promises about 
job creation and service provision are not fulfilled according to the contracts (Peters 
2013). And furthermore, the high level of mechanisation and production for export does 
not seem to be able to sustain a high level of job creation in rural economies (Mwakaje 
2012).  
One of the consequences of land grabbing is dispossession and the eviction of 
impoverished peoples from their land. As Peters states: “holders of land under customary 
tenure face increasing threat”, which “has direct consequences for competition over 
authority at all levels of society, and for competing definitions of property, ownership and 
citizenship” (2013, 544).  
Dispossession and the accumulation of land also lead to inequalities in the distribution of 
resources, subject formation and changes in identity and politics. (Salemink and 
Rasmussen 2016). Due to the centrality of land in sub-Saharan countries, which is a 
valuable resource in itself, land grabbing “will inevitably stir up land related grievances” 
(Ho and Spoor 2006, 585). What is more, in Africa the “land question” has shaped and 
reshaped power structures, is central to politics (Berry 2002), and increases social, 
political and economic tensions (Olukoshi 2005, Vergara-Camus 2012, Peters 2013).  
Through institutions such as the WB or the WTO, policymakers, amongst other things,5 
advocate the promotion of transnational agribusiness and the transformation of customary 
property regimes to more secure ones that enable the well-functioning of the market (Ho 
and Spoor 2006). In the next section these three drivers are pinpointed. 
However, many debates have arisen around land and agriculture development in Africa. 
One of the main debates relates to titling and ‘formal’ tenure rights, and their role in 
attempts to ensure foreign investment and development. In several countries, processes 
                                                 
5 Since the 1990s there has been a shift towards small-scale farming and the support of communities (Daley and Hobley 2005) 
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of formalisation and registration of land in cadastres - either local or central - have been 
established (Ho and Spoor 2006, Parsa et al. 2011, Boone 2017).  
For example, in Ghana, the World Bank worked on a project that included titling and 
large-scale oil palm farming. The project was sold to a company owned by the state and 
private investors. Despite the increase in yields, the consequence for rural people was 
displacement, land scarcity, conflict between owners and non-owners, and the emergence 
of a marginalised sub-class. Many young people abandoned the land after the titling 
because the ‘traditional’ acquisition institutions were eroded. Usually, after such 
processes the technical interventions required and the actual prices for them mean that 
they end up being controlled by economic and powerful interests (Amanor 2005, 2012b). 
From a point of view such as that explained in regard to Ghana above, private property, 
market-based acquisitions and large-scale farming promote investment and bring 
development to Africa (De Soto, in Wiggins 2005); others argue that private property and 
formal titling hamper African development; and what is more, they argue that changing 
the ‘traditional’ organisation of land tenure brings inequality and social and political 
conflict (Olukoshi 2005, Wiggins 2005, Nyamu-Musembi 2006, Amanor 2012b). The 
‘land question’ (a la Berry) in Africa has implications for politics, the economy, culture 
and society, and today’s land grabbing is “intensifying struggles among actors within and 
from outside Africa” (Peters 2013, 544). 
When large-scale land deals are associated with the concept of “land grabbing” there is a 
sense of controversy surrounding the discussion. This is due to the implications of land 
grabbing, which include the eviction and displacement of people living on the land and 
high political contestation (Boamah 2013, Borras Jr. and Franco 2013). On the other hand, 
when the phenomenon has been considered an “agricultural investment” this is related to 
an opportunity for host states and their populations (Li 2011, Boamah 2013). Considering 
these two views as extreme poles in an amalgam of possible realities, this work considers 
the land deals today as “landgrabbing” due to the power that the concept has to “raise 
public awareness and to engage in critical debate” (Borras Jr. and Franco 2013, 1724). 
One possible definition of the concept of landgrabbing is: “the explosion of 
(trans)national commercial land transactions (and land speculation) that has been 
occurring in recent years around the large-scale production, sale and export of food and 
biofuels” (Borras Jr. and Franco 2010, 2). This definition links the current wave of land 
deals with international agribusiness capital. Rahmato (2011) uses the concept of the 
22 
 
“global land grab”, meaning “the rush for commercial land in Africa and elsewhere by 
private and sovereign investors for the production and export of food crops as well as 
biofuels, in which the land deals involved stand to benefit the investors at the expense of 
host countries and their populations” (2011, 2).Yet, in Amanor’s (2012) view, this 
definition locates the phenomenon as an exogenous development. This scholar, on the 
other hand, focuses his analysis on the land grabbing question as a form of historical 
evolution of agribusiness, looking for new frontiers of expansion (Amanor 2012a, 732). 
Rahmato (2011) has argued that landgrabbing benefits “the investors at the expense of 
host countries and their populations” (2011, 2). In his view, the phenomenon has 
consequences for social polarisation and differentiation. He highlights that with the 
current phenomenon of land deals “what is being transferred are rights belonging to 
individuals and communities” (2011, 4), which are being grabbed by private investors. 
So far, the features of this process have been pinpointed; the following section aims to 
tackle the role of different actors in the land rush issue that “links sovereign states, global 




This section highlights the nature of the actors involved in, and motivations for land 
grabbing or land accumulation nowadays. Actors are relevant here because this research 
will focus on their perceptions and interests as a way of explaining negotiation, 
contestation and/or compliance to the new land transitions (Teklemariam et al. 2015, 
Crina and Petrescu-Mag 2017, Indrajit 2019). Actors can be identified as being in the top 
or at the bottom. . Crina and Petrescu-Mag set their research in the bottom-up negotiation.  
Three main actors have been be highlighted as having a role in the land grabbing scenario: 
the host state, investors (foreigners or nationals) and the population, which here is 
conceptualized as local communities: they are spatially situated where land grabbing is 
taking place and are farmers, herders, land owners and users, and “membership to this 
community is determined by the identities and subject positions that are constituted 
through relationships on and with the land (Crina and Petrescu-Mag 2017, 181). The local 
community is an heterogeneous group with different interests and objectives (Li 1996, 
Borras Jr. and Franco 2013, Sud 2014a). 
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However, it is useful also to assess what land grabbing literature has portrayed as actors 
in the land grabbing phenomenon. Investors are foreigners they have been considred 
“emergent” or “traditional”. “Emergent” investors refer to recently developed countries 
such as the Gulf countries, China, India and South Africa. “Traditional” investors refer to 
countries with a long tradition of agricultural development in Africa, that is to say 
Western or donor countries. Investors can also be grouped in terms of region: intra-region 
(South Africa being the most relevant) or inter-region (with Western countries leading 
the biofuel sector) (Planeta en venta 2010, Cotula 2012). 
Furthermore, two other actors are also relevant, as they influence the context for struggles 
over land grabbing: international institutions (e.g.: WB, FAO) and activistsnational 
advocacy against land grabbing (e.g.: La Via Campesina, GRAIN, FIAN). This taxonomy 
is relevant for the purpose of this work, as it aims to use a “from below” theoretical 
framework. 
The host state 
National states in Africa have a major role in the allocation of land and in enhancing land 
deals. What is more, African states act as one of the parties in land deals and as a guarantor 
of the deal in front of any local upheaval against agribusiness companies (Planeta en 
venta 2010).  
Much of the land in Africa is currently owned by the state, with a few exceptions. In 
Ethiopia the constitution states that the land belongs to the state. This is also the case in 
Mozambique, Mali, Senegal and Tanzania, among others. Traditional rights over land are 
protected by law, although such protection “is weakened by productive use 
requirements…; by wide state powers of eminent domain…; by weak compensation 
requirements…; and by absent or inadequate local consultation requirements” (Cotula 
2012, 670). 
On the other hand, in countries such as Ghana, the land belongs to the community chiefs 
(Cotula et al. 2009, 78). However, in many cases “African states claim ultimate ownership 
of land, even though in most countries rural land has continued to be managed under 
various forms of customary tenure” (Peters 2013, 559).  
The state plans are based on the rationale of  “development and public interests” (Peters 
2013, 557). They create the proper institutional environment to facilitate agricultural 
investment through “revising investment legislation to increase incentives for foreign 
investment…; reforming land legislation to facilitate foreign investors’ access to land; 
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and more generally, macro-economic measures to remove policy distortions penalising 
agriculture” (Cotula 2012, 669).   In countries such as Tanzania, Mozambique and 
Ethiopia the state has even reserved land for allocation to agribusiness (Cotula 2012, 669).  
Investors 
There are two kinds of investors: those interested in agribusiness and its increasing profits 
due to food and energy security; and those interested in acquiring land and waiting for its 
price to rise in the future. But it is also possible to make a distinction based on investors’ 
nationality.  
The land rush is a global phenomenon. It does not involve particular countries. Its main 
features are the expansion of agribusiness in developing countries, and the accumulation 
of land and its implications for customary or traditional forms of tenure. The focus, 
however, has been put on the international profile of investors, especially those from the 
Gulf countries, Asia and traditional donor countries (Western or OECD countries). 
Conversely, scholars have pointed out the relevance of national elites and governments 
in the accumulation of national land (Cotula 2012, Peters 2013). As Peters states: 
“national agents, whether governments, political authorities or private actors, are as 
central as foreigners in current land deals” (Peters 2013, 544). In Ethiopia, 60% of the 
deals have been carried out by national agents; the figure reaches 97% in Nigeria, 78% 
Sudan, 53% Mozambique and 61% in Senegal. These figures are up to 95% in the case 
of Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger, countries that have attracted less media attention 
(different sources, in Cotula 2012, 656). However, deals with national investors often 
involve smaller plots of land than those with foreigners (Rahmato 2011, Cotula 2012). 
In terms of foreign investment, two categories are at stake, as pointed out at the beginning 
of this section. “Emergent” countries such as the BRICS or the Gulf countries have 
attracted much attention, especially China and the Gulf Countries. However, it has been 
argued that China’s interest in Africa has more to do with fossil fuels and mining than 
agriculture. Also, China is more active in land grabbing within neighbouring countries 
(e.g. Lao PDR and Cambodia) (Cotula 2012).  
The relevance of South Africa as a key player in land grabbing in Africa has also been 
pointed out, which highlights the relevance of intra-regional foreign investments in 
agriculture (Cotula 2012): “AgriSA, a body representing commercial South African 
farmers, is reported to have acquired 200,000ha of land in the Republic of Congo, and to 
be negotiating with several other African governments” (Cotula 2012, 657).  
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Inter-regional investments by Gulf countries are very relevant in Sudan, and also in 
Ethiopia, where India is also a major player. The motivation of Gulf country investors 
tends to be food security, rather than biofuel production. When it comes to biofuel 
production, Western or “traditional” investors in Africa are key. The EU, alongside the 
US, have a commitment to replace this fuel energy and in the case of the EU this 
replacement should reach the 20% margin by 2015 (The Oakland Institute 2011b). For 
instance, the US company Agrisol has a project involving 325,000ha of land in Tanzania, 
and Norway Green Sources accounts for another 100,000ha (Cotula et al. 2009). The 
same Norwegian company has another two projects in Mozambique involving 135,900ha 
and 125,000ha of land. Also in Mozambique, the Malonda Foundation from Sweden has 
acquired 285,591ha for biofuel production (The Oakland Institute 2011c). Western hedge 
funds also have the most salient role investing in farmland due to the evolution of land 
prices (OCDE, 2010, in Cotula 2012) 
The scale of foreign investment is always bigger than national investment, as previously 
stated. However, the boundaries between national and foreign investors are often blurred. 
There is a high level of mergers and acquisitions in Africa today, and a “record level of 
cross-border M&As6” (UNCTAD 2009, 42, emphasis added): “the acquiring companies 
may be headquartered in a country, but the capital is mainly sourced from other countries” 
(Cotula 2012, 659). Overall, the location of investors and their interests are “distributed 
unevenly” and the same logic of the globalisation of the economy and capital expansion 
makes it difficult to establish clear boundaries in regard to the nationalities of investors 
and their interests. As Amanor states, “[l]iberalisation policies have facilitated the 
globalisation of agribusiness” (2012a, 732). 
Finally, it is also relevant to note that despite the consideration of investors’ nationalities, 
investment in agriculture nowadays is mostly done by private companies; yet, the “home 
country governments of investors can play a supportive role in private sector-led 
initiatives, providing diplomatic, financial and other support to private deals” (Cotula 
2012, 660).  
The quintessential case of governments supporting the private sector is China and its 
‘going global’ policy. In many cases the Chinese government owns the companies, 
whereas in others it facilitates the path for corporations: there is “significant state 
influence over strategic private firms…[which] benefit from access to special credit lines, 
                                                 
6 Mergers and acquisitions 
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tax breaks, and possibly favourable interpretation of regulations and priority in allocation 
of key contracts” (Cotula 2012, 661). 
As highlighted in this section, the nationalities of investors oscillate between nationals, 
emerging foreigners and Western or traditional foreigners in Africa; but nationalities are 
also difficult to identify due the logic of economic globalisation. The interests of investors 
also oscillate between the drivers pinpointed in the previous section: emergent investors 
have a major role in food security enterprises, whereas Western foreigners are more 
relevant to biofuel projects. At any rate, large-scale agribusiness seems to be more 
common among foreigners than nationals; yet, nationals also have a very important role 
in the accumulation of land. As illustrated, the land grabbing phenomenon or the “rising 
interest in farmland” is threatening the livelihoods of already vulnerable and 
impoverished people (Amanor 2012a, Cotula 2012, Peters 2013). As Amanor (2012a, 
731) points out that land concentration “creates pressures on smallholders that ultimately 
result in dispossession”.  
Rural Villagers 
In a few cases deals have been established between communities and private investors, 
but this is a rarity. For instance, in Madagascar in 2005 and 2006, some modifications to 
the law led to the abolition of the presumption that all uncertified land belonged to the 
state. This preceded the signing of a contract between private investors and community 
leaders (Cotula 2011). On the contrary, in Ethiopia, the land belongs to the state and the 
deals are displacing people from their original land, a phenomenon fostered by the state 
due to “development” plans (The Oakland Institute 2011a, Human Rights Watch 2012)  
In cases where communities have more decision capacity and are able to negotiate the 
deal, research demonstrates that the agreements are more balanced and include more 
compensation for the land (Cotula 2011). However, the level of community involvement 
and decision making capacity is actually very low. In many instances, consultation 
processes are a formal requisite rather than actually involving the community in the 
definition of their needs and ownership of the projects’ conditions. In many other cases, 
the commitments made by companies, such as compensation or job promises, are rarely 
fulfilled (Peters 2004, Cotula 2011, The Oakland Institute 2011a, Amanor 2012a). 
Nevertheless, the most relevant role of communities in the land grabbing scenario is its 
role in contesting land deals. As Smalley and Corbera (2012) point out, communities are 
able to reject projects that do not suit them. Access to land is highly relevant in agrarian 
27 
 
societies (Berry 2002, Peters 2004, 2013). It is a highly valued asset for livelihoods and 
resilience in difficult environments that are economically and environmentally 
constrained (World Resources Institute (WRI) in collaboration with UNEP, UNDP and 
World Bank, 2008). Despite the increasing tendency towards urban migration (UNDP 
2012, 58), Sub-Saharan Africa remains a region of the world with a large population that 
are active in agriculture: 66% in 2011; achieving levels of 92% in countries such as 
Burkina Faso, and 89% in Burundi and Rwanda (UNDP 2012, 66). Within the continent, 
East Africa is at the top, with 76.5% of its population being active in agriculture; whereas 
in developed countries the level was 4% in 2007 (UNCTAD 2009, 101). In the lower 
reaches of agricultural activity, there is South Africa accounting for 6%, and Nigeria, 
accounting for 24%.  
As stated in regard to the rationale for this project, communities are contesting land grabs 
in formal and informal ways. Their aim is to protect their access to land through different 
strategies. Dahl points out that citizens “use their potential political resources to the 
full...by using normally unused reserves of political power and influence- whenever their 
vital interests are directly threatened” (Dahl, in Hirschman 1970, 32).  
It has been argued that the bargaining power of communities in cases of land grabbing is 
weak (De Schutter 2011, Amanor 2012a). Conversely, in this work, much attention will 
be paid to the formal and informal strategies that communities develop, on their own or 
with others, to protect their rights.  
Global institutions 
Struggles over resources have become globalised (Newell and Wheeler 2006). For the 
purpose of this work, international organisations such as the World Bank and the FAO, 
and their institutions in the form of “codes of conduct” or “voluntary guidelines” are 
relevant. These institutions are actors “from above” in the global agenda. They support 
“[c]orporations, markets, investors and elites” (Brecher et al. 2000, 1) accelerating their 
power, and promoting policies that will benefit them (mainly through the so-called 
Washington Consensus) (Brecher et al. 2000).  
Linked with land grabs and their impacts, the World Bank and the FAO have launched 
the Principles of Responsible Agriculture Investment (PRAI), widely known as the RAI 
Principles by the World Bank, in co-operation with other UN agencies (FAO et al. 2010); 
the FAO has also developed the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of 
Tenure of Land , Fisheries and Forests, known as the Voluntary Guidelines (FAO 2012); 
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and the less-cited Large-scale land acquisitions and leases: A set of minimum principles 
and measures to address the human rights challenge (Minimum Principles), by the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the right to food (2009). 
The PRAI principles were first disclosed in 2010 at a summit in Seoul at which the G20 
presented a multi-year plan for development. The G20 encouraged the implementation of 
the Principles for Agricultural Investment developed by the UNCTAD, FAO, IFAD and 
World Bank. The principles encountered strong opposition by representatives of the civil 
society. Despite this, the G20 ratified those principles at the following summits in 2011 
and 2012 (UNCTAD 2012). 
 The PRAI were regarded by the former UN Human Rights Rapporteur on the right to 
food Olivier de Schutter as responsible for “‘destroying the world’s peasantry’ (UNHRC 
2010), and [starting] a civil society-led attempt to construct more democratic Voluntary 
Guidelines through the FAO and its Committee on Food Security” (McMichael 2012, 
687). The Committee on World Food Security started a four year process to approve the 
principles in a session that was attended by delegates from 111 Members of the 
Committee, 10 non-Member States of the Committee and representatives from: 10 United 
Nations agencies and bodies (e.g. HLPE on the global food crisis, International Atomic 
Agency, ILO, OHCHR, WFP, WHO among others); 2 International agricultural research 
organisations (Biodiversity International and Transnational Institute); 1 International 
financial institution (WB); 81 Civil society organisations (e.g. Action Aid International, 
Action Against Hunger, Concern Worldwide, FIAN, International Save the Children, 
Medecins Sans Frontieres, Oxfam International, Soroptimist International, Via 
Campesina among others); 73 private sector associations and private philanthropic 
foundations (e.g. Rotary International); and 42 observers (e.g. International Red Cross 
and EESC, among others). The process was concluded in 2014 (FAO 2014) and the 
principles were as shown in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: PRAI vs CFS principles 
PRAI Principles (UNCTAD 2012) CFS Principles (CFS 2014) 
Principle 1: Existing rights to land and 
associated natural resources are 
recognised and respected. 
Principle 2: Investments do not jeopardise 
food security but rather strengthen it. 
Principle 1: Contribute to food security 
and nutrition 
Principle 2: Contribute to sustainable and 
inclusive economic development and the 
eradication of poverty 
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Principle 3: Processes relating to 
investment in agriculture are transparent, 
monitored, and ensure accountability by 
all stakeholders, within a proper business, 
legal, and regulatory environment. 
Principle 4: All those materially affected 
are consulted, and agreements from 
consultations are recorded and enforced. 
Principle 5: Investors ensure that projects 
respect the rule of law, reflect industry 
best practice, are viable economically, and 
result in durable shared value. 
Principle 6: Investments generate 
desirable social and distributional impacts 
and do not increase vulnerability. 
Principle 7: Environmental impacts of a 
project are quantified and measures taken 
to encourage sustainable resource use, 
while minimising the risk/magnitude of 
negative impacts and mitigating them. 
 
Principle 3: Foster gender equality and 
women’s empowerment 
Principle 4: Engage and empower youth 
Principle 5: Respect tenure of land, 
fisheries, and forests, and access to water 
Principle 6: Conserve and sustainably 
manage natural resources, increase 
resilience, and reduce disaster risks 
Principle 7: Respect cultural heritage and 
traditional knowledge, and support 
diversity and innovation  
Principle 8: Promote safe and healthy 
agriculture and food systems  
Principle 9: Incorporate inclusive and 
transparent governance structures, 
processes, and grievance mechanisms 
Principle 10: Assess and address impacts 
and promote accountability 
 
NGOs 
Resistant and mobilising actions have arisen in opposition to the global land grabbing 
phenomenon, as can be concluded from the contestation to the PRAI principles. Many of 
these actions have been pursued for communities as political actors at the local level, but 
many non-state actors have also acted at the local and global level as a ‘resistant force’. 
These actors are “people at the grassroots around the world [that] link up to impose their 
own needs and interest” (Brecher et al. 2000, 1). Those actors are also known as 
transnational networks (Goodale 2007), or counter-hegemonic movements (Santos and 
Rodríguez-Gravito 2005). It is difficult to situate them in a specific location, but they 
influence local and global spaces.  
Relevant actors in the struggles over land grabs are: The Oakland Institute, which has 
supported mobilisations, held meetings between community representatives and raised 
30 
 
awareness with different reports and protests; FIAN, which created a report for contesting 
land grabs through international human rights legislation; Intermon Oxfam, which has 
performed different global campaigns to increase awareness of this issue and also 
published several reports; GRAIN, which has also published several reports about land 
grabbing and has contributed to the creation of a database containing information on land 
deals and a website that collects media, academic and NGO reports on the subject;7 and 
La Via Campesina, a peasants’ organisation, which is the leading force in the food 
sovereignty propositions, and has also been working as one of the principal actors in the 
contestation of landgrabbing.  
In any case, paraphrasing Crina and Petrescu-Mag (2017), land grabbing usually brings 
along clashes between different actors’ interests, farmers and buyers, “generated by the 
loss of rights or access to land and to its associated services (e.g., environmental services 
and physical access to places) (…) It is necessary to understand the interests and the 
powerful interest of a wider range of stakeholders (e.g., farmers, land owners, academia, 
and public authorities)” (Crina and Petrescu-Mag 2017, 183) 
1.4. Research questions 
Land grabbing has had an impact on the rights of rural villagers. It has also been part of 
a wider process of “re-shuffling” land and other resources through accumulation and 
dispossession by different actors (Peluso and Lund 2011, Baglioni and Gibbon 2013). 
Marxist concepts such as “primitive accumulation” or “common enclosures” are 
commonplace in the literature (Salemink and Rasmussen 2016). Scholars have also called 
for increased attention and research on land grabs to increase our understanding of the 
phenomenon (Borras Jr. and Franco 2012) and its meaning for how different uses of land 
are managed and negotiated (e.g. De Maria 2019). 
Despite research efforts on the subject, less attention has been paid to the role of 
communities and their responses to land grabbing, while the focus has been placed on the 
issues explored in this introduction, such as international drivers and international foreign 
investors. Some exceptions to this can be found such as the work of Baglioni and Gibbon 
(2013), Borras and Franco (2013) or Kandel (2015). Those authors focus their attention 
at the local level and on the different dynamics between large-scale investments, 
communities and the role of national elites.  
                                                 
7 See farmlandgrab.org 
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This research aims to answer the question: How are understandings of land changing in 
the context of land grabbing in Tanzania?  At the same time, it will aim to answer the 
sub-questions: 
 What are the various processes through which land grabbing occurs? 
 Are land grabbing processes always large-scale accumulation processes? 
 What are the ways in which people negotiate the acts of land grabbing? 
 What are processes of formalisation of land that accompany the land grabbing 
processes? 
 What are the changing understandings and new dimensions of land? 
The link between the concepts “global” and “local” aims to highlight the interdependence 
between micro and macro processes, which has traditionally been the discipline of 
international relationship scholars. The concept of “global” differs from “international” 
in the sense that international adheres to the relationship between states and governments, 
while global encompasses a more extended set of actors that interact between borders, 
including states and their governments, transnational corporations, civil society 
organisations, religious groups and individuals. The concept of “global” highlights 
complex spatial relationships between governance and outcomes. This complexity makes 
it difficult to observe the relationships that the global and the local have. In the context of 
landgrabbing, this research has identified some spaces at the local, regional and 
international levels that have had an impact on understandings of land rights and their 
governance. 
1.5. Thesis outline 
The thesis consists of three parts: a general introduction, including a review of the relevant 
literature and methodology; three empirical chapters; and a concluding part, including a 
discussion chapter.  
Chapter 2 provides a systematic analysis of land rights and land reforms in the context of 
international development, with a particular focus on African development. In addition, 
it examines the relevance of land rights after the wave of land grabs in the view of the 
HPLE. Chapter 3 focuses on the concept of land grabbing as portrayed by the literature 
that emerged after the Global Financial Crisis in 2007-2008, and the reaction of grassroots 
actors. Chapter 4 introduces the data collection methods and analysis, describes the 
fieldwork sites and justifies the selection of Tanzania as a land grabbing scenario. Chapter 
5 is the first of the empirical chapters and focuses on the dynamics of the actors involved 
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in the context of land grabbing in the sites explored during the fieldwork, with a focus on 
the denial of rights that rural villagers experienced. Chapter 6 presents the findings in 
regard to land grabbing conflicts and phenomena found during the fieldwork in the four 
villages studied. Chapter 7 documents the results regarding the formalisation of land 
rights as experienced by rural villagers. Finally, Chapter 8 discusses the relevance of the 
findings in the light of ongoing debates about the concept of land grabbing, the role of 
NGOs in the land rights scenario and the effects of formalisation. Chapter 8 also presents 




 Land rights in an international development context 
 
Pressures over land due to land grabbing for agriculture production and urban expansion 
have caused the re-birth of historical debates on development (Toulmin 2008, Peters 
2009). This review pays attention to the consequences of large-scale agricultural land 
deals for land rights and land tenure reforms discourses in the development literature and 
for agriculture modernisation debates.  
One of the main consequences of the pressure over land and land grabbing is that it 
interferes with the tenure security of the local population (Toulmin 2008, HLPE 2011). 
In order to address this situation different understandings of land rights and land reforms 
have been proposed by practitioners and scholars. The two first sections of this review 
deal with these vindications whereas the third pinpoints debates over agriculture 
development. This review highlights the resistance role and influence that those more 
marginalised and affected by land reforms have in order to improve their tenure security 
and their governance of the land. Finally, the review concludes in the fourth section. 
 
2.1 Meanings of land rights 
The phenomenon of landgrabbing has led to increased discussions about land rights in 
Africa. These discussions have traditionally revolved around what Daley and Hobley 
(2005) have summarised as two contrasting narratives. The first, the “Western-legal 
view”, understands land rights as isolated from political and social relationships and 
refers to individual rights over land as an economic mechanism to enable market 
efficiency and development. The second, the “anthropological view”, stresses “the links 
between land rights, social processes and structures, and political and economic 
organisation” (Daley and Hobley 2005, 3). In the “anthropological view”, land rights are 
embedded in social and political relations, and when modifying such rights power 
structures change, triggering conflict (e.g.: Alden Wily 1988, Berry 2002, Peters 2009). 
1.1.1.1. Western-legal meanings of land rights 
Meanings of land rights as Western-legal understandings draw on Locke’s ideas of 
property (1772), and also on the property rights school (see Gordon 1954, Coase 1960). 
Locke (1772) considered that despite nature and its resources being given to mankind in 
common, “there must be of necessity a means to appropriate them some way or another” 
34 
 
(Locke 1772, 195, emphasis in the original). Locke also considered that the state is the 
enforcement agent in the surveillance of property (Joireman 2011, 4). 
Similarly, the property rights school claims that individual property rights are the most 
efficient8 mechanism to minimise the cost of resource allocation and its exploitation. 
However, such rights require enforcement by state coercion and law (Gordon 1954, Coase 
1960). The school argues that communal rights9 over resources (land) lead to individual 
competition for these resources. This gives way to over-exploitation and resource 
depletion and damages economic performance (Gordon 1954). These impacts can only 
be addressed through making unregulated common property private property or “public 
(government) property, in either case subject to a unified directing power” (Gordon 1954, 
135).   
In this understanding, land rights are “rights to territorial parcels of land, precisely 
measurable and definable, with property rights in general (of which land rights are a 
subset) regarded as being primarily about the possession (or ownership) of physical 
things” (Bohannan 1963:101-3, in Daley and Hobley 2005, 8) . However, as the next 
section aims to explain, property rights over land in different contexts have implications 
for cultural, social and political relations (Daley and Hobley 2005, Cotula 2009, Peters 
2009). 
1.1.1.2. Anthropological meanings of land rights 
Anthropological meanings of land rights express the “relations between people and 
groups…in terms of their mutual rights and obligations with regard to land” (Middleton, 
1988, p.ix, in Daley and Hobley 2005, 8). They are embedded in social, cultural, 
economic and political relations around land rights (Peters 2009). Anthropological 
meanings are based on the contestation of the understanding that individual ownership of 
land and its legal registration and state enforcement (Western meanings of statutory 
rights) is a superior system compared to customary land rights10 (Peters 2009).  
Despite the fact that communal rights over land relate to customary land rights, customary 
land rights can be either individual or communal (Alden Wily 1988, Knight 2010). These 
                                                 
8 The property rights school advocates have a neoliberal political economic understanding of land rights and property. They base their 
theories on economic maximisation and efficiency. Efficiency refers to the minimisation of economic costs given a set of different 
resource allocation possibilities. 
9 Communal land rights “means that there exists a corporate entity (the tribe, the village, the lineage, the extended family) acting as a 
joint ownership unit” (Platteau 1995, 2). This concept and its origins will be explored further in the Anthropological view of land 
rights (section 1.1.2.) 
10 “informal local” land rights (Daley and Hobley 2005) 
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meanings of customary rights over land proceed from the clash of two different 
understandings of land rights in Africa during the colonialist period: that of the coloniser 
(that of Western-legal views) and that of the Africans (Alden Wily 1988, Berry 2002, 
Peters 2009). The colonial powers identified that African land rights were not based on 
the individual property rights tradition of their culture. As Knight (2010, 21) states, 
“[c]olonizers argued that … Africans had no notion of “private property””. Consequently, 
African customary land rights were understood as communal (Alden Wily 1988).  
Another colonial interpretation of African customary land rights was that they were 
considered as inalienable and outside family relations such as inheritance, a view brought 
about from the colonial understanding of customs in Africa (Platteau 1995, Knight 2010, 
21): land was “inalienable from the lineage, could not be bought or sold, but belonged to 
the community as a whole” (Knight 2010, 21 footnote 7).  
Customary land rights are understood, therefore, as non-statutory informal land rights that 
in some cases are communal and not transferrable. Informal land rights stand for “socially 
shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside 
officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky 2006, 5, emphasis on the original). 
In the context of this work, such rules are related to the control, allocation, transfer and 
use of the land.  
Land rights in Africa today are governed “by a complicated combination of national 
statutory law, subsidiary regulations and local by-laws, national policy (which may or 
may not be consistent with the law), and customary land law (which may or may not be 
consistent with state policy)” (Alden Wily 1988, 26).  This complexity makes it difficult 
to talk about only two understandings of land rights, customary and statutory, as there are 
in fact different understandings that can involve communal and statutory rights, or 
individual and customary rights without one having to exclude the other. For instance, in 
Tanzania, communal rights are recognised by statutory and formal law. And those rights 
are transferable by family relations or by the market.  
Furthermore, within this complexity, African states are the dominant agents in controlling 
and allocating land rights, even where customary land rights are supported by the legal 
system, such as in the case of Ghana (Alden Wily 2003a). In Africa today more than 75% 
of the land is managed by customary land rights (Toulmin 2008), and in some countries 
this figure reaches 90% (Knight 2010). Alongside this, in countries such as Ethiopia and 
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Mali, all of the land belongs to the government constitutionally, and communities11 and 
individuals can legitimately use the land through customary land rights that very often 
are also recognised by the law, as in the case of Tanzania, Botswana and Uganda (Alden 
Wily 2003a). As Knight (2010) highlights, customary and statutory land rights (private 
or public –governmental) are usually entangled in systems that “have been inherited, 
observed, transmuted, learned and adopted” (Knight 2010, 4).  
Problems arise when these tangled understandings of land rights overlap and show little 
or no recognition of each other. On the one hand, Western legal views have not rendered 
economic or social validity to customary land rights (Knight 2010, 5). On the other hand, 
the dominant state has overseen customary land rights. When land was unregistered, the 
state considered it to be its property (see Alden Wily 1988, Boone 2007). As Boone states: 
“[i]n most African countries, the state itself became owner of all land not formally 
registered as private property” (Boone 2007, 562).  
This has triggered social and political struggles and has reshaped understandings of land 
rights (Berry 2002). The anthropological meaning of land rights is helpful to investigate 
the changes in a particular context, and the structures and processes of construction that 
determine the distribution of land rights (Daley and Hobley 2005). Land rights are 
understood here as a wider range of rights or a “bundle of rights”12 that “may be formal, 
informal, customary or religious, and can include leasehold, freehold, use rights and 
private ownership” (Knight 2010, 19). 
Referring to land tenure rights in Africa, Knight (2010) defined this “bundle of rights” as 
the “freedom to: occupy, use, develop or enjoy one’s land; bequeath land to heirs or sell 
land; lease or grant land or use rights over that land to others with reasonable guarantees 
of being able to recover the land; restrict others’ access to that land; and use natural 
resources located on that land” (Knight 2010, 19). Rahmato (2011) adds to this definition 
the use and control of the communal land shared by the community and the natural 
resources within the customary legitimate land of a community. 
This communal land has also been dubbed “the commons” and it is an important contested 
issue in the landgrabbing phenomenon today. As Boone (2007) and Alden Wily (2003a) 
stress, in some cases the state has “privatised” this land, making it public land controlled 
                                                 
11 The concept of community is understood here as a heterogeneous group of people living in the same village or town. The concept 
allows for internal social and political differentiation among community members. It avoids the understanding of communities as 
homogeneous groups of people with “very similar (if not identical) interests, identities and aspirations for the future” (Borras Jr. and 
Franco 2013, 1724) 
12 Bundle of rights stands  
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by the government. For instance, in Tanzania, common land that was not considered 
“village land” by the Land Act of 1999 came under the new category of “general land”. 
This tends to be forests and woodlands. These lands have usually been managed by 
customary systems and the lack of markets has caused them to be considered underused 
or idle by African governments (HLPE 2011). This transformation has implications for 
the “bundle of rights” over land that communities and individuals hold, damaging their 
tenure security. Processes of land reforms and tenure security are the topic of the next 
section. 
2.2 Land tenure security and land tenure reforms 
 
2.2.1. Land tenure security and land rights 
Tenure insecurity is defined as the feeling of losing land rights in the future; it is “the 
perception of the likelihood of losing a specific right to cultivate, graze, fallow, transfer 
or mortgage” land (Barrows and Roth in Sjaastad and Bromley 1997, 553). Knight (2010) 
defines the concept of land tenure security as “the degree of confidence that land users 
will not be arbitrarily deprived of the bundle of rights they have over particular lands” 
(Knight 2010, 19). In Knight’s (2010) view, rights are secure when they are both legally 
and socially legitimate. 
The current situation of increased pressure over land due to the expansion of large-scale 
agriculture in Africa, together with the plurality of rights over land and the oversight of 
customary land rights by African governments, makes rural populations’ land rights weak 
or non-existent (HLPE 2011, 39). This has contributed to a wider consensus among 
practitioners, scholars and even local peoples,13 regarding the need to increase land tenure 
security (e.g.: Alden Wily, 2003a; Boone, 2007; Cotula, 2009; De Soto, 2000; HLPE, 
2011; Smalley & Corbera, 2012; Toulmin, 2008; UN Special Rapporteur on the right to 
food, 2009): “[s]ecuring rights is of ever-greater urgency, given the rising demand for 
land” (Toulmin 2008, 10).  
On the other hand, it has been argued that secure land rights promote investment, not only 
by foreign capital but also for rural peasants. When land rights are secure, investors rely 
on gaining profit as a return on their investment in agriculture (Cotula 2009). It has also 
been highlighted that strengthening the land rights of local people protects their 
                                                 
13 Based on their research on land grabs in Kenya, Smalley and Corbera point out that “interview respondents expressed strong demand 
for title deed” (Smalley and Corbera 2012, 1065) 
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livelihoods in the face of elite or foreign investment (Cotula 2009).  In order to increase 
security of tenure, scholarship on land rights in Africa stresses the need for the registration 
of customary land rights and their recognition by statutory law (e.g.: Alden Wily 2003a, 
Knight 2010, De Schutter 2011, HLPE 2011).  
Processes of registration of customary land rights, however, have resulted not only in 
many conflicts and tensions but also in the appropriation of the land by local elites. As 
Amanor (2012a) states: “it allows the dominant political coalitions at the local level to 
redefine customary tenure in line with their narrow group interests and appropriate the 
land of the poor and marginalised” (Amanor 2012a, 735). Furthermore, the 
transformation of customary land rights into formal or statutory rights has been argued to 
favour expropriation, the expansion of agribusiness and the taking of land (Ho and Spoor 
2006, Cotula 2009, Amanor 2012a, Peters 2013). These negative impacts have 
superseded debates about the reform of land tenure systems in Africa.  
2.2.2. Land tenure reforms in Africa 
Land tenure is the “nature of and manner in which rights and interest over various 
categories of land are created or determined, allocated and enjoyed” (African Union Land 
Policy Guidelines, in HLPE 2011, 26). Similarly, Knight defines land tenure as “the way 
land is held or owned by individuals or groups” (2010, 19). Land tenure reform debates 
have revolved around “distinctions between statutory and customary law, formal and 
informal tenure” (Peters 2009, 1317), but also around processes and structures for 
managing land rights. Such processes have also opened up discussions about “state-led 
and community-led reform[s]” (Peters 2009, 1317).  
These processes have been dubbed formalisation. This refers not only to the process of 
the registration of land into formal titles and privatisation, but also, as will be discussed 
below, the strengthening of the formal institutions that are in charge of cadastres, the 
management of land and conflict resolution.  Efforts to transform African customary and 
informal land tenure systems have influenced development projects supported by the 
World Bank and donors,14 especially since the 1980s (Daley and Hobley 2005, Peters 
2009). During these years there has been a shift in development policies due to the 
implementation of the structural adjustment programmes and liberalisation supported by 
the World Bank and the IMF. These programmes are consistent with the idea that private 
                                                 
14 The term ‘donors’ refers to the members of the OCDE and its Development Co-operation Directorate (DAC) that contribute to 
development projects through multilateral or bilateral Official Development Aid (ODA). 
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property (in a Western-legal view) is necessary to provide tenure security, promote 
economic growth and investment and enable the market to function well (Daley and 
Hobley 2005, Ho and Spoor 2006, Peters 2009). As Peters states, the “World Bank’s 
prescription was to replace customary systems … as necessary preconditions for 
modernization and development” (2009, 1318). This was considered to be the hegemonic 
approach to land tenure reforms that built upon Western-legal understandings of land 
rights (Daley and Hobley 2005). 
This hegemonic, “top-down” or “from above” land reform aimed to implement titling 
schemes in developing countries with customary land tenure systems. Titling schemes 
involve the registration of individualised land rights in “the belief that only formal legal 
(and usually freehold) rights are secure enough to build agricultural growth and enable 
poor people to access credit” (Daley and Hobley 2005, 4). Titling aims to provide people 
with individual, formal and statutory private property titles (Ho and Spoor 2006, HLPE 
2011). 
De Soto’s (2000) The Mystery of Capital is a case in point of the justification for land 
tenure reforms promoting titling schemes. His main argument is that customary and 
informal rights are not just a cause of economic underdevelopment; they also oppress 
people and relegate them to the insecurity of extra-legality. In De Soto’s view, private 
property rights are the “key process” that transforms assets into capital and the major 
reason why developing countries have lagged behind in agricultural development. De 
Soto’s understanding of land tenure reforms is supported by the property rights school 
thesis and Western-legal views of land rights. This point of view advocates for a 
straightforward relationship between the formalisation and individualisation of land 
rights, tenure security, access to credit and agricultural development (Ho and Spoor 
2006). 
However, during the 1990s, an increasing number of scholars and organisations, 
including the World Bank itself, conducted research on such relationships, contesting the 
performance of hegemonic land tenure reforms in Africa (Daley and Hobley 2005). 
Drawing on Daley and Hobley (2005, 4) the conclusions of such research, four 
shortcomings of titling schemes can be highlighted: 
 There is little or no evidence that titling schemes provide agricultural development 
and increased productivity. Several studies have demonstrated that titling has little 
or no impact on rural investment and income (Ho and Spoor 2006, 581). 
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 Customary land tenure systems have been considered as flexible and, therefore, 
insecure. However, research has concluded that such systems are also able to 
foster agriculture performance and they are not always perceived as insecure for 
local people (Daley and Hobley 2005). Ho and Spoor (2006) highlight that tenure 
insecurity could be prevented by informal customary systems and not only 
through titling. Also, when customary tenure systems rely on communal property, 
“common property represents private property for the group of co-owners” 
(Broomley, in Ho and Spoor 2006, 581). 
 The cost of registering land as in statutory and centralised land reforms has 
prevented many people and governments from being able to afford land 
registration (Cotula 2009, HLPE 2011). It has been argued that customary systems 
have lower transaction costs and, therefore, are more cost efficient (Ho and Spoor 
2006). The cost of certification has also led to the exclusion of certain groups 
(such as the poor, women and children) and a rise in the number of landless 
people, as well as inequality (Daley and Hobley 2005). 
 Research has concluded that land reforms build on titling schemes to promote the 
commoditisation of land and its accumulation. They enable the formation of 
national and international elites and the ‘savvy’ behaviour of chiefs and local land 
administrators. (Daley and Hobley 2005, Knight 2010). This situation has 
increased tenure insecurity instead of preventing it. Land registration “might 
actually exacerbate (historical) land conflicts and can lead to the domination of 
land resources by the vested elite” (Ho and Spoor 2006, 582). Yet, titling schemes 
can also increase inequality and social differentiation (Peters 2004, Daley and 
Hobley 2005, Amanor 2012a). 
Still, land reforms and registration processes are considered as tantamount to providing 
tenure security to the rural population, as pointed out in the section above.15 The HLPE 
has claimed that the “[r]egistration of land and natural resource rights is critical to 
providing security to rural people, and to enable them to negotiate form a better position 
with both, investors and government” (2011, 28). The HLPE is an important actor in the 
governance of food security and nutrition. The HLPE is in charge of promoting a reform 
of the UN Committee on World Food Security that started in 2009. In 2010, due to public 
                                                 
15 One exception to that claim is the research conducted by Locher, Steimann and Upreti (2012), who have considered that due to the 
legal pluralism operating in land tenure systems in developing countries affected by landgrabbing, a registration process of any kind 




concern that landgrabbing had increased, the CFS requested that the panel “report on land 
tenure and international investment in agriculture” (HLPE 2011, 6). They concluded that 
there was a need for registration, but according  to five “key” elements for this purpose16: 
(i) “recognition by government of local (customary) rights, irrespective of registration”; 
(ii) “low-cost systems for recording rights”; (iii) “devolution of land management 
responsibilities to local government, with accountability mechanisms”; (iv) “local 
consultation requirements…or free prior and informed consent”; and (v) “joint 
management or attribution of rights over common resources” (HLPE 2011, 40).  
These recommendations are in accordance with a shift towards “governance” in 
development in general, and in land reforms in particular.17 The governance paradigm is 
socio-political; it “is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and 
private, manage their common affairs” (Kacowicz 2012). Similarly, the cited CFS reform 
aims to include a “wider group of stakeholders and increase[e] its ability to promote 
policies that reduce food insecurity” (FAO 2014, online). In the context of land, the FAO 
has defined land governance as: 
the rules, processes and structures through which decisions are made about the use of and 
control over land, the manner in which the decisions are implemented and enforced, and the 
way that competing interests in land are managed. It encompasses statutory, customary and 
religious institutions. It includes state structures such as land agencies, courts and ministries 
responsible for land, as well as non-statutory actors such as traditional bodies and informal 
agents. It covers both the legal and policy framework for land as well as traditional and 
informal practices that enjoy social legitimacy (FAO 2009, 1) 
Furthermore, by the late 1990s, due to the shortcomings highlighted above, the World 
Bank and several multilateral agencies had adopted a “community-led” approach or 
“community-driven” development approach (World Bank 2008) to agriculture and land 
tenure reforms (ie: IFPRI 2002, World Bank 2008). Peters has dubbed this a “pro-poor” 
or “human centred” approach to development (Peters 2004, 2009). Yet, some scholars 
have considered this shift ambiguous due to the fact it has the same aim of registration 
and the support of centralised, state-led programmes. The following sections will discuss 
                                                 
16 These recommendations draw upon the Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food 
in the Context of National Food Security, which highlights that securing access to natural resources is tantamount to the realization of 
the right to food (in HLPE 2011, 39). Also the UN Rapporteur on the Right to Food (2009) states that: “States should assist individuals 
and local communities in obtaining individual titles or collective registration of the land they use, in order to ensure their rights” (2009, 
16). The Rapporteur stresses that registering rights, though,  need of information and participation processes and the oversight of 




decentralisation processes and their implications for tenure security and improving the 
lives of the poor. 
2.2.3. Community-led reforms: the role of decentralization in tenure security 
In the previous section, “state-led” reforms have been explained. They support titling 
schemes and a view of land rights in the context a Western-legal understanding, 
strengthening central institutions and processes; they are dismissive of local institutions. 
However, due to the failure of this kind of reform, pinpointed above, the WB18 and donors 
have moved towards more locally driven land reforms to enforce tenure security, reducing 
the relevance of the “state-led” role. 
Locally driven processes are either a return to customary tenure authorities and land 
rights, or community tenure reforms; both have been pinpointed as alternatives to “state-
led” reforms. Boone (2007) and Alden Wily (2003a) have summarised three different 
land tenure reforms, including the “state-led” process: (i) reinforce community rights, 
devolving land rights to traditional authorities (“re-traditionalisation”), a reform that has 
been implemented in Ghana; (ii) promote property rights at the national level (“state-led” 
reforms”), a process followed in Botswana (see Alden Wily, 2003a); and (iii) locally-
driven and decentralization processes (“community-led” reforms), which aim to 
recognize  de facto user rights through elected local institutions. This process has been 
followed in Tanzania. “Community-led” reforms are processes that are widely supported 
by the scholarship on land tenure reforms in Africa today (e.g.: Alden Wily 2003b, 2003a, 
Boone 2007, Toulmin 2008, Joireman 2011). Drawing on Boone (2007), Table 2 below 
summarizes the three pinpointed land reform processes discussed so far, highlighting their 





Table 2  Three different land tenure reforms and their implications and proposed solutions derived from Boone 
(2007) 
Land Reform Description and aims Cons Pros 
                                                 
18 In 2008 the World Development Report “hailed the role of small farmers in leading the way out of hunger and poverty and 
recognized the importance of state investment in agriculture and of some subsidies” (Thurow 2010, 106). 
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Focus on large-scale farming 
 
 “Exploitation or expropriation 
of community resources by 
opportunistic insiders or by 
outsiders has caused 
illegitimate trampling on the 
rights of indigenous 
communities, and the erosion 
of traditional mechanisms that 
ensured the downward 
accountability and 
effectiveness of community-
level authorities” (p.570) 
“restoration of a status quo 
ante in which members of a 
‘natural community’ managed 
their own resources in ways 
that promoted collective 
interests” (p.570) l 
Land rights depend upon the 
membership of a community 
 
““consolidates local states”. 
This has as an outcome that 
“the relationship between the 
central state and individuals, 
households, and rural 
communities is mediated by 
local elites who have political 
authority and also (some) 
economic authority over their 
subjects” (p.578) 
 
 Corruption and co-optation of 
local leaders that leads to 
exploitation and expropriation of 
resources 
 Who is a member of the 
community and therefore entitled 
to rights ownership? 
 What local authority should be 
build? 
 ‘neo-traditionalisation, hampering 
current rights of non-indigenes 
 Exclusion of woman and other 
groups 
 Customary non-democratic law 
 Supports the idea that “indigeneity 
is a political classification that is 
an integral part of the modern 
African state” (p.578). Therefore, 
not being an indigene may mean 
denial of citizenship.  
 
 If the systems operate in a 
transparent way and accountable 
mechanisms for local leaderships 
are put in place “communities 
could manage their own resources 
well…and could also achieve 
significant increases in 
agricultural production” (p.570) 
 
Promote private property 
rights: “state-led” reforms 
 
Focus on large-scale farming 
 
Implies “transferring control 
over land from the political 
sphere to the market” (p.580) 
Relies on the Western-legal 
understanding of land rights, 
transforming land into private 




 Supported by WB and donors, but 
also by investors “who seek land 
for commercial purposes” in 
agriculture or tourism (p.573). 
This leads to exchanging rights 
easily at lower prices. 
 Supported by women’s 
movements.  
 Central control in freeholding 
titles 
 “moves toward individualization 
of control and disposition of land 
are, by definition, changes that 
erode communal coherence and 
structure” (p.580) 
 
 There is not a trend in African 
countries towards this policy in 
land reform. It is more prone the 
“‘re-traditionalisation’ of control 
over land” (p.574) 
 The state has to increase the law 
enforcement of contracts and 
manage processes placed on local 
governments to prevent lack of 
capacity 
 Avoids problems of patron-client 
relationships more present in 
the previous one and supports 
individual citizenship in spite 
of family relations. 
Institutionalise user rights: 
“community-led” reforms / 
decentralisation processes 
 
Focus on small-holder farming  
 
Still focusing on political 
modes of allocation instead of 
market modes, although it 
encourages formalisation 
through local institutions 
“land registration and titling as 
a means to stabilize the land 
access and use rights to the 
small farmers now cultivating 
the land” (p.574) 
 
It is not completely the 
opposite to community rights; 
however it respects the rights 
of emigrants and other groups 
excluded in customary law  
 
 The same problem arises regarding 
whose land rights are recognised, 
and could stir up conflict among 
current users’ rights and traditional 
or customary rights 
 
 “is generally considered to be the 
most flexible, pro-poor, and 
practical way forward, and also it 
can be useful as a sort of generic, 
pro-farmer stand on the land rights 
question” (p.575) 
 Protect the poor from arbitrary 
dispossession 
 Not confident in local and 
customary authority  
 “ratification of the on-the-ground, 
status quo land distribution, it is a 
strategy that could circumvent 
indeterminate debates over 
historical claims” (p.575) 
 
On the one hand, “re-traditionalisation” as land tenure reform is the devolution of the 
authority and administration of land rights to traditional authorities and the enforcement 
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of customary land tenure systems. However, as stated previously, within customary 
systems it has been claimed that some traditional practices exclude some groups from 
decision making processes and land ownership (Peters 2004, Joireman 2008, Toulmin 
2008). In Peters’ (2004) view, in customary systems across Africa there is a process of 
struggle that leads to a “simultaneous creation of privilege and penury, wealth and 
poverty, political power and powerlessness” (Peters 2004, 285). Many of these struggles 
are due to age, gender, pertinence/non-pertinence to the community and marital relations. 
Drawing on Toulmin (2008) and Boone (2007), such negative implications can be 
summarised as follows: 
 The exclusion of certain groups from ownership: women, foreigners, and others 
due to marital status. This can lead to an increase in past land claims that can stir 
up conflict with current users of land, not only with foreigners, but also with users 
of other regions of the same country.  
 The leaders are not democratically chosen: customary “land-management powers 
[are] non-elected, non-state, non-secular, local-level actors like chiefs and 
marabouts” (Boone 2007, 564).  
 The customary leaders are often co-opted by political and economic elites, and 
they may seek individual profit; the representation of their community is not 
straightforward.19 Patron-client politics in Africa is common practice and has its 
roots in informal relations, many of them related to kinship. This way of doing 
politics has its strengths in a cultural and economic context such as the African 
one, where family relations are predominant and the state does not control all of 
its territory; but, it has also been considered that it benefits some elites (Chabal 
and Daloz 1999). What is more, it ‘consolidates local states’ where the 
relationship between citizens and the central state is “mediated by local elites who 
have political and also (some) economic authority over their subjects” (Boone 
2007, 578). 
On the other hand, in Hyden’s (2006) view, “community-led” reforms are less interlinked 
with customary leaders than processes of devolving the authority and allocation of land 
to traditional leaders –such as in the case of Ghana, which was discussed previously. It is 
the medium-level enforcement of local institutions that enables the coordination between 
customary and statutory law (Boone 2007, Toulmin 2008). Furthermore, it has been 
                                                 
19 In 2012, 90 representatives of communities attended a conference in Sierra Leone. Some of them complained that they had been 




considered that the paradigm of “community-led” reforms is a point of convergence for 
development practitioners and Africanist scholars inside and outside Africa (Hyden 
2006). 
“Community-led” reforms involve processes of decentralisation. The World Bank (2008) 
has defined decentralisation as “the transfer of political, administrative, and fiscal 
authority to lower levels of government” (World Bank 2008, 254); in this case the transfer 
is in regard to land rights. “Community-led” reforms have also been considered as more 
democratic and able to protect vulnerable groups from tenure insecurity, providing them 
with more decision making capacity and ownership of land tenure reforms (Li 1996, 
Alden Wily 2003b). 
However, in Peters’s view, such an optimistic scenario may be “more of a vision of what 
ideally should happen rather than what is happening in current land policy programmes 
or what is likely to happen” (Peters 2004, 276). Despite the attempts to make 
“community-led” reforms inclusive of different actors’ voices - the state, civil society and 
the private sector (World Bank 2008, 245) - to promote democratisation, it has been 
argued that this move corresponds more with the shift towards ‘good governance’ 
approaches to development since the initiation of structural adjustment programmes, 
which seek to increase the “reliance on legal forms and legal culture similar to those 
operating in the West, market-oriented economies” (McAlusan 1998 in Pierre and Peters 
2000, 275). 
Despite claims that processes of decentralisation are more democratic and participative 
and  empower communities (Alden Wily 2003a), and therefore increase the tenure 
security of the poor, some scholarship has argued that they are in fact a continuity of “top-
down” developments (Peters 2009). It has been sustained that an actual participatory20 or 
democratic process of land reforms or other development projects not only places those 
who are more vulnerable and marginalised as the main players in the definitions of rights 
and needs, but also recognises their capacity to influence  the transformation and 
distribution of rights (Mander 2005, Newell and Wheeler 2006, Vergara-Camus 2012, 
Borras Jr. and Franco 2013). Moreover, “governance is ‘good’ only to the extent that it 
benefits the social groups who are impoverished, oppressed and socially vulnerable and 
excluded” (Mander 2005, 247). 
                                                 
20 “Participation essentially concerns the exercise of popular agency in relation to development” (Hickey and Mohan 2004, 3) 
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However, participation has also been considered a form of “tyranny” (Cooke and Kothar 
2001). These scholars argue that despite the rhetoric of placing people at the centre, 
participation is more of a technical process than a real emancipatory political process 
(Hickey and Mohan 2004). In order to avoid the negativities of participation, and make it 
meaningful and transformative, Hickey and Mohan (2004) reflect on “issues of power 
and politics” related to development. In order to have actual participative processes, these 
scholars assert that if participation shall contribute to economic development, it should 
be “grounded in evidence and [in a] theoretically-informed argument”, instead of in 
confrontation with dominant discourses (Hickey and Mohan 2004, 3). 
In Mander’s (2005) view, the core of sound real participatory processes for development 
or governance “is the active agency of the repressed in assessing their own needs and 
finding their own solutions to their own problems” (Mander 2005, 233). Drawing on land 
rights, Mander (2005) highlights the political content of development projects, instead of 
considering them neutral. Acknowledging the analytical goal, any authentic reform that 
aims to improve the conditions of those who are more vulnerable 
requires authentic processes by which… groups acquire consciousness of their oppressed 
situation and the causes of this situation, and by which they themselves both identify and 
advocate for the enforcement of their rights, and develop strategies to resist, combat and seek 
to overcome the situations created by the denial of their rights” (Mander 2005, 242). 
Furthermore, Hickey and Mohan (2004) state that a participatory approach needs to 
undertake “an analysis of what makes participation difficult for marginal groups in the 
first place” (Hickey and Mohan 2004, 11). For instance, smallholder peasants -threatened 
by global industrial agriculture that uses large-scale farming, fertilizers and 
mechanization- have united and come up with alternatives which aim is to protect their 
rights to access “land, water, seeds and credit” (La Via Campesina, 2003 in Patel 2006, 
82, emphasis added). The movement highlights self-reliance in food production through 
small-scale family farming, agroecology, and a process of consensus building and 
decision making based on equality and inclusion.  
At least 1.5 billion people are dependent on small-scale farming, and very often they are 
the poorest and hungriest people in the world (De Schutter 2009, 6). As Amanor (2012a) 
highlights “[s]mallholders occupy an increasingly perilous position in global agri-food 
chains, which cannot be addressed by merely ensuring them security of rights to own 
land” (Amanor 2012a, 744). Furthermore, this scholar states that smallholders have lost 
their bargaining power with the agri-food industries that dominate agriculture by 
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monopoly (Amanor 2012a) The result is that small-scale farming is considered “generally 
non-viable, relegating it, at best, to subsistence agriculture. Unable to compete, relegated 
to the poorest soils – the hilly, the arid, and the erosion-prone – small farmers have been 
pushed to the margins” (De Schutter 2009, 2). The consequences of this marginality are 
as follows: 
 Smallholders have started to be integrated into what is known as “out-grower 
schemes”, incorporating smallholders “into a framework of scale and linkages” 
and establishing “contractual relations between agribusiness and smallholder 
farmers” (Amanor 2012a, 735).  
 They have abandoned the land and “flown” to urban areas creating massive slums 
with high health and poverty problems (De Schutter 2009)21. 
 An emergent class of landless peasants have become cheap agricultural labourers 
in large-scale farms, often in combination with subsistence agriculture (De 
Schutter 2009). 
The marginal situation of smallholders and the poverty problems that have arisen among 
them have contributed to a shift in development. This shift aims to focus its attention on 
smallholders’ farming as a way to reduce poverty and hunger (see IFPRI 2002, World 
Bank 2008). As the former Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter 
stressed: “agriculture must develop in ways that increase the incomes of smallholders” 
(UNHRC 2010, 5).  
La Via Campesina demands and understanding of land rights are as follow: 
 …[a] genuine and integral agrarian reform that guarantees peasants full rights to land, defends 
and recovers the territories of indigenous peoples, ensures fishing communities' access and 
control over their fishing areas and eco-systems, honours access and control over pastoral lands 
and migratory routes, assures decent jobs with fair remuneration and labour rights for all, and 
a future for young people in the countryside; 
...where agrarian reform revitalises interdependence between producers and consumers, 
ensures community survival, social and economic justice and ecological sustainability, and 
respect for local autonomy and governance with equal rights for women and men; 
...where it guarantees the right to territory and self- determination for our peoples 
...where peoples' power to make decisions about their material, natural and spiritual heritage is 
defended 
                                                 
21 “More than 1 billion people today – one in six people, and 43 percent of the population in developing countries – already live in 
slums” (De Schutter 2009, 2) 
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... where all peoples have the right to defend their territories from the actions of transnational 




  New understandings of land and negotiation processes over land 
control. 
 
3.1 Understandings of land  
3.1.1.1.Land affordances  
Large scale land acquisitions and the effects it is having on developing countries is 
changing the understanding of land and its dimensions. Scholars such as Li (Li 2014a), 
De Maria (2019), Baglioni (2013) or Lund and Pleuso (2011) have pointed out the need 
to rethink about land, the reshaping of scales of land and the need for more nuanced 
understandings of the dimensions of land and nature.  
For instance, Li (2014) asks “What is land?” and with that question she implies that our 
understanding of the resource is changing, and that land is not understood the same way 
in different places or by different actors. According to her, land is not a resource 
intrinsically, but in order for land to be a resource it needs to be assembled by the use 
fences, laws, accumulation and ultimately its exploitation through productive uses 
(2014a, 589). In her view land has many affordances. 
Li (2014) distinguishes three dimensions in which how to analyse and understand land. 
Though land’s uses and meanings, through land spatiality and location and through the 
technologies deployed to assemble the resource. Sud (2014b, 44) states that land “is 
literally globalized and traded internationally, rather than just being oriented to a global 
economy. Here one is indicating the growing literature on the “foreignization of space””, 
what she has coined as “macro understanding of land” (Sud 2014b, 53). 
3.1.1.2.Material dimension of land  
From a material point of view, different actors will give different meanings to land. “Land 
is material and it is social”. It needs to be assembled to be used, to be socially exchanged 
and to attribute to it value and productivity. But also, as she points out, “land sustains 
life” and this gives land a different dimension that its mere productivity, land has a “live 
giving quality”. This meaning as a common thing, a commonality that we all share as a 
replicability of our existence” (Li 2014, 589).  
Technology and space: 
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The material dimension of land also talks about its location and the devices used to 
ensemble land: “land stays in place. It is excludable and can be partitioned, but it cannot 
be removed” (Li 2014a, 591). The devices used also have an impact on the spatial 
dimension of land, as it is possible to control land from remote places through new 
technologies such as satellite images, which are very different than the boundaries that 
local people use. Those technologies will affect control over land which can now be done 
from a distance, adding a new dimension to the land grabbing debate.  
Understanding land as idle: 
There is an understanding of land that deems this resource as “underutilised”: “To classify 
land as underutilised requires discounting current uses: It also requires a new regime of 
distinction, in which a diverse array of land types in a great many places is homogenised 
and aggregated under a new label: their underutilisation” (Li 2014a, 592). This gives land 
a new dimension and understanding. Li (2014) suggests that this underutilisation is a 
narrative that has been created in distance and by a different set of experts.  
the huge untapped potential of idle lands, awaiting only technology and capital to make them 
productive. Technology and capital are the magic mix that account for why land is about to 
become suddenly vastly more valuable than it was just yesterday, or a few years ago. Economy 
of scale is a crucial notion here, the idea that efficient and productive technologies can only be 
applied at a large scale, which accounts for why they are not already in use (Li 2014, 598) 
Similarly to Li, De Maria (2019) states that land needs to be understand in a holistic and 
complex way that goes beyond economics and considers changing dimensions of land in 
the current context of large scale acquisitions. The author attributes four dimensions to 
land: economic, spatial, environmental and institutional new meaning that needs to be 
unpacked.  
 Economimcs: land was the only production factor before capitalism. In this 
sense, the value of land depends on its capacity of produce revenues. Similarly 
with the conclusions of Li (2014), land is aggregated and considered under 
producing from this point of view and recent land grabbing have created the 
narrative of considering land “idle”. Further, from a trading point of view, and 
also such as Li claimed, land is a fix factor not able to move, however, De Maria 
points out that “ownership of land is becoming increasingly mobile, so that each 
country’s endowment of land is not constrained anymore to national borders” 
which gives land a dimension of trading resource (2019, 6). De Maria 
acknowledges that land is more than a mere production asset and has a 
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complexity intrinsically linked to its nature: “land is a complex commodity, with 
both market and non-market features; it supports the livelihood of billions of 
human beings; it is strategic for feeding the world population; it is a fundamental 
brick in the architecture of ecosystems and a vital element for building 
communities resilient to climate change; it is often the ground on which social, 
cultural, and individual identity are built” (2019, 6).  
 Space: “the geographical and spatial features of this phenomenon matter (…) the 
recent and rapid technological developments in remote sensing, satellite 
imagery, community-based Geographic Information Systems (GIS), mobile-
based and drone-based mapping have just started to be systematically applied to 
the LSLAs context (…) the global geography of land grabbing, together with the 
distance (or proximity) of investor and destination countries, constitute 
[relevant] elements … the spatial boundaries and features of specific large-scale 
land deals and concessions, which are also extremely relevant, are often hard to 
find. There is an [imbalance] between the macro-geography and the micro-
geography of LSALs” (De Maria 2019, 6); meaning that deals that are traded 
globally have no clear boundaries on the ground. 
 Environment: there are limits to the substitutability of land. Economics has 
embraced concepts that belong to other disciplines related with natural sciences 
“such as pollution, biodiversity, natural resource management, sustainability, 
and climate change. Among others, the issues related with climate change 
received particular attention in the last decades, producing a tremendous 
acceleration in land-use modelling techniques”; thus land management has 
become a very much relevant subject. There is a need to understand the impacts 
on the environment that land grabs will pose. Assessment of the effects in 
biodiversity, climate change, and land use have not been addressed properly (De 
Maria 2019, 8). 
 Institutions: De Maria (2019) talks about an “institutional superstructure”: Land 
is not just a good defined by its economic rent, its position in the space and its 
natural features, but it is also a political, social, spiritual, and cultural asset. Land 
is so deeply embodied in the collective imagination of many societies, that it 
contributes, among other functions, to define the social identity both at the 
individual and at the collective level. This “institutional superstructure” is “the 
way in which social customs and official legal systems allocate property rights 
and regulate access and use of land, it is not static and evolves within time and 
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space. The historical evidence suggests that the actual path that this evolution 
takes can deeply affect the evolution of societies themselves (De Maria 2019, 8–
9). 
Relational understandings of land: 
Ranjan Datta (2015) understands land in its relational perspective. In this perspective land 
is not an object but an actor and as such relates to other actors in meaningful ways, the 
important thing for this author are land relationships: “Land becomes relationships, 
culture, and spirituality where humans and non-humans connect in their everyday 
interactions” (2015,109). This understanding of land corresponds with an indigenous 
meaning of land where land is seen in multiple ways. Dudgeon and Berkes (2003) have a 
similar understand of the land but more embedded in the concept of indigenous 
technological knowledge. While Datta’s understanding is more holistic and original as 
considers land as an actor which has “material agency” (Datta 2015, 109).  In any case, 
Dudgeon and Berkes (2003) rather highlight the ecology and resource management of 
indigenous knowledge of the land, which draws from how people interact with their 
environment as opposed to understandings of the land which may come from 
development or investment projects (Dudgeon and Berkes 2003, 75).  
Also, Crina and Pretescu-Mag (2017, 174) highlight that “land as a natural resource 
(besides its social and material value) carries a cultural significance into which societies 
place those components of the nonhuman world that are considered to be valuable”. This 
dimension of land has an holistic component that has been regarded as necessary in order 
to handle the complexities of land transitions today and the need to preserve the many 
dimensions of land and its necessity for sustaining life (e.g. Freyfogle 2003). 
3.1.1.3.Exclusion and legitimacy 
Another dimension in which to analyse land is its excludability. In order for one person 
to use land another is excluded from it, and for one use of the land another use is excluded: 
“The mode of exclusion can be physical and forceful (hedges, fences, guns), regulatory 
(e.g. through customary or formal property law or land- use zones), or it can operate by 
means of a market mechanism that excludes people who cannot afford the price. It always 
includes a persuasive element, an attempt to defend exclusion in terms of its legitimacy 
(…) the range of human uses to which land can ‘legitimately’ be put is huge: land can be 
source of food, fuel and fodder; a place to build a house; a home for spirits; a place to 
protect a forest, harvest water or supply ‘environmental services’; ground to mine for 
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minerals; or a source of profit through use or speculation. Indeed land supports every 
aspect of human and non-human life, so complete exclusion from its affordances is not 
possible” (Li 2014a, 592). Li wonders what makes certain uses of land stick and what 
does it make that we accept exclusion or that the ensemble of land be done in a certain 
way?  
Hall et al. (2011, 7) defined exclusion as “the ways in which people are prevented from 
benefiting from things”. These scholars have theorized about the concept of exclusion as 
a process that “is not random …, nor does it occur on a level playing field. It is structured 
in power relations” (5). They identify the opposite of exclusion not as inclusion, but as 
access, in the understanding that access is “the ability to benefit from things” (7). Making 
access an opposite of exclusion, rather than of inclusion, brings light to the debate on 
exclusion from land. In their view, there are two sides to exclusion from land: exclusion 
as a condition and as a process. As a condition implies people lacking access to land and 
as a process, exclusion are “large-scale and often violent actions in which poor people are 
evicted from their land by or on behalf of powerful actors” (Hall et al. 2011, 4). Both this 
sides to exclusion are interrelated, as the process of exclusion will inevitably lead to the 
condition of exclusion, unless it is counteracted.  
The work of Hall et al. (2011) identifies four sources of exclusion: regulations, force, the 
market and legitimacy –for instance legitimacy due to inheritance, use, first settler, buyer, 
and possession of a formal or informal deed. Land is and exclusive resource and therefore, 
the use of one user excludes other users or uses of the land (Hall et al. 2011, 7). Which 
Li (2014) also refers as to the affordances of the land.  
Legitimacy, is therefore, a source of exclusion that may result in other sources of 
exclusion. For instance, regulation may give new legitimacy that is conducive to 
exclusion, or the market will give legitimacy to transactions with land that may have never 
happened (Li 2014b), even the use of force can be seen as legitimate in certain cultures 
and situations to exclude people or groups of people. Violent land grabbing excludes 
people from land (Cotula et al. 2011, Borras Jr. et al. 2013), cultural and social factors 
exclude women and make them the most impoverished group on earth (Daley and Englert 
2010), and pastoralist are excluded in favour of farmers within already excluded groups 
(Robbins 2000). Power, here is a source of legitimacy; however, it can be that power and 
force loses legitimacy with the interception of regulation. And here is where regulation 
has been found important for women to prevent exclusion from security of tenure (Daley 






3.2. Negotiating in land grabbing  
3.2.1.1.Participation  
Participation has been seen as the solution from processes of exclusion in many 
development literature. Participatory processes have been claimed to provide the solution 
of the pitfalls of development project implementation. Participation concerns the ability 
of local people to define local obstacle or problems, conceptualise, initiate design and 
implement programmes to address these problems. The aim is for local actors to be 
empowered in order for them to generate and ‘do’ their own ‘development’ (Lundy and 
McGovern 2008, 109) 
Participation, therefore, according to the framework of Hall et al. is a process that aims 
to legitimate certain actions.  Participation is more than participating in education, and 
again the sources of exclusion from access to decision making processes are force, 
market, legitimacy and regulations. The standpoint is that making people participate in 
development programs will not help them to access the required decision making places 
where their voices need to be heard, or will be.  
There are different sites for participation: the family, the village, the government, NGO 
programs and interventions. Power is decisive as a source from exclusion in participation. 
Losing the power to control certain decisions over land will have the end result of 
hampering the access to use that land, however, not having the ability to participate in 
decision making processes will not straightforward have an impact on the use of the land. 
Participatory processes aim to putmarginalised, impoverished and oppressed peoples are 
at the centre of the definition of needs, struggles and change. They are considered as the 
only ones who are entitled to define their claims and the needs they have. Furthermore, 
Falk (2007) argues that because the major role and power of global capital, electoral 
politics are no longer effective to “press social democratic leaderships effectively” (2007, 
20). Falk argues for the necessity of a real participatory ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ “to 
gain influence and change”. Similarly, Ife (2010) has stated that the only political process 
for bottom-up approaches is participatory democracy. 
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In the development literature, scholars such as Mander (2005) argue that “the process of 
diagnosing the sources of impoverishment and rights denial, and of needs that 
legitimately should be addressed would derive authenticity only if these are undertaken 
centrally (although not necessarily exclusively) by those people and groups who suffer 
from the denial of rights in the first place” (Mander 2005, 242). It is in this process of 
defining needs and rights that communities and individuals start to be aware of their 
entitlements and political options. However, “in governance perspectives telling call for 
participatory exercises in institutional imagination…those doing the imaging are the elite 
or members of the middle class with the economic and cultural capital to count as 
‘stakeholders’”, whereas those more affected are included after, or excluded at worst 
(Santos and RodríguezGravito 2005, 9).  
Only with real participation will real empowerment be achieved: “participation is the 
means to empowerment” (Lundy and McGovern 2008, 109). Participation means 
inclusion and is antagonistic with exclusion. However the concept has also been 
considered a buzzword (Green 2000, Hickey and Mohan 2004). A main contrasting 
narrative to participation is the of-cited work Participation: the New Tyranny? (Cooke 
and Kothar 2001). The concept has not only been used as a blueprint for unappropriated 
interventions based in a simplistic process of consultation, but has also been claimed to 
be co-opted by policymakers, practitioners and powerful actors to push forwards their 
agendas claiming the legitimacy of participation of communities (e.g.: Peters 2009). One 
way of transcending this debate can be a focus on negotiation and how it has been 
deployed in the literature.  
3.2.2. Negotiation beyond participation: a power and interest framework.  
 
As pointed out in the previous section, land grabbing has brought up concerns about land 
changing land uses. Sud (2014) refers to this such as transitions on land use. Transitions 
in land use “may involve diverse actors, including villagers, scientists, investors, legal 
experts and government officials” (Li 2014a, 590). Sud (2014b) focusses on the 
governance of such transitions. For her, governance is “the deployment of the authority 
of the state through norms, the practices and policies of bureaucratic governmental 
institutions, and politics” (Sud 2014b, 43).  
The concept of politics is defined by Indrajit (2019) as “the variegated ensemble of 
practices through which people conduct their lives in the context of the disciplinary 
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mechanisms that seek to institute order in society. Compliance with such practices as well 
as contesting them both constitute political practices…a practice is considered political 
so long as it is intended to advance a perspective, idea or notion of social life” (28). 
One can say that those practices are what Sud (2014) refers as to “codes of conduct” that 
some actors try to advance in the land deals internationally, such as the Principles of 
Responsible Agricultural Investment detailed in section 1.3 in previous chapter and the 
contrasting Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land , 
Fisheries and Forests. But those practices are also operative at the local level with either 
compliance or contestation to land deals.  
Some of the narratives around land deals makes land grabs look fair and remunerative for 
local people and in accordance to their interests, and thus they may bring up compliance 
in local villagers as those deals are introduced to them as an opportunity (Peters 2013). 
As Sud writes: “the idea is not to do away with land deals, but to make them fair, 
transparent, remunerative, and respectful of local cultures and values” (Sud 2014b, 45). 
This leaves out, in the view of the author, questions of power and politics which constitute 
negotiating elements of land grabs among different actors in different scales –
understanding scales at an international, national and sub-national level (Sud 2014b).  
Sud goes further when she asserts that any attempt to overcome the lack of discussion of 
power and politics in the land grabbing question –which she rather prefers to call land 
deals, has been simplified in approaches to titling and formalisation, on the one hand, and 
approaches to power and politics inspired in the undesirable consequences of 
“accumulation by dispossession” (e.g. Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012). Here “The 
claim is that land is being taken from the poor, for the rich, with the collusion of the state” 
(Sud 2014b, 45). Similar views have been introduced recently in cases such as the 
Ugandan case (Kandel 2014). The opposite that has been claimed is the “politics of 
repossession” (Kloppenburg, 2010 in Sud 2014b, 45). Countries end up with a mix of 
those practices in their policies. 
Sud also talks about a “macro understanding of land” which is the accumulation of land 
for private investment purposes which has been the focus of most of the literature on land 
grabbing. Those focus on the supranational and national level actors, while sub-national 
scale of land deals have been overlook: “understanding of global land deals, and the 
playing out of these in country contexts, needs to catch up with advances in understanding 
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of the sub-national scale (…) for tighter integration of the local, regional, national, and 
global scales in understandings of land deals” (Sud 2014b, 46). 
Sud also uses two types of policy and tenure reforms based in Subramanian (2004, in Sud 
2014) and Kohli (2006,2012, in Sud 2014). Business oriented reforms or business-
friendly are reforms that do not aim to liberalise the land market to achieve economic 
optimal allocation of land as a resource (market oriented reforms), but they are “based on 
a narrow state–business alliance. Here, private growth can be pursued in the name of the 
public good” (Sud 2014, 4).  
 
What has happened is that those reforms have failed to produce the so desired changed 
and have not brought up more prosperity or rights for local people as was suggested by 
the property rights school as stated out in Chapter 2. The end result has been the need for 
the states to look for other actors to organise the land markets and distribution. As Sud 
puts it: “Failure to change land policy in general, say due to political pressure, has led to 
States reaching out to chosen private players and interest groups (…) they involve narrow 
state–business alliances, business-friendly practices, by definition, lack public 
accountability and transparency” (Sud 2014b, 47). The land grabbing literature, current 
and past (i.e. Berry 2002) has extensively referred to this kind of opacity and corruption 
or co-option. Some examples are Kandel (2014) who describes how top-down actors and 
elites are appropriating land in Uganda. Or Cotula (2011) who explains that even local 
elites and village leaders are in agreement with land deals without fully inform their 
fellow villagers. This narrative and group of interests has always been present in the 
literature on land reforms and its relationship with the state and politics (e.g. Hyden 2006, 
Amanor 2012b). 
Scholars have referred to this as “accumulation by dispossession”(e.g. Benjaminsen and 
Bryceson 2012)- “the shift in land from the poor to the rich” (Sud 2014a, 593). However, 
other groups with their own interests that may be not doing the accumulation may benefit 
from the current accumulation of land. For instance, Sud (2014a) refers to the “man in 
the middle” as a group that is actually linking global investment with local land by 
identifying the “vacant” plots of land or taking the investor to the place acting like global 
actors in local spaces; “middlemen can be understood as go-betweens, mediators and 
negotiators. They are facilitative (and/or obstructive) parts of a chain linking two end 
points, or points leading to the two ends. In the land economy, they can represent sellers 
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or buyers, or act on behalf of government representatives as gatekeepers or fixers, or they 
can be independent consultants who deal with several parties in a land deal” (Sud 2014a, 
594). Those middlemen have a very much relevant role in enabling the consent to land 
deals at the local level as well, and therefore should not be overlook by the literature, and 
even though oftentimes they have been portrayed as negative actors, they can also help 
pursue or support local people interests as they hold some degree of influence (Sud 2014a, 
610). For Sud (2004b) those middlemen are more than simply enablers of land deals, but 
they are able to create their own rules. Sometimes they operate with violence and 
coercion, and other times with political aims or rather unscrupulous aims. She identifies 
land brokers, musclemen or enforcers, consultants, government represent, party 
representatives as some of these middlemen. They are ever present in the current context 
of land deals.  
A framework of negotiation, power and interests: 
Crina and Petrescu-Mag (2017) have analysed the context of land grabbing and land 
fragmentation in Rumania with a focus on a bottom-up approach – negotiation. They 
consider negotiation such as “the most adequate means to tackle and to solve them [land 
grabs] and to generate long-term positive results for all stakeholders” (Crina and Petrescu-
Mag 2017, 175). Thus, negotiation is the process “through which the parties, with 
common and conflicting interests, gradually adjust their offers and demands to reach a 
mutually accepted agreement” (Crina and Petrescu-Mag 2017, 181). They aimed to know 
the perceptions and behaviours of land owners about land grabbing in order to help with 
land transitions and the challenges that land reforms were bringing to the country. Also, 
they considered relevant to research into the needs and interests of stakeholders in land 
deals negotiations in order to ensure win-win outcomes and “integrative solutions” (Crina 
and Petrescu-Mag 2017, 176 emphasis added).  Some of the problems that Crina and 
Petrescu-Mag identified in their research in Romania was that oftentimes land owners’ 
collaboration with those in charge of making decisions that will transform territories was 
not managed properly (176). 
In this regard they support inclusiveness in decision making processes, which could be 
seen as a mean to avoid Li (2014a) and Hall et al. (2011)’s powers of exclusion. This idea 
departs from balanced gains and proper negotiation processes: “agreements between 
informed partners (hopefully with similar negotiation power), have the potential to both 
implement concrete measures of land use management and apply principles of new modes 
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of governance (Haldrup, 2015), directed toward attaining community-based solutions 
(CBS)” (Crina and Petrescu-Mag 2017, 181). 
The participatory character of CBS means that the process encourages people to get involved. 
Inclusiveness requires that all community members (or their representatives), regardless of 
their visions and opinions, are included in the decision-making process. The collabo- rative 
nature of CBS implies the ability to work together with others, with different viewpoints, with 
the aim to diffuse conflict and reach agreements on community issues (DeGrosky, 2003). CBS 
require the understanding of attitudes, needs, and behavior of community members, and in this 
case, of land owners. Win–win solutions can be achieved only through the progresive 
adaptation of interested parties to each other’s demands and offers, within an integrative 
negotiation process (Crina and Petrescu-Mag 2017, 181) . 
Even when the concept of participation and inclusiveness has been criticised by scholars 
who have considered it only a buzzword (Green 2000, Cooke and Kothar 2001), it is 
helpful here due to the description that Crina and Petrescu-Mag (2017) have done of its 
components which will be helpful in guiding this analysis.  
 Community-based solutions drawing from negotiation highlights the needs and 
interests of the community 
 Power and interests are also relevant concept when talking about negotiation. 
 Power: capacity of the negotiator or stakeholder to direct the negotiation towards 
their interests. The sources of that power are: legitimacy (law can give 
legitimacy as explained above by Li (2014). But Crina and Petrescu-Mag also 
add: “financial resources, support of influential relationships, information, time, 
personal characteristics (e.g., charisma and edu- cation), or the best alternative to 
the negotiated agreement. The last one represents the best option a negotiator 
has if the current negotiation fails” (182). 
 Negotiation strategies: “The main negotiation strategies are distributive and 
integrative negotiations. In a dis- tributive negotiation strategy, at least one party 
loses; the strategy can take the form of win–lose, lose–win, and lose–lose 
negotiations. In an integrative strategy, partners make efforts to understand their 
options with the purpose of enlarging the size of the common out- comes; they 
try to reach an agreement that fulfills the needs of all parties: win–win” (182).  
Teklemariam et al. (2015) also explores negotiation that brings about ‘win-win’ outcomes 
in land acquisitions, which they problematize as ‘control grabbing’. In the view of these 
scholars it is necessary to look at the stakeholders, their interests and their level of 
influence –or power: “Understanding the groups of stakeholders and to what extent their 
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interests and power influence the deal will aid in formulating inclusive and win–win land 
deals both in de jure and de facto contexts. Lessees who acquire land usually enter into 
land contracts to address their strategic business interests and deal strategically, whereas 
actors on the side of the lessor (i.e., local government, local communities, and 
households) may not have such strategic intent and power. Consequently, the need exist 
to integrate the “power” and “interest” of the dealers in acquisition of agricultural land” 
(Teklemariam et al. 2015, 782). The authors have created a taxonomy of stakeholders in 
negotiations based in the interjection of their power and level of interest (see Figure 1) 
Figure 1: power and interests matrix in land deals negotiations (Tekemariam et al 2015, 784) 
 
 
Objects: have low level of influence in the outcome of the land deal, but high level of 
interest in the land 
Players: high power and high interest, including the designers and real actors of deals that 
use the contexts set by the third group of leaders and context setters.  
Leaders and context setters group: consists of stakeholders with low interest in the deals 
but comparatively high power in influencing the context of the deal.  




 Methodology and case study 
4.  
4.1. Methodology 
There are different methods in social sciences, and the methods used depend in great 
measure on the way in which the researcher perceives reality. They depend on what we 
know about the social world (ontology) and how we can acquire that knowledge 
(epistemology) (Elbers 2012). This research follows an interpretivist approach to the 
social world, meaning that it considers that researcher and reality are inseparable and 
knowledge is influenced by a person’s lived experiences, and thus it reality is subjective. 
Positivist approaches, on the other hand, consider that the social reality is objective and 
can be objectively known beyond the researcher interpretation of the world (Bryman 
2008).  
An approach that is more interpretative of the social world usually, although not 
necessarily, follows qualitative methods. As this research is based on the perceptions of 
individuals regarding the changes in their land rights and the issues surrounding their 
experiences, it leans towards an interpretivist understanding of reality and it follows a 
qualitative methods’ design. Positivists approaches usually rely on quantitative 
methodology, however, mixed-methods are becoming more common among the two 
ontological approaches. 
This research drew upon qualitative methodologies that understand that “human actions 
are significantly influenced by the settings in which they occur” and by the “internalized 
notions of norms, traditions, roles and values”; “one should study that behaviour in real-
life [face-to-face] situations” (Marshall and Rossman 1999, 57). Qualitative or 
configurational designs are “sensitive to how participants interpret their social world” 
(Bryman 2008, 26).  
4.1.1.1.Research design 
The research design drew on the use of multiple case studies. “Case stud[ies] offer 
detailed insights into mechanisms, motives of actors, and constraints they face at 
particular moments which no other method –statistics, experiment, biographies, or even 
more systematic comparative analysis –can offer” (Hancké 2009, 61). The research aimed 
to explore the views of those who are more vulnerable to their reality in the context of 
land grabbing and the protection of their livelihoods. As Hancké points out “[case studies] 
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can be quite powerful tools to test and/or unpack an existing theory and come up with 
new, better arguments” (2009, 61).  
This research aimed to explore how the views of local communities’ land rights and 
identities are informed by local and global struggles over land grabbing. In the wake of 
this, the research aimed to disentangle which views are included and excluded in the 
process of constructing land rights identities and demands, the language that communities 
use to demand their claims, and the strategies that better represent communities’ rights.  
In order to answer these questions the thesis used a mixed-methods approach to 
systematically gather the data. The main methods used were participant observation, 
structured and semi-structured or open-ended interviews with individuals, and focus 
groups.  
Participant observation is the involvement of the researcher in the day-to-day lives of the 
community, group or institution (Bryman 2008). This method has been applied 
traditionally by anthropologists in the study of cultures and recently in the study of the 
cultures within different organisations, institutions or even summits, forums or 
conferences (e.g.: Merry, 2006). This research method aims to understand a culture or a 
society “on its own terms” (Eriksen 1995, 10). Fieldwork is the main tool that is used to 
gather data in ethnographic methods; it is “the most important source of new knowledge 
about society and culture” (Eriksen 1995, 14). Fieldwork requires the researcher “to take 
part in local life as much as possible” (Eriksen 1995, 16); the fieldwork for this research 
consisted of four months and a half of participant observation in local communities in 
Tanzania that have experienced a threat of land grabs.  
As a researcher conducting fieldwork research I had to reflect on my own experiences 
during fieldwork and my subjectivity. By doing fieldwork I observed the people in many 
and different ways, this was a good tool to gain understanding and validity of data. My 
interactions were often spontaneous and I used local translators with poorer English 
because they were more embedded in the communities they belonged and less used to 
external influences. That made me gain a unique and special flare of the needs and 
demands of local people that were appreciated as some locals told me I was much more 
flexible than other researchers on the field, being able to adapt to local pace of things, 
transportation or accommodation.  
Eriksen (1995) points out three limitations of fieldwork: language, gender bias, and chief 
informants’ failure in representing the whole society. To overcome these limitations other 
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methods were used, as mentioned above. In terms of the language, which was one of the 
major constraints, a translator was required. To avoid the limitation of representing 
segmented groups, interviews considered gender, age and civil status to have a broad 
participation of all groups.  
The villages I visited had Swahili as a vehicular language. English is a widespread 
language in Tanzania, but is rather used by the urban educated people. Vilagers cannot 
speak English, only some youngsters or villagers who have achieved secondary school 
can speak elementary English. This made necessary for me to use translators. The use of 
translators has been explored by researchers who have acknowledge the challenges that 
this may bring (Regmi and Researcher 2010). In my case, I found that sometimes the 
translators due to cultural values had objections to some of my questions which I dealt by 
explaining my intentions further. The way I worked with translators was taking notes and 
asking for real translations of pieces of the interviews  on the spot, so I could have an 
understanding of what was going on and was even able to ask for clarifications on certain 
questions and lead the conversations to where I wanted them to go. For that I had to 
negotiate with translators and assistants continuously and be involved in the interviews. I 
was not only a passive audience of the questions beein asked, but I was fully present and 
involved in conversations. This was a bit more challenging, hwoever, in the case of focus 
groups, where the dynamics are faster and more difficult to influence due to the same 
nature of a focus group and its spontaneity. In those cases, the assistant-translator was the 
main conductor and I would ask for less clarifications until the end  
4.1.1.2.Fieldwork research exercises 
More specifically, the research data were gathered through informal interviews, 
participant observation and focus groups carried out over a four and a half month period 
of fieldwork in four different communities affected by land grabs in Tanzania (see Table 
3). In order to assess the context of land grabbing and the strategies of communities, 
community members were interviewed alongside different groups including researchers, 
local and national NGOs and other CBOs, church leaders, doctors, teachers and other 
civil servants. Other sources of data were different land training sessions and workshops 
with relevant actors as well as the analysis of documents gathered during the fieldwork, 




Field notes are the tool of participant observation. The notes provide data on casual and 
spontaneous interviews; such interviews are one of the more valuable sources of 
knowledge in participant observation. Although spontaneous, subjects were informed of 
their participation as studied subjects of this research project accordingly. Interviewing, 
in fact, is one of the most useful tools in ethnography; interviews can allow the 
conversation to develop in a very flexible way (Madden 2010). The field notes also 
included relevant facts regarding land rights or land grabbing issues that were observed 
during the participation. They were very useful during the times when I was not 
conducting itnerviews with someone, in occasions I will grab a motorbike with some local 
villager with some English knowledge and go around villages –which are large, and stop 
to talk to people or have some spontaneous interview or interactions. I will stop at the 
river where people will be cleaning or fishing, or when I saw groups of young men 
chatting. I will also ask questions to women who tend to have many food stands in the 
main street of the village. Conversations were always guided to see their understandings 
of what was going on with land deals in their villages, they involvement with this or land 
decisions and their personal experiences with land. I always explained who I was and 
seek support for the conversations I was having with them, and I played my credentials 
as a researcher with a Tanzanian permit to conduct research in that particular village.  
Interviews 
Other qualitative methods were used alongside the participant observation data. Semi-
structured interviews were held, sometimes in a snowball pattern, and often 
spontaneously when staying in the villages. Interviews with NGO staff and other 
practitioners were held on an arranged basis and sometimes due to contacts established 
during the interviews. 74 interviews were undertaken with villagers, and 130 were carried 
out leaders. Conversations with groups of people were also held when in the village and 
while visiting farms or other locations within the village. The interviews were developed 
with an interview guide “so that the more specific issues can be addressed” in order to 
answer the research questions (Bryman 2008, 472)  
Focus groups 
A total of five focus groups were carried out during the fieldwork. FG1 was with village 
leaders, FG2 women, FG3 was with men and women, FG4 was with men and FG5 was 




These consisted of visits to farms and around the village with the participants. During the 
transect walks informal conversations were held and relevant questions could be asked. 
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Table 3: Field22work exercises 
 
Village P1 P2 M1 M2 Districts
Total (interviews+FG participants) 25 27 35 25 3
Interviews with villagers
men 8 11 10 11 1
women 9 6 9 10
Interviews with leaders
men 4 6 4 4 2
women 1 1 1 1
Unsturctured conversations
men 3 1 2 1
women 3 1
Focus Groups (1 of each)





Village Assembly attendance 1
Boundary conflict resolution attendance 1
Transect walks 2 2 2 2
Visit to a large scale farm 1
Visit to a small scale farm (investor) 1
Conversations with large scale farm staff 2 1
NGO land rights training workshops 1 1











Total interviews+convers:  132 (10 convers)
Total Focus groups participants: 21 (5FG)
Documents:
HA Land rights training manual
HA Q&A booklet from villagers during training
Land Use Plans (3 villages)
TALA recommendations on land rights
Task Force meetings records
Different village meetings minutes on land issues
Mama Ardhi project baselines
Mama Ardhi reports from local NGO to intl.NGO
Letters and legal docs to gov bodies from villages
TIC figures about agricultural investment
Visual documents
Others:
Workshop attendance on the right to food and agribusiness at Dar-es Salaam
Common interviews with peasants during the workshop affected by SAGCOT
1













4.1.1.3.Access, validity, quality and ethical considerations 
Research results must fulfil three criteria to be accepted: be valid, reliable and replicable. 
One of the major critiques made of qualitative methods is that they are difficult to 
replicate. This is even more so in the case of ethnographies, where the tool of the 
researcher is his or her self. As Hancké puts it “in more discursive research settings…the 
data literally do not exist without [the researcher] interpretation” (2009, 91). Furthermore, 
when relying on others’ views, secondary data or interviews, there is also the subjective 
interpretation of the interviewee or the author of the data. However, this is not only a 
feature of qualitative methods. Quantitative methodologies that build variables, and 
include or exclude time frames may not lead to the same results, due to a certain amount 
of interpretation (e.g. Boix and Stokes 2003). 
Validity, on the other hand, has to do with the connotation and delimitation of the 
concepts to be used and how to measure them: it “refers to whether the concepts…are 
correctly expressed in the measurements [the researcher] use[s]” (Hancké 2009, 87). In 
order to measure the validity of empirical observations, Hancké (2009, 87-99) suggests 
measuring one concept in several ways or measure its consequences instead of the 
concept. In this research I measured the different concepts by grouping the interview 
questions in four main topics according to the research question and sub-questions and 
analysed responses accordingly. Also, those topics were always present in the different 
fieldwork exercises conducted and during participant observation. In this way, different 
concepts were measured in several ways. In regards of consequences, the different 
qualitative methods used and the intention of repeat interviews several times and do it for 
the consequences to different sub-groups within the community will fulfil this criterion. 
Finally, reliability deals with ‘how stable’ a measurement is, which is very similar to 
replicability. As Hancké states, reliability happens when the same question is repeated, 
or another technique gives the same outcome. In this sense, he proposes two techniques 
to deliver reliability in the research data: repeat the question and/or ask another person 
the same questions. For this research the first technique was applied, repeating the same 
topics in different settings, at different times and with different groupings. The second 
technique was assessed as looking for the cooperation of assistants, or using techniques 
such as drafting.  
                                                 




Some of the limitations of the fieldwork and interviews have been stressed above. 
However, another constraint of participant observation and ethnographic research is the 
effect that the researcher has on the context. As Alden Willy (1988) pointed out in her 
ethnographic research about land rights, when she had finished her research local people 
were more aware of the threats they had faced than before, and consequently they started 
to complain more. As result of this research, many people stated their willingness to start 
processes of applying for village land, especially young people who seemed to know the 
village procedures to acquire land. Other people also became aware of land conflicts in 
their village when they were not previously. And also, the Task Force Committee 
secretary and chairman of a self-management group in P2 became re-engaged and 
motivated to initiate actions in order to follow up in their demands for taking back the 
land that was given to a large-scale investor in their village, as will be documented later. 
Access 
The access to the communities was overt and facilitated by contacts in the country. To 
get access to the communities contact was made with five organisations: two academic, 
two local research centres and one international NGO. An application was made for the 
Tanzania Commission of Science and Technology (COSTECH) research allowance, 
which was granted and also authorisation in each region was sought in order to conduct 
the research in the targeted villages. These credentials were very valuable in accessing 
the villages and gaining the trust of the villagers. Access in qualitative research is highly 
relevant for the performance of the project. Clear explanations about what the project was 
about, and the involvement required were given before any data gathering was done. 
Negotiation is one of the main processes in participant observation and it is an ongoing 
process. Difficulties arose such as suspicion about my aims and worries about the 
consequences of the participants’ responses. For instance, many villagers thought that I 
was interested in buying land, or that I was an investor. Others thought that I held some 
power in making their demands reach the government and shifting their experiences.  
Preparation for such events was taken into account as this could have affected the results 
of the data. Bryman (2008) suggests three things to do: “play up credentials…[such as] 
understanding of their problems”, “be non-judgemental”, and “have a role…by helping 
out occasionally with work”, among others (Bryman 2008, 439). During fieldwork I 
stayed accommodated in villages and participated as much as I could in the daily lives of 
villagers. I helped with some tasks like carrying water, cleaning clothes in the river, 
visiting their farms and helped cooking. I also eat and bought in local business. Staying 
69 
 
in accommodation within the villages helped me very much to I tried to understand and 
be non-judgemental of the cultural and social differences between me and villagers, 
particularly in gender roles and levels of poverty that at points where difficult to cope 
with.  
I played the credentials of the university and informed participants and villages of my 
project. I prepared fliers and consent forms for each individual and for the village as a 
whole. I was also awarded a research permit, and this facilitated very much my tasks at 
villages as explained above. In one occasion I found a villager who did not want to talk 
to me during my walks around the farms, however, he agreed days later after gathering 
information about myself in the local government. In this occasion the use of my research 
credentials were much relevant.  
Validity and reliability of qualitative methods  
As Hancké (2009) states: “in more discursive research settings…the data literally do not 
exist without [the researcher’s] interpretation” (Hancké 2009, 91). This raises concerns 
about the subjectivity and validity of qualitative –discursive- designs. Furthermore, in 
ethnographic designs, the researcher’s involvement with the participants and the use of 
his or her ‘self’ as a research ‘tool’ makes ethnography anxious about its own validity and 
objectivity as a science (Madden 2010). However, this is partly overcome by considering 
reflexivity as of ‘methodological value’ (Madden 2010). Reflexivity is “the capacity of 
language and thought…to turn or bend back upon itself, to become and object and itself, 
and to refer to itself” (Babcock, 1980 in Madden 2010, 20); it relates to the researcher 
being aware of the way in which his or her political, social and historical identity 
influences his or her research (Madden 2010). 
The data gathered were organised and codified in order to assess the content and for 
indexing purposes: “indexing of data involves devising a consistent system … according 
to a set of common principles and measures” (Mason 2002, 151). The analysis was 
supported with NVivo software for qualitative research, and also SPSS for frequencies in 
responses. The pattern for analysis also followed thematic analysis indexation, this is the 
use of a “group of techniques for thematically organizing and analysing textual data…the 
researcher produces a list of codes (‘template’) representing themes identified in their 
textual data. Some of these will usually be defined a priori, but they will be modified and 
added to as the researcher reads and interprets the texts” (King 2004, 256). The labels or 
codes created were used as templates in Nvivo and as variables in SPSS. The templates 
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evolved from an initial codification. Table 4 below shows the initial codes according to 
interview guides (see also Annex 123):  
Table 4: Initial template for coding 
Theme Code  
what local understandings of land rights are and 
what necessities villagers have 
 
Access to land (A) 
Ownership (O) 
Tenure security (TN) 




to identify the most involved people in the 
definition of land rights and necessities while 
identifying at the same time the excluded groups 




to identify if any change concerning land rights 
over time has happened and what can be the 
causes and indicators 
 
Land transfers (LT) 
Investors Impact (I) 
Income (W) 
 
to learn about local and global factors that may 
interact in the change of those rights, with 
especial reference to local and international 
NGOs and/or CSOs 
 
NGOs Impact on LR (NI) 
Global-Local influences (GL) 
According to King (2004, 257) “a code is a label attached to a section of text to index it 
as relating to a theme or issue in the data which the researcher has identified as important 
to his or her interpretation”. The codes allowed create themes, but I also created 
hierarchies by village and actor for each code, allowing me to assess the information 
specifically or generally (e.g.Figure 2).  
                                                 
23 Annex 1 displays the interview questions according to the interviewee attribute of villager, leader or practitioner and links them to 
the research questions, themes and initial codes. 
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Figure 2: Example of template and code hierarchy 
 
Ethical considerations 
The research project raised ethical concerns about privacy and confidentiality, the 
fulfilment of the potential communities’ expectations, integrity and consent. Information 
was provided to the participants at all times about the project, their involvement and their 
ability to withdraw at any point during the research. Protecting the rights of the 
participants was considered and ethical issues were discussed and approved by the Ethics 
Committee of the University of York.  
4.2. Justification of case study 
The fieldwork lasted four and a half months, from February to June 2014, and was carried 
out in four villages in Tanzania, and Dar-es-Salaam. The selection and construct of the 
site for the fieldwork raises another debate over ethnographic methodologies. 
Traditionally, the study of the ‘other’ that is tantamount to ethnography is impregnated 
by an ‘exotic’ quality. Concerns about “agency, symbols, and everyday practice” (Marcus 
1998, 82) are closely related to the study of other cultures far away from the spatial and 
mental place of the researcher. However, this tendency has been challenged by 
ethnography at home, to understand particular processes and/or institutions. This has 
dissolute the field’s geographic boundary, and understanding it more like a “mental 
construct of the ethnographer, shaped by his or her intellectual interest” (Madden 2010, 
44). This different understanding of the field is very relevant for the purposes of this 
research, as it aims to link global and local spaces of interpretation, but in a sense that it 
is not a geographic space, but is more conceived as what Marcus (1998) has dubbed a 
“multi-sited ethnography” design that “examines the circulation of cultural meanings, 
objects, and identity in diffuse time-space” (Marcus 1998, 79), despite this dissolution it 
is “indeed ‘local’ at its very core”, and the selection of the place “and sites of investigation 
emerge inseparably from the highly politicized way that the problem of investigation…is 
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cognized” (Marcus 1998, 82). The way the researcher links such sites, defines the 
ethnography. 
4.2.1.1.Tanzania as a land grabbing scenario 
Tanzania has undergone several land reforms, like many African countries, since 
colonialism. Land grabbing is not a new phenomenon in the country, or across the whole 
continent, as pointed out in the introduction to this research. However, the current 
amalgam of new actors and new instruments of global governance and the international 
relevance of environmental sustainability for the international community make the 
momentum for an assessment of land grabbing of special significance. In Tanzania, the 
land grabbing started with colonialism and continued with the socialist ujamaa village 
campaign after independence, from 1973 to 1976. This phenomenon was known as 
‘villagisation’; it  “was a massive attempt to permanently settle most of the country’s 
population in villages, of which the layouts, housing designs, and local economies were 
planned, partly or wholly, by officials of the central government” (Scott 1998, 223). 
Villagisation programmes in Tanzania had the aim of increasing the wellbeing of the 
population, but, conversely, their results were very pervasive. Despite the fact that the 
implementation of the villagisation programmes was not as violent as in countries such 
as Ethiopia, and the government’s claims that they were voluntary, they were actually 
forced and coercive.24 The agriculture and land law reform at that time had the aim of 
transforming agriculture into large-scale farms owned by the state in a centrally planned 
economy. 
Before socialist collectivisation and during the colonialist domination, the “British in East 
Africa turned to planning large-scale development projects and mobilizing the required 
labor” (Scott 1998, 225). Scott (1998) distinguishes between two different periods of 
British domination: before and after the IIWW. He states that afterwards, large-scale 
schemes were more ambitious and even ‘gigantic’. The main yields were peanuts, sisal, 
rice, cotton, tobacco and cattle. Under such schemes “[r]esettlement and mechanization 
were integral parts” (1998, 225). Metropolis plans before, and Nyerere collectivisation 
after drawn on a total “scepticism about the actual agricultural practices of Africans” 
(Scott 1998, 226), and in the belief of modernisation of the society and agriculture. Both 
schemes failed to end Tanzanian underdevelopment; conversely, they caused major 
                                                 
24 Due to the dramatic effects of villagisation programmes in many countries they are forbidden nowadays by international legislation 
such as indigenous rights. 
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damage to economic development and the welfare conditions of the population. The 
inadequacy of local agricultural practices and land tenure systems was one of the major 
causes of the failure (Scott 1998). Both ‘top-down’ development schemes had the vision 
of small-scale peasants as non-efficient and not able to trigger development.  
This vision still dominates the top-down development paradigm, which has a negative 
view of peasants and has “tried to eliminate or transform peasants into something else” 
(Naranjo 2010). With this assertion in mind, after the end of the Cold War and the 
inception of the structural adjustment programmes, donor-led development programmes 
still focused on the transformation to large-scale farming schemes to overcome 
underdevelopment in Africa (Amanor 2005, Olukoshi 2005, Wiggins 2005). 
On the other hand, in 1989, the Land Ministry launched a process of consultation to 
establish a new land law. The process aimed to be inclusive of the views of citizens.25 It 
ended in 1999 with the approval in the parliament of The Land Act and the Village Land 
Act. One of the major consequences of the Land Act is that it created the category of 
General Lands, which Alden Willy (2003b) has argued should be named Government 
Land, because its aim is to consider all unused land as owned by the government. In Alden 
Willy’s view, this ‘General Land’ seems to be targeted at enabling large-scale foreign 
investment. Furthermore, a report from the IIED, the FAO and the IFAD states that 
“investors can only lease and use ‘general land’, not ‘village land’” (Cotula et al. 2009, 
73), a distinction that was born only in 1999. However, the official aim of this new 
legislation is to formally register all of the land tracks of the country within a community 
based process (Alden Wily 2003b). 
Alongside the national law reform, two other processes related to land distribution and 
accumulation. First, in 2003 the NEPAD launched the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture 
Development Program (CAAPD); this program is supported by international 
governmental organisations such as the AU, FARA, DFID, ISS, UNDP, and FAO, among 
others.26 The CAADP has two main goals: (i) increase the national agriculture budget to 
10%, and (ii) increase agriculture productivity by 6%. Both aims will be fulfilled by 2015. 
Tanzania has signed the programme and is currently undergoing several programmes 
under its auspice.27 However, Rahmato (2011) has argued that in order to increase 
                                                 
25 The Commission in charge of its development held “227 meetings with 80,000 persons, hear[d] and read 4,100 complaints, [met] 
with 150 officials, [and traveled] internationally” (Alden Wily 2003b, 15) 
26 For further partners see: http://www.nepad.org/partner. 
27 See: http://www.caadp.net/library-country-status-updates.php 
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agriculture productivity, African governments rely on foreign investment, which fosters 
land grabbing and disempowers local peasants. 
Second, in 2009, the Tanzanian government launched the Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture 
First), which aims to transform agriculture in Tanzania; the challenge is to “modernize 
and commercialize agriculture in Tanzania” (Ministry of Agriculture Food Security and 
Cooperatives 2012). The programme is led by the Tanzania National Business Council, 
which is a made up of 20 private and 20 public corporations and is chaired by the current 
president of the Republic of Tanzania, Yakaya Mrisho Kikwete. The Kilimo Kwanza 
programme will use the Southern Agriculture Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) 
for its implementation. “SAGCOT provides the framework to connect a critical mass of 
efficient and effective private sector investment in agricultural value chain development, 
while also integrating with public sector inputs and investment” (Ministry of Agriculture 
Food Security and Cooperatives 2012). This implementation framework, alongside the 
Kilimo Kwanza, establishes that what is different from past top-down implementations is 
that it is more focused on small-scale farmers’ promotion.  
To what extent the Kilimo Kwanza is a different development initiative or a continuing 
pattern that links with the past, and uses a small-scale discourse only to legitimise this 
policy, is far from clear. As Peters (2004) has highlighted, claims about community-based 
approaches (or small-scale farmers in analogy) can be appropriate for elites to still 
implement ‘top-down’ development policies. For instance, The Oakland Institute points 
out that under the auspices of Kilimo Kwanza, US investors have negotiated with the 
Tanzanian government the allocation of 325,000ha; “the AgriSol project is largely 
focused on the development of large-scale industrial farming, involving the use of 
genetically modified seeds and high levels of mechanisation. It relies on the relocation of 
162,000 people currently farming small plots of land targeted by the project” (The 
Oakland Institute 2011b, 2). The same institute reckons a project from an UK corporation, 
CAMS Group, that involves 45,000ha of sugarcane plantations (The Oakland Institute 
2011b, 4). On the other hand, the Land Matrix, which is a public database that records the 
amount of land, the host and guest country and the countries involved in large-scale land 
deals, reports, alongside the above-mentioned in The Oakland Institute, a deal with a 
Norwegian company, Green Sources SA, for 100,000ha; and another with a South Korean 
group, Korea Rural Community Group, for another 100,000ha, among others.28. On the 
                                                 
28 See: http://landportal.info/landmatrix/get-the-detail/by-target-country/united-republic-of-tanzania?mode=table&limit=20 
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other hand, the IIED, FAO and IFAD report stresses that “about 640,000 ha, out of a total 
of 4 million ha requested by companies has been allocated for biofuel production in 
Tanzania” (Cotula et al. 2009, 73). The same report states that “about 1000 small-scale 
rice farmers on these lands will need to move, and are not eligible for compensation as 
the land is ‘general’ not ‘village land”(2009, 73). 
Hancké points out that methodologically, cases “can be defined on the basis of three 
important characteristics: they are bounded in time and space, the case has to relate to the 
rest of the world, and case and theory have to be related” (Hancké 2009, 63). With the 
above introduction to the land and agricultural reforms in Tanzania in mind, and the three 
characteristics pinpointed by Hancké, Tanzania is taken as a case study in this research in 
three aspects: 
‘time and space’ 
Globally land grabbing was exacerbated due to the Global Food Crisis in 2007-2008. 
Since many countries started seeing their food availability as not enough to feed their 
populations, they sought their food security in other countries. The paradigmatic example 
of this is the Gulf Countries, which chaired a conference about food security and 
agriculture investment in Ethiopia with the president of this country as a guest in his own 
territory (Planeta en venta 2010). Despite the fact that the crisis fueled land grabs, the 
gestation of international and national reforms helped this situation. 
For instance, the land law and agriculture reforms that Tanzania underwent at the end of 
1990s and that were consolidated at the beginning of the 2000s, creating a favorable 
climate for the marketization of land. Also, FDI investment in agriculture increased 
globally since 2004. In the period from 2005 to 2007 the FDI investment in agriculture in 
developing countries increased by more than three times per year on average. TNC 
presence increased in the region “opening a variety of exploration projects in new 
locations and injecting large volumes of capital into green-field projects. They also 
undertook a record level of cross-border M&As29” (UNCTAD 2009, 42). In the specific 
case of Tanzania, the figures show that FDI increased from 331 million dollars in 2004 
to 744 million in 2008 (UNCTAD 2009). Another relevant tool was the CAADP and its 
main implementation tool the SAGCOT were launched in 2003. 
                                                 
29 Mergers and acquisitions 
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The Land Act and the Village Act, despite being released and approved in 1999, were 
only implemented in 2001. After several regulations were approved to implement the law, 
by 2003 it only was used in some districts (Alden Wily 2003b); and by the time of 
fieldwork the law still much unknown, which was one of the main concerns of civil 
society. 
 ‘relate to the world’ 
This relationship with an empirical reality draws on what has been pointed out when 
talking about the characteristics of the current wave of land grabs. Borras Jr. et al. (2013) 
have summarised the three main distinctive characteristics of the momentum for this 
trend: (i) the emergence of ‘flex-crops/commodities’, (ii) the rise of middle-income 
countries, and (iii) the role of nation-states in enabling such processes (2013, 162–3). 
These characteristics are present in the case of Tanzania. However, the main investors are 
high income countries rather than middle-income ones. This fact does not exclude the 
country from this phenomenon. Several scholars, such as Cotula (2011) or NGOs such as 
GRAIN (2012) have sustained that there is not one particular actor; there are traditional 
(developed) and new middle-income countries, such as China or the Gulf Countries, in 
the picture. 
Furthermore, to make the Tanzanian case suitable for the requirements of ‘relevant 
universe’ that relates with a ‘wider phenomenon’ that in this work are local effects of 
struggles over land grabbing, it requires contestation. There are several examples of 
contestation over land grabbing in Tanzania, being the main achievement their lobbying 
for limiting the quantity of land involved in the contracts. One of the relevant actors in 
this struggle was the local NGO and research centre Hakiardi, jointly with other 
representatives of the civil society, which in 2012 were able to bring about a ceiling 
limitation for land deals of 10,000ha (The Guardian 2012). Moreover, organisations such 
as ActionAid and La Via Campesina are supporting national mobilisations. For instance, 
La Via Campesina (2012) informed that the MVIWATA (National Small-Scale Farmers 
Networks Groups in Tanzania) released a report as a result of a national Symposium that 
denounced the land grab situation in the country and its consequences for small-scale 
farmers.  
 ‘relationship with theory’ 
This thesis uses two pieces of literature from the scholarship to create its theoretical 
framework (see chapter 2). Both are relevant to the current case study. Firstly, as seen in 
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the introduction to this chapter, Tanzania has been undergoing several land reforms as 
well as a transition to large-scale farming; this implies a transition from traditional or 
customary land tenure systems to formal ones. Secondly, the grassroots movements that 
have been contesting this issues, the ability to limit the ceilings of the land grabs in the 
country, and the global actors that are involved, enable the theoretical framework of 
change “from below” and its criticism of top-down development policies in developing 
countries.  
4.2.1.2.Fieldwork sites 
The research explored four villages in two districts and two different regions (Pwani and 
Morogoro) in the East of Tanzania. In District 1, the villages studied belong to different 
wards, whereas in District 2 the villages belong to the same ward and are neighbouring 
villages, sharing village boundaries.  Despite the administrative organisation (see Figure 
3), the most relevant authorities are at the Village, District and Central Government 
levels. Other levels perform more of an administrative role than a political one. 














                                                 














Both regions studied –Pwani or Coastal and Morogoro - belong to the so-called Rufiji 
basin. The basin contains the largest mangrove forest in the world. The Rufiji River is the 
largest in the country and the basin is the target of SAGCOT strategies, although some of 
the commercial farms found did operate within this strategy while others did not. The 
ones that did were the ones located in the Morogoro Region. During colonial rule, the 
Coast Region, Dar-es-Salaam and the Morogoro Region were the same administrative 
unit named Coast Province. Dar-es-Salaam is at the same time a Region and the 
commercial capital city of Tanzania, while Dodoma is the administrative capital city of 
the country. Morogoro gives its name not only to the Region, but also to the District and 
the main urban centre within it (Ndembwike 2008).  
The Pwani Region population was 1,098,668 in 201231 and the population of the 
Morogoro Region was 2,218,492 (citypupulation.de 2017). The Pwani Region has a 
typical tropical climate with a heavy rain season from March to June, when access may 
be difficult through the truck roads. During the fieldwork the damage to the roads caused  
P2 Village to be isolated for one week. Organisations’ activities and land rights trainings 
stopped during the rainy season period in the field. The main ethnic group in Pwani are 
the Zaramos. The Pwani Region is divided into six districts, Bagamoyo, Kibaha, 
Kisarawe, Mafia (an island in the Indian Ocean), Mkuranga and Rufiji, 26 divisions, 125 
wards, 417 villages, 73 streets and 2,039 hamlets (The United Republic of Tanzania’s 
President’s Office 2015a).  
The Morogoro Region is the second largest in the country after Tabora. It contains the 
Uluguru Mountains, which give their name to one of the main ethnic groups, the Luguru. 
It has seven districts: Kilosa, Kilombero, Morogoro Rural –the biggest one, Morogoro 
Urban, Mvomero,  Ulanga and Gairo, 32 divisions, 214 wards, 659 villages, 295 streets 
and 3,213 hamlets (The United Republic of Tanzania’s President’s Office 2015b). 
Although Maasai and Sukuma or Bar’baig are not traditionally ethnic groups in the area, 
they are widely settled. These two ethnic groups are traditionally livestock keepers who 
arrived in Morogoro in search of pastures. This is a distinctive difference between the two 
areas studied in this research and has an impact on the conflicts around land that both 
regions face. Some incipient pastoralists presence was found in the Pwani Region. 
However, it is not widely experienced, as pastures in the villages studied in Pwani are 
scarcer due to the nature of the soil.  
                                                 
31 Last official census by Tanzanian National Bureau of Statistics 
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Illustration 1: Tanzania regions, capital cities and case study locations 
 
Source: Citypopulation, 2017 
In 2015 the President’s Office launched Investment Profiles for each region of the 
country. These Profiles target different areas for economic development and available 
land. In the Pwani Region the Profile estimates that there is an area of “1,933,224 Ha of 
arable land, which is suitable for agriculture production, of which only 530,328 Ha is 
utilised, equivalent to 27.4 percent of the total arable land”, and an area of 128,795 
hectares, of which only 1,945 Ha (or 1.5 percent) is utilised for irrigation (The United 
Republic of Tanzania’s President’s Office 2015a, 5). The Profile also targets other 
investment opportunities in livestock ranches, mining, agriculture industries, and tourism. 
Similarly, in the Morogoro Region, the available activities are the same, Table 5 describes 
the main investment opportunities by relevance. 










Table 5: Investment Opportunities 
 
Source: Morogoro investment profile, 2015 
 
4.2.1.3.Introduction to the four villages 
The village government is formed of 25 villagers. They are usually referred to as leaders. 
Apart from them, there is also the elected Village Chairman and the Village Executive 
Officer (VEO). The VEO is the liaison between the village and the district, and may have 
been sent from somewhere else to that village. Without the VEO village meetings and 
other procedures are not possible. The village also has different committees, and can form 
different committees to deal with different problems or interests of the villagers. Two of 
the committees that were relevant for this research were the Village Land Committee and 
the Planning Committee. Some villagers were members of the Youth Committee. The 
Village Chairman is the main leader of the village. In the four villages the Chairman and 
the VEW participated in interviews and were visited several times to gather and 
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corroborate information and documents. The village leaders were unsure of the 
population of the village or the size of it. It is mainly at District Level that this information 
is gathered, and the size of the villages is difficult to obtain unless there is an established 
LUP. 
4.2.1.4.Demographic trends 
The Tanzanian population was estimated by the UN in 2017 to be 56,372,726 
(Worldometers, 2017).32 The country’s population grows at a rate of 2.7% every year and 
quadrupled in size between 1967 (12.3 million) and 2015 (49 million) (National Bureau 
of Statistics, 2015). The urban population makes up 32.2% and the main commercial city, 
Dar-es-Salaam, doubled its population in ten years from 2005 to 2015, from 2.5 million 
to 5 million people. The median age of the population is 17.4 years (Wolrdometers.com 
2017).  
Figure 4: Tanzanian Population (1950-2017) 
 
Source: worldometers.com, 2017 
 
Considered scarcely populated traditionally compared to Asian developing countries, 
population trends are changing fast in Sub-Saharan countries in general, and in Tanzania 
in particular, as the figures show. The new investment opportunities and the demographic 
trends are having a considerable impact on the changing relationship between the people 
and the environment, their institutions and the land.  
The increase in the population has an impact on the need for land, at the same time that 
the openness to commercial agriculture. Both have an impact on grabs. Li (2014b) refers 
                                                 
32 In the last official census in 2012 it was 44,928,923 (TNBS 2017) 
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to ‘grabbing’ as a type of ‘bullying’ that enables access to the land to those who are more 
powerful.  
Powerful people—government officials, village heads, army officers, customary chiefs, 
prominent villagers—grab land and claim ownership. They take advantage of a legal vacuum 
created by overlapping laws and weak enforcement. Brute force often shapes outcomes, and 
money can buy land, even when it should not be for sale (Li 2014b, 14–5). 
These dynamics have been explored in the context of Tanzania and the four cases studied 
show this reality. At the same time they shed light on the ‘opportunities’ that some have 
found in developing small farms or bigger ones, with the acquiescence of villagers who 
may have found an opportunity for labour. They surpass Li’s (2014) concept of ‘bullying’ 
in the understanding that they include neighbour to neighbour problems associated with 
savvy behaviour among the villagers themselves and problems of exclusion depending 
on the use of the land (pastoralism vs.farming). 
4.2.1.5.Participants 
4.2.1.6.Socioeconomic background of villagers 
The population of the villages is measured by people and household or family. P1 had a 
population of 2,798 people and 490 families; P2 had 2,003 people and 363 families; M1 
had 1,257 people and 362 families; while M2 had a population of around 1,600 people 
and 400 families.33 All of the villages were formed of different hamlets: P1 had six 
hamlets, P2 had four, M1 had three, and M2 had five. In regard to farming, the villagers 
in District 1 -P1 and P2- harvested mainly maize and cassava, while in District 2 –P1 and 
P2- they harvested maize and sesame. In both places some people harvested rice but only 
in District 2 were livestock present. Cassava and sesame were the main cash crops that 
the villagers harvested. Many women and youths were involved in small businesses; 
women were mainly involved in cooking and selling food on the main streets. They sold 
small snacks like cooked cassava or potato samosas. Young people worked as bodaboda 
drivers and some people had shops. Usually, there were two or three shops in the village 
main settlement that sold drinks, cookies, lighters, batteries, and soap. Young people also 
tended to have a business where they sold fried potatoes mixed with eggs, a typical food 
that people eat at night.  
The villagers’ farms were usually 1 to 5 acres in area. Some may have had around 10 
acres but they were not the majority. They used a sickle as their main tool for working 
                                                 
33Approximate 2012 data from District 1 and 2 sources.  
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the land. Most of the interviewees had no cash and they produced for home consumption. 
Others were able to have cash due to a small business or cash crops (see Table 6). The 
ones with higher incomes were pastoralists.  
Table 6: Participants’ responses regarding their cash income34 
Cash income in 
TSh Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 0-200,000 18 18.4 26.5 
200,001-400,000 14 14.3 47.1 
400,001-600,000 7 7.1 57.4 
600,001-800,000 4 4.1 63.2 
800,001-1,000,000 9 9.2 76.5 
1,000,001-2,000,000 8 8.2 88.2 
2,000,001-4,000,000 6 6.1 97.1 
+4,000,000 2 2.0 100.0 
Total 68 69.4  
    




NGO1 was not a land rights based organisation; they had different programmes and 
projects regarding violations of rights. NGO1 was founded over twenty years ago by a 
nowadays retired teacher, who was still the Director Executive of the institution. The 
offices were in the urban area of the district, and were small with limited staff. During the 
visit and interviews the executive did not stop talking on the phone with paralegals 
distributed throughout the villages they were attending and he received a visit from a 
paralegal who needed paper and also participated in this study. Their aim and strategy 
went beyond land rights issues; they were concerned with a wide range of issues such as 
gender and HIV issues. From 2009 to 2011 NGO1 was working on funding for a program 
related primarily with land and funded by an international NGO. They were supporting 
the communities through training on the laws and training paralegals to stay link to them; 
the issue of the LUP and cooperation for the emission of CCRO. In doing this, they 
ensured that all of the appropriate institutions were in place within the village. The village 
                                                 
34 The table does not include leaders and seven participants who did not want to respond to that question 
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needed to have a Village Plan Committee to decide on the use of the land (through the 
LUP) and they had to call assemblies and ensure that the plans were well agreed by the 
village.  
NGO2  
This organisation was settled in 2003 and had about thirty members. They were retired 
people who decided that they were able to continue working and wanted to keep active 
in helping the communities; they used to be members of the military or government 
officials. Their main purpose in working with land issues was that they “observed that 
communities may collapse due to land. Because there were many conflicts among people 
and the community did not know about land law. We decided to train the village 
government and the communities on that” (Q44-General Secretary NGO2, 15.04.2014). 
This CBO was working at the district level and also had its offices in the main urban area 
around the communities they helped. They were also funded by an anonymised35 national 
foundation in Tanzania. Their main aim was to train people in the villages and in the local 
governments on the law and on which infrastructures they needed to deal with the 
emission of CCRO. The Retirees was a very small organisation and had very few links 
with others; their main task was training villagers on land rights and the institutions they 
needed to have in place.  
NGO3 
NGO3 is primarily an advocacy NGO; however, they also had a service delivery role as 
they worked on training communities and training land monitors who reported to them 
regularly. The staff of the organisation were graduates and postgraduates in the field of 
politics, law or economics from different ethnic groups in Tanzania, including 
pastoralists. The Executive Director was also an academic. NGO3 has also a role as a 
think tank and research centre. NGO3 was a strong institution and cooperated regularly 
with research internationally and was the mentor of national coalition of civil society 
organisations36. NGO3 was based in Dar-es-Salaam, but many of its staff travelled around 
the country conducting training on land rights or in the LUP. NGO3 was a coordinator of 
funding and research, and a co-operator with Advocacy NGOs in the North, working with 
the central government on commissions and aiming to change the law; in particular they 
                                                 
35 All the participants and organisations in this research are anonymised. 
36 The name of the coalition anonymised for the requirements of this research. 
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believed that in Tanzania the main problem is that all of land is public and is vested on 
the president as trustee of the people.  
They conducted the same type of training as described above for NGO1 and NGO2, and 
they also trained paralegals and helped communities with legal cases in some instances. 
Their work was remarkable and their founder had been a leading force in fighting for land 
rights at the national level in Tanzania. Their main objective was to enhance the 
knowledge of the public on land matters, to strengthen the capacity of decision-making 
organs regarding land and to facilitate public participation in decision making processes.  
Illustration 2: Land Rights Trainings 
 
Source: author's fieldwork, Feb-June 2014Others 
Other NGOs participated in the research in a less involved way through interviews with 
their staff. They were national and international NGOs. Also other practitioners such as 
official donors and scholars were interviewed during the fieldwork in Tanzania. They 
have been anonymised.  
4.2.1.8.The agricultural context: SAGCOT and Kilimo Kwanza 
In May 2010, within the auspices of the World Economic Forum on Africa celebrated in 
Dar-es-Salaam the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania was launched. 
The SAGCOT is a strategic framework to improve agriculture competitiveness in 
Tanzania under the strategic framework of the CAADP. The CAADP is a pan-African 
development plan supported by the African Union for agriculture, which aims to boost 
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food security and agricultural growth. Tanzania signed the CAADP in 2010 and in 
November 2011 finalised the TAFSIP – the Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security 
Investment Plan. This institutionalised boost for agricultural development put the 
emphasis on agricultural transformation from subsistence to commercial one (Ministry of 
Agriculture Food Security and Cooperatives 2012) and created the appropriate climate 
for large-scale commercial agriculture.  
The programme is supported by international donors and UN agencies, such as the FAO 
and the World Bank and it is also part of the Agricultural Sector Development Program 
created between the government and the WB, which has been implemented in the country 
since 2006. The interaction between Kilimo Kwanza, ASDP and SAGCOT is exemplified 
in the following diagram (Figure 5): 
Figure 5: SAGCOT within Tanzania's developmental and agricultural strategic framework 
 
 Source: (AgDevCo and Prorustica 2011) 
SAGCOT is led by its Executive Committee, co-chaired by the Minister of Agriculture 
and the Executive Vice President (North and Central Africa) of Unilever. SAGCOT 
covers one third of mainland Tanzania (Illustration 3). The aim is to place Tanzania as 
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one of the major agricultural producers in cereals, agriculture, livestock and cash crops to 
sell surpluses to the rest of the world. The implementation of the plan began in 2011, 
when the SAGCOT Partnership organisation was created to develop the Blueprint of the 
program and a second stage where funding will be launched to catalyse funds into early-
stage investment opportunities. The programme aims to engage smallholder famers with 
commercial agribusiness, including ‘hub and outgrowers’ schemes.  
The Corridor is also embedded in the pre-existing institutional framework of the Kilimo 
Kwanza (Agriculture First) strategy of the Tanzanian government, launched in 2009. The 
partnership members are the Tanzanian government, global businesses, the Tanzanian 
private sector, farmers, foundations and donor institutions. Some of the members include 
Unilever, Yara Internatinional, Monsanto, Dupont, and Santbic Bank USAID (AgDevCo 
and Prorustica 2011). Building in Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture First strategy), the 
SGCOT Investment Blueprint describes how $2.1 billion of private investment will be 
catalysed over a twenty-year period, alongside public sector grants and loans of $1.3 
billion. The result will be a tripling of the area’s agricultural output. Approximately 
350,000 hectares will be brought into profitable production, much of it farmed by 
smallholder farmers, and with a significant area under irrigation (AgDevCo and 
Prorustica 2011).  
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Illustration 3: SAGCOT Area37 
 
             Source: (AgDevCo and Prorustica 2011) 
As explained before, SAGCOT is integrated into the Kilimo Kwanza agricultural strategy 
for the country. The primary source for Tanzanian development and for the domestic 
economy for families and the government is agriculture. More than 70% of the population 
is still rural (FAO). The Kilimo Kwanza policy aims to boost this sector to improve GDP 
growth and development in Tanzania, supporting small producers alongside big investors. 
The programme distributes seeds and fertilisers to rural populations. Its main goal is to 
increase the growth of the agricultural sector from 4 to 10%. The programme is 
considered the “Green Revolution” strategy for agricultural improvement in Tanzania 
(Mbunda 2011). The Kilimo Kwanza has ten pillars: 
1. Political will to transform agriculture through the creation of a national vision on 
Kilimo Kwanza 
2. Financing agriculture 
3. Institutional reorganisation and management of agriculture 
4. Paradigm shift to strategic agricultural production 
5. Land availability for agriculture 
                                                 
37 The corridor area is illustrated by the darker shadow 
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6. Incentives to stimulate investments in agriculture 
7. Industrialisation for agricultural transformation 
8. Science, technology and human resources to support agricultural transformation 
9. Infrastructure development to support agricultural transformation 
10. Mobilisation of Tanzanians to support and participate in the implementation of Kilimo 
Kwanza. 
The SAGCOT projects are explored in relation to the Morogoro Region and they affect 
the M1 and M2 villages. In District 2 there was an administrative representative for 
SAGCOT at the District Council.  
4.2.1.9.The law and policy con38text 
4.2.1.10. Land Law of 1999 
The Land Law of Tanzania is broken down into two acts; the Land Act -no.4- and the 
Village Land Act -no.5-, which were enacted in 1999 and officially settled by 1/05/2001 
as the new land laws regulating land transactions and land resources in Tanzania. The law 
was passed after a process was begun in 1991 by the President of Tanzania. The President 
settled the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters (1991-1992) in order to 
collect views and opinions from the people of Tanzania regarding land issues. The 
Commission aimed to disentangle some of the problems that were making the land 
ownership systems dysfunctional (NGO3-Anonymised 2013). It is significant to point out 
that the Commission paid special attention to the conflict among pastoralists and farmers. 
The Chairman of the Commission was the land rights professor and advocate. The 
Commission underwent an extensive participatory process at grassroots level. Thousands 
of assemblies and consultancy groups took place around the country, which included rural 
villagers. The main recommendations and the underlying principles were: 
[Recommendations:] a) The tenurial status of all lands would be declared constitutionally to be 
either national or village lands; in urban areas the present system of allocation through rights 
of occupancy would continue; 
                                                 
38 This section is based primarily on the information gathered during the land rights training assisted while in fieldwork in the village 
M1. The training was carried out by NGO3. I also used the land training manual NGO3 that has been anonymised and that I translated 
partially from Swahili.  
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b) national lands would be vested in a National Land Commission independent of the 
Executive, accountable to the Legislature and overseen by a reconstructed Judiciary; village 
lands would be vested in Village Assemblies; 
c) dispute-settlement machinery would be reorganised by creating Elders Councils at the 
village level and Circuit Land Courts at a higher level in which elders would participate; 
community values would be brought to bear on decision-making by magistrates and judges; 
d) a limited land market would be created which would guard against anarchic tendencies and 
socially disruptive effects by providing for overall control by the community through the 
village assemblies (in the case of village lands) and elected ward and district committees (in 
the case of national lands); 
[Principles:] a) agrarian accumulation “from below” would be encouraged based on a vision of 
an autonomous national development (albeit capitalist) as opposed to the current practice of 
incautious opening up of the country to predatory merchant and compradorial capital, both 
local and domestic; 
b) the monopoly of radical titles in the executive arm of the state would be broken up and 
diversified in a way that would permit control and administration of land “from below” and  
countervailing forces against abuse by monopolistic state organs would be created; and, 
c) procedures that would be legitimate, accessible, open and transparent would be devised 
(Tanzanian Affairs 1995) 
The Commission has a positive impact on land laws and policies, especially when 
allowing villages to control village land. It also had a relevant impact on the 
Constitutional debates in 2014 and has made explicit the right for women to own land. 
However, the main aim of limiting the Presidential power and transferring it to the 
Parliament was not achieved (recommendation b). This is still a major claim of Advocacy 
NGOs in Tanzania: 
Two land laws were enacted in 1999: the Land Law no.4 and the Village Land Law no 5. Those 
two laws have given to the President the power to control the land in behalf of the people… 
(NGO3-Anonymised 2013, 36) 
The law differentiates Tanzania’s land into different groups in order to make it easier to 
control and manage, and to give directives about how to own land and how to receive 
compensation in case someone should take another person’s land. The law also grants the 
right to own the land, to use it and to sell it. One of the major changes in the law is the 
right to own the land and to obtain customary certificates. Although recognising 
customary ownership, the acts place more relevance on formal ownership.  
Land ownership is ruled by the norms and customs of the tribe. Each society or clan has its 
own ways of accessing, distributing and using land that are followed since the time of their 
ancestors. After the 1999 Law, this kind of ownership has been considered as weak or valueless 
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when compared with the process of owning the land with a certificate. (NGO3-Anonymised 
2013, 68) 
Meaning of land 
The Land Act no 4 and the Village Land Act no 5 of 1999 specify that the concept of land 
includes all of the land and the things on top and below the land surface, including 
buildings and natural vegetation. However, the concept of land excludes all minerals and 
petroleum and gas products, according to article 2 (Interpretation) of both laws. Minerals, 
gas and petrol are excluded from land ownership and the authority concerning such things 
lies with the Ministry of Energy and Minerals. The management and control of such 
natural resources come under the Mineral Law no 14 of 2010.  
Categories of land 
This is one of the more relevant aspects of the law concerning my research and it is 
relevant for issues concerning land dispossession and land grabbing. According to the 
Land Law of 1999, section 4.4, all Tanzanian land is subdivided into three different 
groups: general lands, reserved lands and village lands. 
1. General land: Section 2 
This is public land that is not reserved or village land. Village Land that is not in use –
idle land –can be considered general land. The management and control of this kind of 
land is in the hands of the Land Commissioner controlled by the central government. This 
type of land is generates more debates, as it is under central government control, and the 
government can declare any unused Village Land General Land (Alden Wily 2010). 
2. Reserved land: Section 2 and 6 
This land is set apart for special uses such as forest reserves; dams; trees surrounding the 
sea shores; islands near the seashores or lakes; lands where waste is dumped; sixty metres 
inland from the sea or lakes; national parks; water sources and roads. This kind of land 
comes under the authority of government parastatals such as TANROAD or TANAPA 
(NGO3-Anonymised 2013).  
3. Village Land: Sections 2 and 7 
The texts regulating village land are: Village Ownership Law no,27 of 1995, Village Law 
and Ujemaa Village of 1975, Local Government Law no.7 of 1982, and Village Land Act 
no.5 of 1999. Village Land is: 
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 Land inside the boundaries of the village that is registered according to article 22 
of the Local Government Law no.7 of 1982 
 Land reserved as village land in accordance with Village Law Number 27 of 
1965 
 Land that had boundaries demarcating village land under any law that was used 
in the period before the Village Land Act no.5 of 1999 was enacted.  
 Land that was not Reserved Land for twelve years before the Land Law of 1999 
was enacted and if villagers were not taken into consideration in the approval of 
general meetings it is also village land. 
Land ownership system 
There are two types of land ownership in Tanzania, customary land ownership and 
occupancy ownership: 
Customary land ownership 
Land ownership is ruled by the norms and customs of each tribe. Each society or clan has 
its own ways of accessing, distributing and using land that have been followed since the 
time of their ancestors. After the 1999 Law, this kind of ownership was considered weak 
or valueless when compared with the process of owning the land with a certificate 
(NGO3-Anonymised 2013). During the colonial period, this type of land ownership was 
not recognised by the law and there was a distinction between formal ownership (that of 
the coloniser) and informal ownership (that of the customs of Tanzania). This distinction 
allowed one (formal) to be considered superior to the other, and, thus, led to dispossession 
(Alden Wily 2010, NGO3-Anonymised 2013). Nowadays, customary land ownership is 
recognised by the law and a customary certificate, both for the village (Village Land 
Certificate) and for individuals (Customary Certificate of Occupancy), and the certificate 
can be obtained by following the required procedures described in the NGO3’s land rights 
trainings. 
Village Land Certificate: 
The village boundaries must be demarcated before the village is formally registered as 
such. The village certificate will be given then to the mentioned village. This will mean 
that the village has a recognised government and established boundaries. The boundaries 
must be according to the law or to any other agreement reached among local governments 
or the land commissioner. 
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After the village has been registered it receives the Village Land Certificate according to 
section 7(2). This certificate stresses that the land will be used for living purposes and 
used by villagers in their activities according to the law. The certificate: 
 Is obtained by order of the President 
 Gives to the village government mandate to control the land 
 Shows the village boundaries, and replaces any other certificate given to the 
village before. 
 States that the land is for pastures, when the settlers are herders and pastoralists. 
If the village boundaries change, the village must send the information to the district 
council in order to change the certificate. The village is supposed to have a land use plan 
according to its needs and these needs are agreed by the village general meeting. The 
Land Use Law no. 6 of 2007 that emanates from the Land Laws of 1999 gives directions 
on these commitments, and is assessed further in the next section. 
 After the processes of preparing and accessing the Village Land Certificate and the 
village land use plan, the villagers (the beneficiaries) can obtain a customary certificate 
of ownership. The procedures to obtain such certificates are detailed below. 
Customary Certificate of Occupancy (CCRO) 
This is a certificate provided by the village government according to section 25 of the 
Village Land Law no5 1999, which states that the requested person owns the land through 
customary procedures (refers to section 23, 34). Section 25 discusses the certificate that 
is obtained by form number 2, according to the law. The form: 
 Will be signed by the chairperson and the VEO 
 Will be signed and thumbed by the one receiving the certificate 
 Will be signed, stamped and registered by the District Land Office where the 
village belongs 
 Can be obtained with no lasting period or with a lasting period (section 27) 
 There will be a tax paid (rent) if the person is not Tanzanian (section 28.22(2)) 
According to section 29, the certificate of ownership will be given with some conditions 
to the owner. The owner will make sure that: 
• (S)he uses the land 
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• Those using the land do it properly, taking care of it and keeping it in good 
order. 
• If the land is used for farming, (s)he makes sure that farming is appropriate 
• Pastoralists use the land in a sustainable way and with modernised ways of 
keeping animals. 
• She pays the taxes and expenses needed 
• She lives in that village 
The fact that each village has a certificate and provides certificates of ownership to the 
villagers so that they can own the land legally is seen as a revolutionary concept and a 
developmental improvement. However, the process of getting such certificates is 
expensive and takes a long time.  
Occupancy of General Land 
The origins of occupancy are found in the colonial British land law of 1923, which stated 
that the land is controlled by the people and nobody has the mandate to use it without the 
agreement of the state. The new law takes this principle when allocates a certificate to a 
foreigner, who cannot own the land by custom. This certificate, called a Certificate of 
Occupancy, applies only to General Land and has a period of duration of 33, 66 or up to 
99 years. The owner is not an owner as such, but, rather, is considered a tenant because 
(s)he cannot own the land forever. 
Certificate of Occupancy (CO): 
These procedures are explained by the Land Act no. 4 of 1999 in sections 25-29. The 
person aiming to own the land in this way has to send a request to the Land Commissioner. 
Also, consent should be sought from regions, districts and villages, and their 
correspondent land officers. If the land is allocated for the certificate, it needs to be clearly 
specified how the land will be used. This is an important point of the law, because if the 
Certificate of Occupancy is issued for a particular use, it can be repealed if the land is not 
dedicated for the initial purpose for which the certificate was approved. The person 
requesting the land will cover all of the expenses incurred in issuing the certificate.  
Accessing land according to the law 
Before the new Land Laws of 1999 were settled, people owned land in different ways. 
There are five different ways of acquiring land that are widespread in Tanzania: 
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Inheritance: this is a very old way of accessing and owning land and was used by different 
clans and kinships. People could obtain the land either by inheriting it from their father 
or from any other relatives. This procedure can be customary or involve a certificate; both 
are recognised by law. “It is very important to keep safe all the documents related to the 
inheritance, so the new owner will not face any problem” (NGO3-Anonymised 2013). 
Clearing land from the bush that does not belong to anyone: this way was used by the 
population traditionally but has become very uncommon and contested in villages, 
especially over the last twenty years. Somebody could clear a piece of land that had no 
owner and use it for cultivation. The current law does not allow or this way of acquiring 
land. However, for those who gained land in this way before the law, they are legally 
protected and considered the legitimate owner of the land. This does not apply to reserved 
lands. 
Buying: buying and selling land was a common practice even before the new law. 
However, the land law of 1999 forbids land owners from selling land if they are not 
developing it.  The law gives land a marked value, which is a significant change, as before 
land had no value. Land can also be sold and used as collateral for loans in financial 
institutions. There is a concern among villagers and development workers regarding the 
impact that this market price has for the rural populations who are selling their land to 
deal with economic constraints such as paying for school or health expenses.  
This way of accessing the land is one of the fastest ways, especially for those with higher 
income. Those who sold the land in order to solve their own economic problems have regretted 
doing so as the value of the land has increased and they have no land to cultivate. The person 
who buys the land has all the rights over the land. It is important to note that land transfers need 
to be agreed and witnessed by the authority concerned, either the village government or the 
land commissioner. In this way the owner pays the proper taxes (NGO3-Anonymised 2013, 
20). 
Given by the local government: The Land Law states that an individual, a group of people 
or any other entity that demands land must send a letter to the authority concerned 
requesting such land in order to acquire it in a legal way. The authority in that case relies 
on the village government and the assembly. Then the request goes up to the district and 
government level. This procedure applies to outsiders to the village, but also to villagers 
themselves who may want land. In this case the request does not need to go to the district 
and government. Nowadays, local governments are charging fees for this process to 
villagers, although sometimes they may decide to give the land for free. Some examples 
that people participating in the interviews expressed are given below: 
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The village government announces every farming season [who wants land] and those who want 
the land, they go and they get land (Focus Group participant, 19.04.2014) 
4ac were given to me by a village programme, “Bega kwa Bega”: shoulder to shoulder, in this 
programme we do not pay for anything. Village leaders decided to divide the land to the people 
so they can cultivate (Men in P1 Village, 18.03.2014). 
Land gained as a reward: land can be gained as a reward from someone (e.g. as 
compensation for nurses, teachers, work, etc.). In that case the person who gives the land 
loses any right over it; the new owner has the rights over such land and the old owner 
cannot claim the land back. 
5ac were given to me as compensation for being a nurse volunteer (Women, Kinu Village, 
10.05.2014) 
In all of these cases, the owner can obtain the customary certificate of occupancy, or the 
certificate of occupancy, depending on the circumstances of the person requesting the 
land. However, there are other ways to get access to land without a certificate, such as 
renting it or borrowing it from others. In that case the land is borrowed or rented from the 
owner of the land and an agreement is made between the parties. The ownership in that 
case remains with the owner of the land. The tenant or lender will not get a certificate, 
even when (s)he has been using the land for a long time.   
Experience has shown that those who rent the land disagree about returning it back to the 
owner. Owners need to be careful in these circumstances. It is better to have a formal agreement 
(written) when these circumstances happen (NGO3-Anonymised 2013, 34). 
4.2.1.11. Land Use Plan Law 
The Land Use Plan Law no.6 of 2007 is a consequence of the Land Law of 1999, which 
highlights the needs for all the groups to benefit from the land. The Land Use Plan (LUP) 
is also regulated in the Land Policy of 1995 and 2006 and in the People’s Settlement 
Policy of 2000. According to the Directive of National Land Use Plan of 2010 (page 10), 
a LUP is a system of evaluation and stresses different uses of land and all of the natural 
resources needed to develop the life of the villagers and reduce poverty. The directive 
insists on coordinating the planning and implementation of the LUP jointly with villagers, 
who, in the end, are the main users of the land. Inclusion is recommended, including 
farmers, pastoralists, people of different genders and ages, who might have different 














 What are the various processes through which land grabbing occurs? 
 Are land grabbing processes always large-scale accumulation processes? 
This chapter will answer the questions of what are the various processes through which 
land grabbing occurs and whether or notlnad grabbing is always a large – scale 
accumulation process. Whith this aim, the chapterdocuments cases of land-related 
conflict and dispossession in the four villages studied in the regions of Morogoro and 
Pwani in Tanzania. The cases can be split into two categories: large-scale dispossession, 
which usually involves international actors and has been widely considered as land 
grabbing or the global land rush by the literature that has emerged since 2008 (e.g.: 
Anseeuw et al. 2011, Cotula 2011, Pearce 2012, White et al. 2012); and small-scale 
dispossession, which usually involves national elites (Peters 2013), or even villagers and 
their neighbours (Kandel 2015). The end result is exclusion from the land: “the ways in 
which people are prevented from benefiting” (Hall et al. 2011, 7) from the land and its 
resources through dispossession.  
Five cases are categorised. They were present to different degrees in each village, 
although only three of the villages have experienced large-scale land grabbing as 
described by the literature (see Table 7). The cases are: large-scale deals in three of the 
villages studied; widespread legal small-scale land transactions that have resulted in land 
dispossession due to socio-economic stratification; dispossession by demarcation; 
villagers grabbing each other’s land, which has happened in four of the villages studied 
and is a trend throughout the whole country; and finally, small-scale illegal acquisitions, 
which can be violent, and are carried out by some unscrupulous elites. These five cases 
have also prevented pastoralists from having access to pastures, and thus excluded them 
from their right to use the land. This situation, in turn, has exacerbated the pre-existent 




Table 7: Main ongoing conflicts during fieldwork observation 
Village P1 
Total cases 
Four illegal small investors-taken to court  
Boundaries among villages and among neighbours 
People grabbing land from others 
Village P2 
Total cases 
Large-scale legal investor-failed project 
Development projects 
Boundaries among villages and among neighbours 
People grabbing land from others 
Village M1 
Total cases 
Large-scale legal investor-incipient project approved 
Boundaries among villages and among neighbours 
People grabbing land from others 




Large-scale legal investor-incipient project declined 
Boundaries among villages and among neighbours 
People grabbing land from others 
Legal small investors 
Pastoralists 
Source: Fieldwork observations, Feb-June 2014 
5.2 A failed large-scale biofuel farm in P2 
P2 Village is situated at a distance of 82km from Dar-es-Salaam. Although the distance 
may not seem that great, the 36km that separates P1 from P2 is very difficult to cover, 
due to the track roads, which are often destroyed by rain and therefore impassable. It takes 
more than two hours to go from one village to the other in normal conditions by motorbike 
or car, and there is a bus twice a day, if conditions allow it. The journey from Dar-es-
Salaam to P2 may take around six hours, usually more, considering the traffic jams and 
waiting times if travelling by public transport. Despite this, it is still attractive to urban 
people, although much less than P1 for evident reasons. The potential of electricity and 
road developments is attracting many people from urban centres with speculative aims. 
One villager in P2 explained this: “In the last year39 there has been a lot of increase [in 
                                                 
39 Interview took place 10.04.2014 
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people selling and buying land]. People from Dar come looking for land, many people 
know that electricity will come and they want to buy here” (Q40-Young farmer man P2, 
10.04.2014). 
Illustration 4: Track road from P1 to P2 
 
Source: author's fieldwork, Feb-June 2014 
In P2, the research covered a large-scale investment that the recent literature on 
landgrabbing has defined as dispossession by transnational agribusiness corporations 
(White et al. 2012, Li 2014b). This large-scale investment has been the target of many 
interventions by NGOs in the area and has attracted international media attention. At the 
time of this research, the large-scale jatropha farm, which was the project crop, had failed 
and there was no clarity among the villagers, or local, district or central government 
officials interviewed regarding what would happen to the 8,210.78ha farm that occupied 
part of the land of nine neighbouring villages. Several letters had been sent to the 
company’s CEO, by district officials, warning him that they had the ability to remove the 
certificate of occupancy that had been issued according to the law for a certain purpose, 
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as that purpose had not been fulfilled, and the officials were claiming the land back or a 
new project deal.40  
The British company that was the occupier of the land had received a Certificate of 
Occupancy for 99 years41. The land affected, which was Village Land, after agreement 
with the village assembly, had become General Land. The company was paying a yearly 
rent for the land of 20,526,950 TSh. This rent was being paid to the central government 
and not to the villages. The nine villages had received compensation of 939,343,118 TSh. 
This compensation was granted, only after the villages, aided by international and 
national NGOs and CSOs, pursued fair compensation. The compensation had been paid 
to the villages as a whole and to the 162 people whose farms had been directly affected 
by the project. These people had received compensation and a new piece of village land.42  
The farm was settled in 2008 and the activities finished three years later. The effects of 
the farm drew international attention, as landgrabbing became a topic on the agenda of 
international NGOs. Villagers in P2 explained how the investor arrived in the village in 
2006 in the company of the MP Representative of their district. They claimed that they 
had trusted the MP’s statement that it was a good decision due to the accompanying 
promises that the agreement would bring: “The investor … came with a political leader 
who talked on his behalf. They convinced us and we agreed; however, at that moment we 
didn’t know about the importance of the land. Everything was dealt with at district level 
or higher. The village agreed on this because the political leader convinced us. We didn’t 
have any education at that time” (Q1-Chairman P1, 18.03.2014). The Task Force was 
settled when the conflict started with the investor by NGOs. The chairman of that Task 
Force explained: “The investor came here in 2006 and started operations in 2008. In 2010 
the promises he made to the villagers had not been fulfilled. The promises were 
infrastructure, buildings, and schools. So the village governments claimed that they will 
make follow up”. Another villager claimed: “The problem was between the investor and 
the village, because the investor wasn’t developing the village as promised with schools, 
wells, health centres, roads. The problem is that they did not do any of that. The villagers 
were not happy with the political leader (MP Representative of district). He was the one 
                                                 
40 During the fieldwork access to those letters was granted and the farm was visited. 
41 Civil society pressures pushed the government to the development of a new Land Policy in 2016 that does not allow more than 33 
years period. 
42 Information gathered during different meetings with both the District Land Officer in the district where the farm was located and 
the Ministry of Land and Human Settlements in Dar-es-Salaam. 
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who had brought the investors and they thought he was responsible for the problem” 
(Q33-Young farmer man P2, 08.04.2014). 
In 2010, an international NGO, which was cooperating with a national CSO, arrived in 
P2 and established the Task Force Committee (for the case of the anonymised company). 
That Committee was later trained and legally aided by national staff of an international 
NGO. They helped them to claim compensation, asked for meetings with the right 
representatives and wrote formal letters. The committee was formed of members of the 
eleven villages affected by the large-scale farm.  
In 2013, the investor started to pay compensation due to pressure from the Task Force 
Committee. At the time of this study, the Task Force was aiming to claim for the 
devolution of the land, a process that they considered very difficult, as they had given 
away the land and the government was in control of it: “the investor couldn’t take away 
the land… but we gave him the land… but the government made the contracts, so we do 
not have power to take back our land” (Q42-Task Force Secretary P2, 11.04.2014).  
This is due to the fact that when they agreed to the investment, they agreed to transfer 
their land from village land to general land: “If you give more than 50ha of village land, 
it is automatically transformed from village to general land and the community loses the 
power over that land. Villagers do not know the land law and they realise later” (Open 
interview NGO3 Executive Director, 03.03.2014). From then on, it will depend on the 
government’s will to return that land to the villages who initially agreed to the project.  
However, even in the case that the government decides to reclaim the land, in some cases 
the land is made collateral for international bank loans, which makes the dissolution of 
the Certificate of Occupancy problematic, as explained by the Tanzanian media. One of 
the participants stated that, the “president was in [neighbouring village] and was asked 
about this matter. The president said that the land must be returned to the villages. I say 
they will return 20%, but I am not sure if the land can be given back to the villages” (Q42-
Task Force Secretary P2, 11.04.2014).. 
In 2014, three years after the jatropha farm collapse, I accessed the farm. It was difficult 
and slow through the track roads, which are disappearing due to vegetation and rain 
damage due to the lack of use. The trip took two hours from the centre of P2 village and 
the road conditions meant that at times there was a need to walk through small ponds and 
other bad road conditions. The jatropha trees had been abandoned and the two guards 
informed us that the farm was being used only by a pastoralist worker for his cattle. The 
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offices were visited and some office staff were there, but the past popularity of the farm 
due to the NGOs and media interventions made the visit short and uncomfortable.  
The rumour among the villagers and other participants was that it was being transformed 
into a ranch for cattle and a future airport: “they say they are taking some cows there; one 
hundred every week” (Q42-Task Force Secretary P2, 11.04.2014). “The investor wanted 
to harvest jatropha, but it didn’t go as he expected, he failed and left. There is another 
person on that land nowadays. They want to introduce another thing. The new investor 
arrived in 2013, but he has not done anything until now. The new investor said that he 
wants to build a new airport and grow a lot of cows, but we do not believe or trust him. 
At the moment there are 80 cows there” (Q33-Young farmer man P2, 08.04.2014). 
During a fieldwork visit to the Ministry of Land and Human Settlements, representatives 
of the Ministry - the central government- explained that in April 2014 the investor had 
sent a letter requesting a change to the purpose of the farm and also a change in the name 
of the company. They explained that the new company was a “sister company” of the 
previous one and they requested a change from the production of jatropha “to a mix of 
arable uses and livestock keeping”. This letter arrived after different letters had been sent 
to the investor by the District Officials advising him that if the land was unused they 
would cancel the deal. I accessed the letters during the fieldwork.  
The District Executive Director of the district to which P2 belongs claimed that the new 
investor was Canadian and had the cooperation of a South African partner, where the 
cows were coming from. They planned to have 4,000 to 5,000 livestock. He explained 
that they needed to be informed of the changes by the investor, because they needed the 
agreement of the villagers again: “we do not have problems with the cows, but we want 
explanations about how the villagers are going to benefit from it” (Open interview-
District 1 Executive Director, 10.03.2014). The observations during the fieldwork 
demonstrated that despite the perceived conflict between the governments (local and 
national), in many instances the District and central governments have asked investors to 
fulfil their agreements or return the land.  
5.3 A proposed large-scale sesame project in M1 and M2 
M1 is situated approximately 160km from Dar-es-Salaam and 80km from the main urban 
centre of the region. Access is fast; 110km are motorway, and then access is through track 
roads for about 50km. The track road conditions are worse than those in the Pwani region 
and the bus service only runs once a day from the urban centre. M2 is 10km from M1 
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Village and trips can be made by motorbike or by walking. Access between the villages 
is easy, although trips by motorbike can be dangerous because the track roads are sandy. 
M1 and M2 were one village in the recent past; M2 was a hamlet of M1, but growth in 
the population led to their division into two, which explains certain issues that have 
happened within the two villages, such as demarcation conflicts.  
Illustration 5: Track road from M2 to M1 
 
Source: author's fieldwork, Feb-June 2014 
M1 and M2 had recently been the target of a SAGCOT project involving a sesame and 
millet farm of 3,000ha, which was supposed to be developed by a Yemeni investor with 
a tradition of agricultural investment in the area. This had created a difference between 
M1 and M2. While M1’s Village Assembly had approved the project, M2’s had rejected 
it. The project also involved the development of water irrigation systems and water intake 
for industry (Open interview-District 1 Executive Director, 10.03.2014). The village has 








Illustration 6: Villagers crossing the river to access village centre or other hamlets 
 
Source: author's fieldwork, Feb-June 2014 
The project was proposed to the villagers by the government agency of RUBADA, which 
stands for the Rufiji Basin Development Authority. RUBADA has developed LUP for 
M1 and M2, reserving part of the village land for investment purposes. RUBADA was 
established by Act of Parliament No.5 of 1975 (RUBADA Information Book, n.a.). 
Government agencies such as RUBADA and MKURABITA, which is the Tanzanian 
acronym for The Property and Business Formalization Programme, are involved in the 
demarcation of land for villagers and also investors. MKURABITA was formed by a 
government initiative in 2004, with the aim of enabling communities to formalise 
property and access the business sector. Both agencies were widely regarded by the NGO 
staff who participated in this study as hampering villagers’ rights. The Consultant to the 
Yemeni investor in M1 and M2 explained this: “the reality is that the land belongs to the 
villagers. The government may decide to change the use of the land, but the land remains 
the people’s land. This is why the government, through RUBADA, was trying to get the 
land in advance from the villagers, so the land belongs to RUBADA. So, now it is easier 
to transform that land from RUBADA to the investor. But it is difficult because RUBADA 
has no money… you have to compensate villagers for the land. So, RUBADA is waiting 
for the investor to pay them, and then they will pay the villagers compensation. That is 
the problem…you see…hahahaha!”. Even recently created initiatives, such as SAGCOT, 
aim to differentiate themselves from such institutions, which are widely considered to be 
corrupt. SAGCOT’s Executive Director, who was interviewed in Dar-es-Salaam during 
the fieldwork, expressed that they had nothing to do with RUBADA. However, 
RUBADA’s Executive Director, who also participated in the interviews, stated that their 
projects were embedded within the SAGCOT strategy, which corresponds to the views 
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of the District Officials in District 2, one of whom was the SACGOT Coordinator at 
District Level, who explained the project in M1 and M2. 
In a conversation with one of the advisors of the company about the investment he 
explained how the procedures had started two years ago, and are recorded in the village 
visit book.43 The company is still waiting for the Certificate of Occupancy to start its 
activities. This situation, he claimed, was negative for both the villagers and the investor. 
In his view, the villagers saw their promises as unfulfilled and the investors who were 
willing to develop the local economy had been discouraged: “It is disturbing them [the 
delay], because once they have agreed on giving you thousands of hectares of land they 
hope that you will develop their villages and give them employment. Also, sometimes 
they can learn and apply what you are doing in their small farms. But if you delay the 
projects, you miss this kind of opportunity and they feel bad. That is why sometimes they 
raise their voice and say, ‘people are coming from the outside grabbing our land’. If they 
see that once you have promised something to them nothing is going on, they start crying” 
(OEI9-Investment Consultant, 29.05.2014). 
This view was supported by some of the villagers who claimed that they wanted the 
investor to go away and come again to renegotiate the deal. This could be due to the 
awareness that they had had since the beginning of the negotiations.  
In any case, the project was still active and was going through the required procedures at 
the national level. The investor arrived in the village for the first time in 2012 and, in 
2014, one month prior to the research fieldwork, the beacons were installed and the land 
was surveyed by District surveyors using GPS technology (Illustration 7). 
                                                 




Illustration 7: Beacon delimitating investor's land 
 
When the villagers agreed to the investment and gave permission to RUBADA LUP, the 
land transferred to the investor was no longer village land. The revised LUP documents 
show the village meetings and assemblies at which the villagers agreed to this (Illustration 
8). 




It was unclear among the villagers and district officials whether the investor was still 
planning to implement the project, but the land was not on the M1 map drawn for the 
LUP.  
During the fieldwork I planned to participate in a Village Assembly. However, it was 
cancelled, which is not uncommon in villages due to a lack of participation. The four 
villages studied have populations ranging from 1200 to 2798, including children. 
Traditionally, the assembly should have the participation of half of the village population, 
but this does not happen for obvious reasons. Around 40 people attended the village 
assembly that I aimed to observe, but the villagers complained that there were not enough 
people; they had expected at least 100. The village leaders wanted to carry on with the 
meeting and there was a moment of tension and discussion, but finally they decided to 
postpone the meeting for one week, when they would celebrate it no matter how many 
attended. Not everybody is interested in attending the meetings; some complain about the 
distance they have to travel by foot or by bike, or that they have to pay a bodaboda driver, 
while others need to cross the river. This has an impact on the decisions that villages make 
about the land that they will give away, which may not be reversible.  
The village of M2 had also agreed to a RUBADA LUP for the same Yemeni investor as 
M1. It is common that large-scale farms affect two or more villages; Case 2 analysed in 
P2 affected eleven villages in total. In this case, the investment would affect M2 and M1. 
M2 was a hamlet of M1, but at the time of this research it was an independent village with 
five hamlets, comprising approximately 400 families and 1,600 inhabitants. The villages 
split five years previously, when M2 gained the status of village instead of being a hamlet 
of M1. At the time there was a boundary problem between them over a certain plot of 
land, which was resolved with the expertise of older villagers in cooperation with district 
officials. 
M2 had a strong position in terms of selling land, and its leaders were doing a lot to 
convince their fellow villagers not to sell the land. Compared to M1, the price of a plot of 
land (the fee to be paid to the government for allocation) was ten times more per acre; 
this price had been set by the village government and ratified in village meetings. In M1 
the fee was 2,000Tsh while in M2 it was 20,000 Tsh. Different reasons can be pointed 
out for this situation: 1) M2 had recently gained the status of village; 2) M2 was smaller 
than M1; 3) experiences of giving up some small-scale farms (50ac) to investors that were 
not developing the land or conducting any economic activity after promising to do so; 4) 
the reactions of some villagers who had spoken up in assemblies after NGO training; and 
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5) as a consequence the leaders were convinced and were making a strong effort to advise 
the villagers to not sell their land.  
Although they were strongly opposed to investors and giving their land away, they agreed 
with the first plan of RUBADA and had even held a village meeting to approve it. They 
explained that they did not know what they had agreed to and, later on, when they knew 
more due to the explanations of an NGO and a young man in the village, they realised 
their mistake. A member of an NGO explained: “Well, they agreed to an LUP and now 
RUBADA is saying this land belongs to them. Some of them now say, “we want 
RUBADA to go away, and then come back later”. This is because they had started to 
understand what they were doing and what went wrong during the process. I wish they 
had undertaken the training to know the good and bad things about the LUP and then they 
would have understood that if they agreed to give the land it would change automatically 
from village land to general land. We say, “this is your land and your decision, and if you 
decide to give it, you must be informed, if the land changes from village to general, you 
will not recover the land again”” (OEI8: Senior program manager NGO3, 29.05.18). 
The training had happened after the LUP and the project were already in place. The NGO 
realised what was happening in those villages while meeting with the District Officials 
and asking to conduct their land training programmes. In one of the meetings, the NGO 
staff member explained how he had seen the documents by chance and decided to ask for 
permission to visit those villages, which was granted.44 The programme for land rights 
training had started with a “baseline study” of the villages and meetings with village 
leaders. At a later stage, the village leaders had chosen 25 villagers to participate in the 
workshops for one day and at other stages public debates had been held in the villages.  
The actions of the NGO also included training “Land Monitors”. The land monitors 
maintained contact and often visited the NGO headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam. At the time 
of the research fieldwork, the NGO had already conducted the baseline study and the 
meeting with the village leaders. During those meetings with the NGO they had started 
to reject the project due to one outspoken man: “in M2, there was this young man who 
was very active during the discussion… before, the community was hiding information 
from us, but he stood up and said, “no, this is the people from civil society, they can talk 
on behalf of us and tell everything to us because they have nothing to hide, unlike people 
from the government”. He claimed to have no fear and talked to the rest. He went on and 
                                                 
44 Research clearance needs to be sought and information must be given to district officials when conducting activities in villages; 
however, this does not mean that the access to them will be limited or denied by officials.  
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disclosed that, “they agreed with the RUBADA project, because they have made 
promises, you were clapping hands”” (OEI8: Senior program manager NGO3, 29.05.18). 
The villagers said that they had not agreed to the project, and that they understood one 
thing the first time the RUBADA came, but a different thing afterwards when they came 
the second time with the map drawings. There were no visible beacons in M2, however, 
during the land rights workshops that happened in the village during the fieldwork. The 
village leaders held informal meetings with the District Official who accompanied the 
three NGO staff conducting the land rights training. During the informal meetings the 
District Officials wanted the village chairman and VEO to explain things. They were 
private meetings and it is difficult to say if after those meetings the leaders maintained 
their strong opposition to the RUBADA project, as it looked very likely that those 
meetings could serve pressure to agree with the District plans. It is common that leaders 
find it difficult to go against higher levels of authority. 
5.4 Four illegal small-scale cases in P1 
Situated in District 1 in a Coastal Region (Pwani Mkoa), P1 is the nearest village to Dar-
es-Salaam (44km). The trip, however, takes a few hours, partly by good tarmac roads and 
a motorway and partly by a rural track, and there is scarce transportation. It is also the 
easiest village to access of those studied. This makes P1 very sensitive to land transfers 
by local elites living in the city. Dar-es-Salaam is one of the biggest and fastest-growing 
urban centres in the country.  
Despite its closeness to the urban centre, P1 does not have a Village Certificate or Land 
Use Plan. However, two of the organisations who participated in this research had 
undertaken land rights training projects there and the elected Chairman was one of the 
land monitors trained by NGO3 Within this role, he had continued his contact with the 
NGO. 
P1 Village had no large commercial farm run by foreigners or nationals. However, the 
villagers faced many land struggles; for instance, the participants complained repeatedly 
about “rich people”, “rich men” and “investors”, who for them were the same, and they 
used the terms interchangeably. People in P1 were very aware of, and concerned about 
land problems in their village. As one villager explained during the interview: “Most 
people attend the meetings in order to know what is happening, especially with these rich 
people and investors who take the land without developing it” (Q16-Young farmer man 
P1, 22.03.2014). He was referring to four conflicts with four different individuals, who 
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the village chairman had taken to court; he was still seeking a legal solution (see 
Illustration 9) 
Illustration 9: Four cases presented to court by P1's Chairman45 
 
Source: Legal documents accessed during fieldwork, Feb-June 2014 
The villagers in P1 complained about those who acquired the land by force, illegally. A 
woman explained during the fieldwork how investors forged documents: “there is one 
investor, we gave him 100ac, now he has forged documents and has 600ac” (Q11-Leader 
woman P1, 21.03.2014). Another villager added: “We have four investors who took land 
illegally. According to our laws, a village can offer to the investor 500ac, not more, and 
only when all procedures have been followed. The investors did not follow the 
procedures. It is not clear who forged the documents, leaders or investors” (Q12-Man 
hamlet leader P1, 21.03.2014). 
There were new leaders in this village at the time of this research. The leaders are elected 
every five years and they are usually associated with political parties. The current 
chairman was a respected person in the area due to his involvement with land matters. A 
local leader in a neighbouring village involved in a conflict with a large-scale agrifuel 
company spoke about him: “local people trust people such as [P1’s] chairman, they help 
more than others to preserve their land rights” (Fieldwork conversation village chairman, 
25.02.2014). 
During the interviews, P1’s chairman confirmed how those investors had threatened 
people by force and used violence, including guns. He also explained how people wanted 
to occupy the farms that were not being developed by those four individuals and how he 
had calmed them down and explained how to choose a legal procedure. One of the 
participants also talked about this: “Because the land hasn’t been cultivated for a long 
time and the investors didn’t follow procedures, the villagers decided to take the land and 
                                                 
45 Translation: “1- The letter to be written to the Commissioner for Land to revoke the title deeds for the following: (…) 2- The large 
parcel of land should be vacant for the use of the people of this village and not otherwise....” 
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cultivate it by themselves. They distributed that land. But the village leaders told them 
not to do that and followed the legal procedures and they calmed down. Also the owners 
(investors) started to threaten them, telling them they will kill them”.  
The fact that those four individuals not only took the land in opaque ways, but also were 
not developing it, was the major complaint of the people in P1. One woman explained: 
the “investors acquired land for development, but they haven’t done anything on that land. 
Also the investors didn’t follow the procedures” (Q20-Farmer woman P1, 27.03.2014). 
A strategy that speculators have developed is to cultivate only the boundaries, in order to 
avoid the legal consequences of not developing the land, which are included in both 
customary and statutory law.  
One investor, who had acquired land legally and participated in the interviews, stated that 
it was very likely that the village would win those four cases, as “the documents are not 
in place and some of them are falsified” (Q28-Small-scale investor P1, 03.04.2014). At 
the time of this research those cases were at the central government level for resolution, 
the highest possible level for villagers to set cases. 
There was an overall concern among the practitioners and villagers about the legal 
procedures that were often overseen. In this case, the villagers, NGOs and the government 
had agreed on the need to follow the statutory law, which requires the participation of the 
village assembly in any transaction involving land. However, as the executive director of 
an NGO expressed: “Nowadays it is easier to acquire or take land in Tanzania. Much of 
the bureaucracy has been removed. It is easier because today you only need to go and talk 
to the chairman; it doesn’t matter whether the village assembly agrees or not” (Fieldwork 
notes, 03.03.2014). Even though this is contrary to the law, different participants 
complained about the need to enforce the procedures and make the villagers aware of 
them. 
NGO3’s Executive Director explained how the procedures are not followed and how they 
are supposed to be according to the Laws of 1999 (see Figure 3): “The procedure is that 
the investor goes to the Tanzanian Investment Centre and they have to wait until a 
consultation has been had with the village authorities, which in many cases are ordinary 
and non-educated villagers. They should make the decision and tell the TIC which land 
is available, and then it escalates again from the villagers to the TIC, who allows the 
investment. However, what happens usually is that the investor goes straight to the 
villages and tells them that the government has agreed to give them part of their land. The 
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communities are shown government letters and agree to give the land” (NGO3 Executive 
Director, 14.03.04). In addition, most of the time the relevant documents and information 
are written in English, although almost nobody can speak, read or understand English in 
the villages. 
Figure 6: Procedure to acquire village land 
 
Source: author 
The unbroken arrows in Figure 6 above represent the legal procedure according to the 
above excerpt from NGO3 staff. The broken arrows represent the channel that investors, 
with the cooperation of some officials such as in the case of P2, usually follow, which are 
not in accordance with the legal procedure and are less transparent. As suggested by P2’s 
experience, in this way national elites can pressure and exert some manipulation in the 
village, the population of which hear about a project for the first time at a Village 
Assembly and have to vote rapidly without the full and proper information. 
5.5 ‘Development’ investors in all villages 
During conversations and interviews with villagers and their leaders, they also identified 
as investors, people from outside the village who proposed development projects, such as 
health centres or schools. In P2, in particular, villagers referred to two projects, involving 
a school and a dispensary: “There are not investors anymore, they do not do what they 
promised and they were chased by villagers; there were two investors. One woman was 
given 75ac; she promised to build a health centre; she hasn’t come back and we have 
taken the land back. She is from Dar-es-Salaam. Another person came and said that he 
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would develop the school and help the village in everything. He failed and has not done 
anything. The school has a lot of land and now it is being sold to an Indian” (Q40-Young 
farmer man P2, 10.04.2014).   
It was not clear though what would happen to the land allocated for the school, as another 
woman explained: “The first owner of the academy was Mr T. He came to the village and 
requested the land and he was given land, like 50acres, and he started the school but after 
a while he failed to operate the school and he gave it to another investor without informing 
the village government and the new investor also did not make any agreement with the 
village government. So we wondered why Mr. T didn’t inform the village government 
about the transfer of that land” (FG3-Women participant, 04.05.2014). 
In the case of the land allocated for the dispensary, it had triggered reactions among young 
people in particular. They had invaded the land and removed the official demarcation: 
“The village gave land to a woman and then she did not develop it. The land had beacons 
[boundary markers], but young people, we wanted to go there and remove the beacons. 
We wanted the land for ourselves. After four years she had done nothing. The leaders did 
not inform us and we wanted to distribute the land to young people. I was the one who 
led the youngsters, although I did not encourage them to take off the beacons” (Q41-
Farmer man P2, 11.04.2014).  
5.6 Double selling and grabbing land of neighbour  
Double selling and grabbing each other’s land was also widely considered to be one of 
the main violations of land rights in P1 village by farmers and their village leaders. This 
is a savvy form of behaviour that the villagers themselves execute: “there is a problem 
with double selling, some people sell land twice and then decide to leave the village” 
(FG1 participant, 03.04.2014). As another leader expressed: “There has been an increase 
in land value [which creates conflict]. A person sold his land in the past for a low price; 
now that land has acquired a high value. He takes this land to sell again and creates 
conflict” (Q12-Man hamlet chairman P1, 21.03.2014). 
In the case of people taking each other’s land, this practice tends to be associated with the 
fact that the land has not been developed: “some people take other’s land, especially when 
the lands not developed. This happens a lot in this village” (Q14-Farmer woman P1, 
22.03.2014). A leader in P1 expressed a similar concern, stating that, “land is a sensitive 
issue: we have boundary problems and people selling the land of their neighbours” (Q18-
WEO for P1, 25.03.2014).  
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The proximity of P1 to Dar-es-Salaam has exacerbated those practices. The villagers 
widely acknowledged the impact of the rapidly increasing value of land. Once free, only 
a few years ago, “people buy and sell land nowadays more because there is no more land 
in Dar-es-Salaam, it is full. It is also very expensive there, 1ac in Masaki may cost 
1,500,000 Tsh” (Q18-WEO for P1, 25.03.2014). Villagers can be allocated 1ac of land in 
P1 for a fee of 10,000 Tsh payable to the local government. This fee usually covers the 
expenses of having to travel to the plot location and some administration fees related to 
the allocation of the land. As Li (2014b) states in regard to the case of the Lanje people 
in Indonesia, they have entered the practice of capitalism by themselves, sometimes 
selling resources that should not have been sold in the first place.  
5.7 Demarcation or boundary problems  
Boundary or demarcation conflicts can happen between neighbours or between villagers. 
The literature has pointed out how land certification may trigger those conflicts (Locher 
et al. 2012). The increased interest in, and transactions involving land have triggered 
boundary conflicts in the villages, even when the land has been acquired through legal 
procedures.  
One of these conflicts was observed during the fieldwork, when a woman in P1 
complained about a neighbour who was not living there but owned a small farm and 
employed people to harvest it. She complained that the neighbour was not taking care of 
the grasses and that they were overgrown and taking over part of the path that demarcated 
the two farms’ boundary. She was concerned that cars would start running over her land 
due to the overgrown grass and destroy her crops. She had decided to plant some small 
casaba trees between the road and her property. In doing so, however, she had taken over 
part of the road as hers, and had planted the trees at least 40cm beyond her previous 
boundary. In that way she had incorporated part of the road into her piece of land, where 
she had complained that her neighbour’s grass was growing. She complained about the 
neighbour in the morning to the hamlet leader, and in the early afternoon the neighbour, 
his employee, the woman and the hamlet leader met at the place where the boundary 
conflict was taking place. The leader talked with all of the parties and demanded that the 
neighbour clear the grasses; then he removed the phony boundary that the woman had 
made, and placed it in its original place. Everything was solved in half an hour and all of 
the parties were happy with the resolution, as they later explained to me; I was present 
during the conflict resolution (Fieldwork notes, 13.03.14) 
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During the interviews, several farmers in P1 expressed how, due to the increased value 
of land, people are selling the land of their neighbours and trespassing over boundaries. 
One leader stated that, “there are many boundary problems because someone may sell 
more land than what is his/hers without considering his/her neighbour” (Q17-Land 
Committee chairman P1, 24.03.2014).  
Problems with boundaries are not only occurring between individuals, but also between 
villages, which affects the issuing of Village Certificates. Many of those problems arise 
when villagers sell land. P1 had had a conflict with a neighbouring village: “There was a 
boundary conflict between P1 and [neighbouring village]. We both sold the same land, 
we thought it was ours and [the other village] sold the same land believing it was 
theirs…we solved that conflict by going to the district. They sent land experts who 
measured the land and said the land belonged to us. The land was sold to different people 
who came from Dar-es-Salaam” (Q11-Leader woman P1, 21.03.2014). Thus, 
demarcation conflicts are common, but they are not unsolvable and there tends to be 
flexibility among villages and local leaders to achieve a resolution, as the two cases above 
show.  
5.7.1 South African and Tanzanian large-scale ‘unused’ farm 
Another large-scale farm case in M1 Village that has been contested by the villagers was 
a 1,100ha farm, owned by South African and Tanzanian investors with Greek origins. 
The farm was fenced off (see Illustration 10) and the land had been unused for several 
years. 





Illustration 11: South African-Tanzanian farm main entrance 
 
This farm had been in M1 for a long time. It was unused and this was causing the villagers 
to complain and exacerbating the conflicts between pastoralists and farmers. Maasai and 
Barbaig pastoralists interviewed in M1 claimed that the land on that farm had to be 
available to them and they were often trespassing on it: “in this village there are conflicts 
between farmers and pastoralists because there is not enough land for pastoralists. The 
big land is taken, but it is for farmers not the pastoralists” (Q61-PM2 Chairman, 
03.05.2014).  
This farm had also impacted on the way in which the pastoralists were accessing the land. 
Where they had accessed it for free in the past, now, even though the land was not 
cultivated, the fences meant that the pastoralists had to pay for access. They had not 
received compensation for the selling of this land by the government. They had no 
alternatives to feed their cattle, and they were having to pay to use that land, which was 
once free to use,: “He owns a big land (the mentioned farm) and nobody is allowed to go 
there with cows… During the dry season we pay to get our cows there” (Q94-Maasai 
young women M1, 17.05.2014). 
During the observations and interviews this farm was always a point of concern for both 
farmers and pastoralists. This was mainly because the investors were not developing the 
land or performing any agricultural activity there, so both groups wanted the land back.  
5.8 Land scarcity, farmers and pastoralists 
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The villagers and leaders interviewed during the fieldwork usually referred to the 
pastoralists as “very criminal” due to the fact that much of the time their cattle eat the 
harvests of farmers. In the long run, pastoralists have to leave the villages due to conflicts 
over their growing number of cattle. Sometimes the conflicts get very tense and there may 
be some assassinations. In one village a Maasai killed the village chairman in a meeting. 
Nonetheless, pastoralists are allocated land by the village government and they can also 
buy land. As stated previously, they tend to have higher incomes and are able to pay more 
money for the land, which grants them access. Also, the only villager who had started the 
process for the acquisition of a CCRO was a pastoralist.  
Pastoralists, however, face some constraints due to their traditions of having as many 
cows as possible as a sign of wealth. There have been many initiatives or try to change 
this tradition of the pastoralists with the aim of limiting the number of cows that they can 
have. The pastoralist stated that the protected areas where they are not allowed anymore 
are a constraint for their access to the land, as well as some large and fenced farms –
although they also confirmed that they can break down the fences of abandoned farms or 
reach agreements with the owners. With regard to their needs they stated that the 
government should give them part of the reserved forest.  
5.9 Summary  
The above sections identified the different land grabs experienced by the villagers. One 
of the main findings of this research is that the villagers perceived that their land rights 
were vulnerable due to land grabs in different forms and on different scales, involving 
different actors on the national, local to international scales.  
For each village, this depended on their experiences with investors and people with higher 
incomes that did not live in the village but acquired the land. The interviews with villagers 
and their leaders and informal conversations show that in P1, the villagers were concerned 
about four ‘rich men’ coming from Dar-es-Salaam and acquiring the land in opaque ways, 
with the acquiescence of previous leaders. These ‘rich men’ were not developing the land 
but speculating with it: “Investors are people that use the power of money to buy a lot of 
the poor people’s land. But they do not develop it, especially in our village” (Q12-Hamlet 
leader P1, 21.03.2014); “We don’t have them (investors), but there are people from Dar 
who come here to request land for farming” (Q5-Farmer man M1, 20.03.2014). 
On the other hand, the results show that in P2, the villagers and leaders were mainly 
concerned about an oft-cited international investor that had taken the land legally. This 
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was jatropha, a large-scale international project (UK) that had affected 9 villages and 
failed in 2012. During the interviews the villagers also discussed other small development 
projects (school buildings) that they also labelled as investments: “There are big ones and 
small ones (investors). Here there is only one big investor. He arrived in 2005. The 
investor wanted to harvest jatropha, but it didn’t give the results he expected; he failed 
and left. There is another person on that land nowadays. They want to introduce another 
thing. The new investor arrived in 2013, but he has not done anything until now…. Small 
investors have also been given land. They have been given land and many of them have 
the title of the land, so you cannot get there… There are two good investors who built a 
school” (Q33-Farmer man P2, 08.04.2014); “There are investors. The ones that built the 
school, but they do not have farms here. The jatropha farm was also an investor; he 
provided some jobs and developed the land” (Q34-Farmer man P2, 09.04.2014). 
The field data tells us that in M1 there was an incipient sesame large-scale international 
project (Yemen) that the villagers had accepted. The same project would affect M2, but 
the villagers there had rejected the project. In M1, the observations also show a large-
scale non-developed farm (Tanzania-South Africa) that the villagers had complained 
about. 
The interviews and informal conversations with the villagers and leaders in M2 show that 
they considered that there were no investors in the village. However, some of the villagers 
complained interviewed about two large farms (50ac) that belonged to individuals that 
were not living in the village who were not developing any activity there: “Yes, we have 
two investors who have fifty acres. I knew about them from the village meeting. We 
discussed whether or not to give him land and we did. Now they are not cultivating the 
land and there is only a forest” (Q101-Farmer woman M2, 18.05.2014). 
In summary, the research shows, through the observations and interviews, that the 
villagers referred interchangeably to investors or ‘rich men’ grabbing the land. Usually, 
they considered them negatively as they were not developing the land, fulfilling their 
promises or contributing to the village. In cases where they were doing so, usually the 
villagers had a positive view of them. Another relevant issue was that the villagers 
considered under the category of ‘investor’ anyone who was not from the village, or who 
came to the village to live on it and farm like them; this included large-scale investors, 
small-scale investors, people from the city buying land but not developing it, or people 
who wanted to develop projects such as schools or health centres in the village, when 
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those projects were not fulfilled but the land remained for the project. Table 8 below 
summarises those cases.  
Table 8: Summary of land deals found by actor features and size 
Type Size found Procedures  Villagers’ and 
leaders’ feelings 







Legal procedures and 
acquiescence of 
village meetings in 
first instance 
Yes, because they 
do not develop the 
land and do not 
fulfil their promises 
National investor  Small-scale (under 
50ac) 
Legal procedures and 
developing the land  
No, because they 
followed 
procedures and 
developed the land 
Illegal speculator  Big-scale46 (above 
50ac, max size 
found 600ac) 
Grabs land from 
villagers and forges 
documents with the 
acquiescence of local 
leaders. Does not 
develop the land 
Yes, speculators 
threaten villagers, 
do not develop the 
land and follow 
illegal procedures 
Legal speculator Small-scale (under 
50ac) 
Legal procedures and 
acquiescence of 
village meetings in 
first instance but did 
not develop the land 
Yes, villagers 
consider that the 
land should be 
developed and that 






50ac) or big-scale 
Legal procedures and 
acquiescence of 
Yes, if they do not 
fulfil promises. 
                                                 
46 In the case of Tanzania, the differences between small-scale or large-scale drawn from the law as explained in Chapter 3. When the 
amount of land is less than 50ac is only the village who needs to consent on the transactions. When is above 50ac to 500ac is the 
district, and when is over 500ac is the central government. However, the village has to agree in all cases if affects village land, although 





village meetings in 
first instance but may 
or may not develop 
the land 
Many are not 





buy land from 
farmers 
Small-scale (1 to 
10ac) 
People that work and 
live in cities but like 
to have a farm in 
villages.  
No, but villagers 
acknowledge the 
negative impact of 
people selling the 





 Institutional aspects of land grabbing  in the Morogoro and Pwani 
regions of Tanzania 
6.1  Introduction 
This chapter aims to answer the question of: What are processes of formalisation of land 
that accompany the land grabbing processes?, and What are the changing understandings 
and new dimensions of land? Jointly with other drivers, such as demographic and 
environmental pressures, land grabbing triggers land scarcity and dispossession, as 
documented in the previous chapters. The rush for land has raised concerns about the 
urgent need to secure the land rights of rural impoverished villagers whose right to access 
land has been threatened (Toulmin 2008, HLPE 2011). Drawing on these circumstances, 
this chapter will document the ways in which the participants in the fieldwork research 
accessed the land they owned, their perceptions of not losing such land –their tenure 
security perceptions, and their views on formalisation. The chapter will discuss these 
findings in the light of debates over the impacts of formalisation: as a key to create 
economic wellbeing and protect people’s rights (De Soto 2000, Collier 2014); or as a 
means to benefit already powerful actors (Nyamu-Musembi 2006). 
The sections below document and explore the dynamics of tenure security and 
formalisation and the impact that these had on the rural villagers in the sites studied. 
Particular mention is made of gendered access to land and security. Also, different levels 
of formalisation are considered - formalisation for individuals and for villages – as well 
as the issue and creation of LUPs, which are in themselves tools of formalisation that are 
more easily implemented than CCROs. In this regard, LUPs can have an impact on 
exclusion from the uses of land (Hall et al. 2011) and the creation of regimes of exclusion 
(Li 2014a). 
The results also document a trend towards ‘informal formalisation’, where villagers have 
started their own manual and rudimentary systems of land control and management. This 
is happening in parallel to the prices of land increasing, along with the fees and taxes 
attached to its management. All of these instruments may exclude people from accessing 
land due to income constraints. Furthermore, the results show how formalisation impacts 
not just on individual villagers, but the village as a whole and the availability of village 
land for future generations: due to cadastres and registries, even rudimentary ones, 
traditional practices such as being able to access land that is not being used, which would 
have gone back to being part of village land available, are prone to disappear.  
6.2  Land access and tenure security 
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This section documents the ways in which the villagers who participated in the interviews 
accessed their land (Table 9) and their perceptions of tenure security; that is, the 
likelihood that they will lose their land and the resources attached to it (Knight 2010).  
6.2.1 Access to land 
Table 9 below shows the ways in which the participants accessed the land.  
Table 9: Participants’ access to land47,48 
 
Gender 
Total Woman Man 
access Village  11 20 31 
Inheritance parents  11 12 23 
Inheritance partner  1 0 1 
Bought  5 6 11 
Partner land  7 2 9 
Cleared the bush  1 2 3 
Family land  8 7 15 
Hire  3 1 4 
Compensation as a nurse  1 0 1 
Total  34 41 75 
Source: Author’s fieldwork data, Feb-June 2014 
 
Village refers to a local process where citizens of Tanzania apply to the local government 
for land and are allocated land from the available communal land in the village. In some 
cases, the land is given to them free of charge, but local village governments have started 
to apply a small fee per acre to cover their administrative fees. This fee varies from village 
to village. It was found that M2 was the most expensive. P1, P2 and M1 charged from 
2,000Tsh to 5,000Tsh, whereas M2 charged 20,000Tsh. From the conversations with the 
villagers, and especially young people in the village, it was found that many of them could 
not afford this small fee. The fee was a relatively new requirement by local governments; 
it was introduced approximately two years before this study took place. In some cases, 
the land was still given free of charge, especially to young graduate members of the 
village. The size of the fee was decided by the village assembly in each village. To apply 
for village land one needs to be a Tanzanian and have a letter of recommendation from 
                                                 
47 This only includes farmers and pastoralists participating in the structured interviews, and excludes officials, village leaders and 
participants in the focus groups. The results displayed in the Tables of this chapter only refer to this group.  
48 The number of responses is higher than the number of respondents because participants usually accessed land in various form, for 
instance, they may have inherited 1ac and bought 1ac with their partners, or on their own, or it was given to them from village land.  
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his or her former village. Villages allocate land to all members: men, women, families or 
single or widowed women, when they apply for it. Usually the process to apply for land 
takes place once a year. 
Inheritance - parents or partners: Through dealings with the villagers and leaders it was 
found that many villagers, men and women, access land through inheritance from their 
parents or partners. The survey shows that most brothers and sisters received part of their 
parents’ land, although some cases were found where the whole family had inherited a 
piece of land from their parents. There was one exception to this: a women pastoralist 
who had not been allowed to inherit land. In the case of a couple where one spouse dies, 
the other will inherit the land.  In this way, some men inherited land from their wives and 
vice versa.  
Bought: The fieldwork observations documented that there is a land market operating in 
the villages. This market is informal, in the sense that there is not a cadastre, but many of 
the villagers interviewed had bought their land from others. In many cases, they did not 
have documents for these transactions, but that was starting to change. Through the 
interviews it was found that it is becoming usual for people to demand a hand written 
document to demonstrate that they have bought the land: “the land belongs to us [me and 
my husband], we bought it and we have a document that justifies the transaction… I think 
that if I lose the paper that says that I bought this land someone can claim the land back” 
(Q31-Teacher’s wife P2, 08.04.2014). Also, whenever land is transferred, according to 
the local law, the village authorities need to be present and the seller must pay a fee to 
them for administrative purposes (like trip allowances and the keeping of registries); this 
fee is usually very low. In some cases, the buyer may not have even paid the price of the 
land, or the price is paid with food. In the past, land was given by one neighbour to another 
free of charge. 
Hire: People hire land from others. Usually land that is hired is low-lying land where 
people harvest rice. The price of the hire is sometimes paid with a bag or two of rice, if 
the harvest is good. Sometimes it is not paid if the owner knows that the harvest has not 
been good: “Me and my husband harvest 2ac that we are hiring from others. Sometimes 
we do not have to pay for the land. It depends on the harvest we make. If it is good, we 
pay; if it is not, we do not pay” (Q96-Farmer woman M1, 17.05.2014). 
Clearing the bushes: The research in the four villages shows that the traditional and usual 
practice in the past is currently forbidden due to increasing land scarcity and the increased 
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population. In the past this was the way in which the villagers accessed the land: “in the 
past, especially in the villages, people tended to clear the forest and if it was 5ac it became 
yours automatically, but now the village administration makes sure that land is allocated 
to people and people know that it belongs to a certain person. You don’t just go to the 
forest, clear 2ac and say that these 2ac are yours. That has passed, but in the past it was 
so, especially in the rural areas. You have elderly people who owned a lot of acres if they 
were clever and cleared them. Then they owned the land and it has passed over to their 
children, and then others inherit it (Q59-Executive director NGO1, 29.04.2014); or: “In 
the past we used to take any land and cultivate so some people inherited land that way” 
(Q7-Farmer P1, 20.03.2014). 
Family land: Many young people harvest one piece of land of their parents. They are 
given one acre of their parents’ land to cultivate by themselves. This also refers to the 
land that some couples harvest together. They may have bought it or applied to the village 
government for it and they consider the land family land. In some cases, it was found that 
the woman harvested one piece and the man another. In cases where have been problems 
in the family (e.g., an alcoholic husband) the woman had decided to split the land in that 
way. Several women explained this case, and how they had decided to harvest one piece 
of land by themselves and separate another piece of land for their husband, so they could 
protect their income: “My mother gave me 1ac. My husband has 8ac and he only 
cultivates 2ac. I only cultivate my 1ac. Before we cultivated together, but then he grabbed 
all of the crops and spent all of the money drinking” (woman, 70).  
Partner land: This refers to couples who harvest the land that one of the partners had 
previous to the marriage or inherited during the marriage. As the table shows, men can 
also harvest from their wives’ land, although this practice is not extensive. 
6.2.2 Perceptions of tenure (in)security 
Security of tenure was defined in Chapter 2 as “the degree of confidence that land users 
will not be arbitrarily deprived of the bundle of rights they have over particular lands” 
(Knight 2010, 19). Table 10 shows the perceptions that villagers had of their tenure 
security during the fieldwork interviews, by village; the following section will show those 
perceptions by gender. The majority of the respondents did not feel that their security of 
tenure was threatened. However, the level of positive responses shows that villagers’ 
‘degree of confidence’ regarding their security of tenure was low, as almost half of the 




Table 10: Participants’ perceptions of tenure security by village 
Village 
Do you feel you can lose your land? 
Total No Yes 
 P1 9 8 17 
P2 10 7 17 
M1 8 11 19 
M2 13 8 21 
                Total 40 34 74 
Source: Author’s fieldwork data, Feb-June 2014 
 
In terms of the villages, P2 and M2 participants felt that their tenure was more secure than 
the others. Although P1 villagers also felt secure, the differences between P2 and M2 
were more significant. As explained in Chapter 4, M2 was the only village that had 
rejected a large-scale investment, and their land administration prices were higher than in 
the other villages, which may have contributed to the perception of increased security. 
Their leaders had strongly recommended that their fellow villagers did not sell the land, 
and that was often mentioned by the interviewees: “many have stopped selling land here 
because they will not have where to get land in the future, and we will become strangers 
in our own land. Also, the Village Chairman, WEO and District commissioner insisted 
on not selling land” (Q78-Farmer woman, 11.05.2014). Thus, M2 was found to be the 
village with a stronger sense of preserving the land and rejecting outsiders. This could be 
related to different factors, as explained in Chapter 4, M2 was a newly settled village; it 
had been a hamlet of M1, ten years before this research. 
On the other hand, the awareness that the P2 villagers had developed after their experience 
with the large-scale farm may also have made them more aware of their rights and 
increased their awareness in the face of possible future negotiations. However, their 
proximity to Dar-es-Salaam had also had an impact on their level of awareness, as the 
number of people coming from the city and asking for land had increased.  
To add depth to the perceptions of tenure insecurity, during the interviews I also asked 
participants49 why they felt they could lose their land in order to understand where their 
perceptions of tenure insecurity came from. Table 11 summarises the reasons why people 
felt a low level of security of tenure. As stated in the section above, the majority of the 
villagers who participated in the interviews did not felt that their land was threatened. 
                                                 
49 In the particular case of tenure insecurity it only refers to villagers that were not leaders or officials. 
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Among those who felt that threat the main reason was that they did not have a title. By a 
title (hati miliki) the participants meant a CCRO. 
Table 11 below documents the reasons that villagers gave in cases where they felt that 
their tenure of the land was insecure. Although it was not the case to a large extent, it was 
significant that they felt that the land may be threatened by their own government. This 
coincides with the view of NGO3 and members of a national coalition of civil society 
organisations, that the president of Tanzania holds too much power over decisions 
concerning land, as explored in Chapter 5. One of the demands expressed by the 
participants was summarised by the village chairman of P2: “We need openness and trust 
in the government on land matters” (Q34-Chairman P2, 09.04.2014). 
Table 11: Participants' reasons for tenure insecurity 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 People can take it from me 7 9.5 9.5 
Government can take it from me 8 10.8 20.3 
I do not feel I can lose my land 40 54.1 74.3 
Because I have no title 17 23.0 97.3 
Because I am hiring it 1 1.4 98.6 
We may need to sell due to necessity 1 1.4 100.0 
Total 74 100.0  
Source: Author fieldwork data, Feb-June 2014 
The second threat perceived by the villagers was the government. By this they meant the 
central government rather than their local leaders or the local government. However, as 
shown by Table 11, this was not the main concern of the villagers. From the fieldwork it 
was documented that the villagers linked their land insecurity first to the lack of title 
deeds; and secondly to the government or to the fact that other people, apart from the 
government, could deprive them of their land. On the other hand, the interviews with 
practitioners in the field of land rights showed that this group were mostly concerned with 
the insecurity caused by the government.  
As documented in Chapter 6, one of the main sources of conflict due to the perceived 
threat was people grabbing land from others. This may be neighbours, wealthier 
individuals or investors, as explained by the interviewees. A former chairman leader 
explained this during an interview: “I feel I could lose my land because a lot of people 
are coming to take land these days. If you are not strong, people may take it even through 
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corruption. If you are poor, the rich will corrupt you to get a poor man’s land (Former 
chairman in Puga Village” QV5, 2014). 
Participants in the focus groups and practitioners who were interviewed were also 
concerned about changes in the size of the population50 and poverty: “in the past the 
population was not so much, especially in the rural areas” (Q59-Executive director 
NGO1, 29.04.2014). Villagers perceived that their land was under threat mainly from 
those coming from the towns and buying land and then not developing it. They referred 
to them as ‘rich people’ and sometimes used the term and concept interchangeably with 
‘investors’. These are not necessarily large-scale and foreign investors, but wealthier 
individuals from Dar-es-Salaam or other urban centres, elites belonging to regional or 
central governments, or individuals with small development projects like building 
schools, or health centres. Villagers who had initially agreed to those activities in the end 
distrusted them when the people who had acquired the land did not develop it, as 
documented in Chapter 6. Therefore, one of the main findings from the interviews and 
observations was that the villagers associated land grabs with undeveloped land when it 
had been acquired by non-inhabitants of the village on either a large or a small-scale. 
When the land has been acquired legally and it was being developed according to the 
initial agreement, they did not express any concerns. This is also addressed in Chapter 6. 
The research found that development and use of the land, or lack of it, is a major issue in 
the struggles over land in Tanzania.  
At the same time the development of land also provides tenure security: “I cannot lose 
the land because we will develop it over time” (Q96-Farmer woman M1, 17.05.2014); “I 
cannot lose my land because I am cultivating it. By cultivating all the time, I can protect 
my land” (Q70-Farmer woman M1, 05.05.2014). Both, customary and statutory laws state 
that after a period of twelve years, if the land has not been developed it should be returned 
to the village or the government.  
6.2.3 Gendered access and security 
Table 12: Participants’ perceptions of tenure security by gender 
 
Do you feel you can lose your 
land? 
Total No Yes 
Gender Women 22 12 34 
                                                 
50The population in the country increased from 25.48 million in 1990, to 34 million in 2000 and 49.25 million in 2013 (World Bank, 
online), a widely known pattern that is a common feature of developing countries nowadays. 
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Men 18 22 40 
Total 40 34 74 
Source: Author fieldwork data, Feb-June 2014 
By gender, the responses of the interviewees displayed an unanticipated outcome, as most 
of the women interviewed did not feel that their land tenure was jeopardised. Contrarily, 
farmer women interviewed during the fieldwork felt more secure than men, which is 
different a priori to the suggestion that women are more excluded from land than men 
(Daley and Englert 2010, Boone 2017).  
Furthermore, as introduced in Chapter 3, women were not found to be particularly 
excluded from access to land. This was documented in the focus groups with women, and 
in the interviews and observations during the fieldwork. Women accessed land in the 
same way as men, as displayed in Table 9 at the beginning of the chapter, and it is difficult 
to conclude that their access is much more difficult than that of men. When villages 
distributed land once a year the processes were open to men and women: “Women here 
have always had the right to own land, even in the village government processes; there 
are no problems if you are strong and can cultivate it” (FG2 participant, 19.04.2014). 
Here, the principle that still prevails is using and developing the land, as expressed by this 
woman during a focus group. Equally unexpected was the response of one woman during 
an interview when she was asked if women could also access land: “When the land 
committee advertises to give land to the villagers every person in the village has got an 
equal right to get land, not women only” (Q68-Farmer woman M1, 05.05.2014).A single 
woman in P1 also explained how she had accessed her land in a different way than being 
allocated by the village: “I have 5 acres of land, two I bought myself and three I rented 
from the village government” (Q64-Farmer woman P1, 04.05.2014). 
The experiences of these farmer women and pastoralists reflects the fact that women do 
not seem to have problems in accessing land. However, there are other areas where 
women face problems and can be excluded due to control over resources. As pointed out 
in Chapter 3, this was particularly evident for pastoralists: “We have four boys and they 
will need land. Girls do not count because they will get married and use their husband’s 
land” (Fieldwork conversation, Barbaig pastoralist M2, 20.05.2014) Thus, it is possible 
for women to access the resource, and still be deprived of rights.  
Most women also expressed concerns about the case of divorce or death of their partner: 
“Women need to have right to own the land, but there are some traditions that do not 
allow that. For instance, if her husband dies, she may lose the land and the relatives will 
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take the land back. Also in the case of divorce, the woman should keep some rights over 
the land. (Q20-Farmer woman P1, 27.03.2014)”. These circumstances make women more 
vulnerable and impoverished as they lose control over the land that they have been using. 
During the interviews and focus groups, women also explained that their husbands had 
the power to make decisions and that it was in the hands of their husbands whether to 
include them in legal documents51 or not. This is why statutory regulation has been found 
to be important for women in preventing exclusion from security of tenure (Daley and 
Englert 2010, Boone 2017).  
The executive director of a local NGO explained how regulation was important for 
women: “Our intention was to sensitise the women to register for land ownership because 
the inheritance law discriminates against women, but if women register for land as single 
owners or in a joint ownership its useful to them, because if the husband dies the land will 
remain with the alive couple. That’s what the law says. So, when we talked to the women 
we found that some of them told us that they do not find the need to own land; they say, 
if my husband has land it is enough. But we try to make them understand that the 
inheritance rules that are unfair to them can be avoided by registering the land 
individually or collectively” (Q59-Executive director NGO1, 29.04.2014). 
Conversely, this interview excerpt also explains why women often feel their tenure is 
more secure than that of men, as they perceive that it is linked to their husband or family, 
who will protect the land: “the land is my husband’s land, we will not lose it unless we 
sell it, but we are not selling it” (Q4-Farmer woman P1, 18.03.2014); “my land has 
belonged to me for many years, my children will help me to protect my land” (Q30-
Farmer woman P2, 08.04.2014). Therefore, the family context can be perceived as a threat 
to tenure security or as a guarantee of it, and this often depends on “ultimate disparate 
freedoms” (Sen in Robeyns 2003, 62).  
1. Control over land and decision making for women 
If access for women was possible, although limited by family relationships, those 
limitations were stronger when they had to participate in decisions and control over 
resources (Chant 2006), in this particular case land. This difficulty was documented 
during the interviews, focus groups and fieldwork observations. To inquire into the 
decision making processes in the village, participants were asked about their attendance 
at meetings and whether or not they felt safe to speak up during them.  
                                                 
51 An example of this can be found in Chapter 3. 
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The reason that most women gave for not attending meetings was that they had a lot of 
work to do, especially during the planting or harvesting seasons. They also stated that the 
meetings were held far away; villages can be integrated - maybe with one to two hamlets 
- and it may take a few hours to get to the main hamlet: “I am not participating in the 
meetings. I never attend any kind of meeting. It is very far to get there; but I feel 
represented in meetings anyway, because many other villagers want what I do” (Q31-
Woman farmer P2, 08.04.2014). In any case, hamlets also held their own meetings, and 
had hamlet leaders and chairmen. Hamlet chairmen are members of the Village Council 
and often meet with other hamlet leaders and the village chairman.  
Women also stated that they did not attend meetings because they relied on their husbands 
for that task: “I do not attend because my husband is the one that goes and I get 
information from him. Also he is involved in committees” (Q31-Woman farmer P2, 
08.04.2014). In other cases, such as pastoralist women, they were not allowed to attend 
meetings due to their traditions: “my husband goes and usually women we are not allowed 
to attend meetings. I can only discuss things with my husband, I do not think the situation 
is improving much for women here, if you see the meeting there, most of the people are 
always men” (Q102-Iraqw woman P2, 18.05.2014). 
In other cases, women felt timid or they did not know enough to express their opinions 
during the meetings, even though they may attend. In such cases many women said that 
they relied on the opinions of other women that thought like them: “Sometimes I feel a 
little bit awkward participating because I am shy and find it difficult to talk in front of 
that many people” (Q27-Farmer woman P1, 03.04.2014); “I attend assemblies, but do not 
talk because I am shy. Sometimes I ask a friend to speak for me, but even the friend says 
to me “speak for yourself”” (Q30-Farmer woman P2, 08.04.2014).  
The opposite was also true to a lesser extent. Some women were actively involved in the 
lives of their communities: “I participated in meetings in the ward about the constitutional 
reform. Each village was consulted for this process. I attended those meetings and 
expressed my view. I said that women should be given land rights. I was chosen because 
I and my husband are very charismatic in meetings. We are not afraid to talk and people 
listen to us; usually people support our views…. I am not afraid, I speak the truth and I 
am free to speak” (Q20-Farmer woman P1, 27.3.2014). In many cases this depends on 
the woman herself, but mostly women were found to have limited control over the 
decisions of their villages or resources. One pastoralist women expressed this view: “For 
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those who are brave enough, they can control their lives but others do nothing, so it 
depends on the woman herself” (Q102-Pastoralist woman M2, 18.05.2014). 
At other times, despite those gender quota efforts, women may abandon those activities 
because of their family duties or because they feel too much pressure. Two particular 
cases were documented around this issue. In P1, alongside the chairman, a woman had 
been trained as a land monitor by NGO3: “I was trained in 2010 in Dar-es-Salaam, but I 
could not continue because of family commitments, but I want to go back to that task 
now” (Informal conversation, 08.03.2014). The second case was in the settlement of the 
Task Force in P2. One of the secretaries of the Task Force needed to be a woman 
according to the NGO’s requirements. However, as the current secretary explained, the 
woman had resigned from that position: “At the beginning I refused to be the secretary 
because of gender balance issues that they [the NGOs] want to accomplish. But the 
woman who was supposed to do it was not very confident. She did it for a while, but there 
was a meeting with officials at the district, and the supervisor of [the large-scale farm] 
and the girl was given something to read in front of all these people; she read, but in the 
middle of the reading she started panicking” (Q42-Task Force Secretary P2, 11.04.2014).   
This lack of confidence among women was also found to be related to their lack of formal 
education. Even when compared to men, who also lack formal education, women felt 
more affected by it than men: “sometimes I may want to contribute something in the 
meetings, but they [family members] say “keep quiet you didn’t go to school” (Q4-Farmer 
woman P1, 18.03.14). This was also perceived overall during the development of the 
interviews. Some of the women felt they had nothing to contribute or knew nothing at all 
when asked about what needs they had or what things they thought could help their land 
rights. Other women were outspoken, but many of them had to be reminded that there 
were no right or wrong answers to the questions, and in a few cases the interviews were 
cancelled because I could see that the woman was in distress.  
This never happened while interviewing men. Only one man expressed that he would not 
speak at meetings because he felt uneducated: “Because I have no education, I find it 
difficult to have a voice. But even if I am not scared, there are others who are scared. 
People are scared because they are not that confident, or do not have enough power or 
education” (Q8-Farmer man P1, 20.03.2014). However, as his statement shows, issues of 
power were also key for him in regard to having a voice or being confident. This can be 
seen when looking at the levels of education among the participants in the interviews and 
the leaders, most of whom had a basic primary education –standard seven; moreover, 
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there was not a significant difference between the men’s and women’s levels of formal 
education.  
Thus, even when access to land was granted to women, their ability to control the 
resources was clearly more limited and the area where there is more exclusion for them, 
as decisions about land were taken primarily at meetings: “We have discussions in 
meetings with villagers to establish if we accept them [investors]” (Q1-Chairman P1, 
18.03.2014). Women are more excluded from those decisions, even if they participate, as 
displayed in the excerpts above. They tend to be quieter, attend meetings less often and 
struggle to voice their opinions. Still, as has also been proven, some individuals are more 
capable or stronger than others: “I do not fear asking or saying anything that I think is not 
working very well. But there are other women who are scared to ask, they do not have 
exposure, they have not travelled to different places so they lack confidence (Q9-Farmer 
Woman P1, 21.09.2014).  
Boone (2007), Toulmin (2008) and Joireman (2011) have argued how statutory law can 
empower women and secure their land rights. On the other hand, customary or traditional 
law also changes, as some scholars such as Robbin (2000) have pointed out: “Women’s 
access to land was more difficult in the past. In the past the land was only owned by the 
clan and when you got married you went to the clan, so you owned the clan land but only 
for use. But nowadays women can own land even at the village level. Clans exist in some 
places, but this is disappearing slowly” (Q59-Executive director NGO1, 29.04.2014). 
This was corroborated by villagers and leaders, who often referred to the time “in the 
past” to express how their own traditions and customs had evolved.  
Therefore, even if the institutional measures and rules are in place, and custom may 
evolve and change and it is flexible, “ultimate disparate freedoms” will depend on the 
willingness of men, or the most powerful: “It is very difficult, because even the 
government can say that men and women are equal, but the government does not live in 
the house, and what happens in the house the government does not know or it is different 
from what the government may say. So, there is nothing to do with this situation (Q102-
Pastoralist woman M2, 18.05.2014). 
This research documented, through the experiences of the women participating in the 
interviews, as well as the focus groups and observations, that access to land is not the 
main problem for them, even if they only harvest family land, or have bought land of their 
own, or inherited it; access is possible for women. They were more concerned with 
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inequality of power, for example in regard to decision making during meetings, 
institutional representation and formalisation of land tenure, where women do not have 
the freedom to decide or chose what they want due to family or community structures. 
This is more so for pastoralist women.  
6.2.4 The role of the local government 
Table 13 below displays the ways in which the farmers and pastoralists who participated 
in the interviews felt they could protect their land rights. While the participants expressed 
that primarily they trust their government to protect their land, almost equally important 
was the need for them to have a title deed or a CCRO. Other aspects of tenure security 
mentioned during the interviews were family relationships, boundaries and land use. 
Boundaries were closely related to title deeds, as the villagers perceived that the title 
would provide them with stronger boundaries for their land.  
Thus, local government was seen as one of the main sources of security of tenure among 
the interviewees: “The village government and the village land committee is the first thing 
that can help to protect our land” (Q48-Farmer man P2, 17.04.2014). Furthermore, when 
asked about where they could go if they experienced any problems, they expressed trust 
in their local leaders and higher levels of government: “In case of problems I will go to 
the Village Government, if they cannot do anything I will go to the Village Land 
Committee, then to the Ward, then to the District until the issue is solved” (Q57-Farmer 
man P2, 19.04.2014). While villagers referred to these three levels for conflict resolution 
or problems regarding land, they did not refer to regional or central government, which 
is acquiescent with the views expressed above in relation to the central government and 
the lack of trust regarding matters concerning land.  
Table 13: Participants' feelings of protection from tenure insecurity 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Village government 32 43.2 43.2 
Tittle deed 31 41.9 85.1 
My family 3 4.1 89.2 
Better boundaries 4 5.4 94.6 
Cultivate the land 2 2.7 97.3 
I don't know 1 1.4 98.6 
Higher levels of government 1 1.4 100.0 
Total 74 100.0  
Source: Author fieldwork, Feb-June 2014 
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In any case, the trust that villagers had in their local leaders conflicts with some of the 
literature on land grabbing that has portrayed local leaders as co-opted by elites and 
corrupt (Cotula 2011). During the observations the picture that emerged was somehow 
different, as leaders were chosen from the farmers within their fellow villagers and had 
the same level of income and education. Some complaints were made during the 
interviews, but only a few and they were mainly related to party political differences. 
Leaders were selected every five years and in some cases belonged to political parties, so 
if the villagers were not happy it was easy for them to change their leaders, and thus some 
of the issues raised related to political differences.  
Thus, most of the rural villagers participating in the interviews valued their leaders 
positively and felt they were accountable to them: “I think these days, leaders listen to us, 
compared to the past when leaders were the sole decision makers…since leaders know 
that people are more aware of land issues, they are doing their work better” (Q2-Farmer 
man P1, 18.03.2014).  
2. Village meetings 
The way in which the leaders included their fellow villagers was explained by the village 
chairman in P2: “Every three months we have a village meeting and we introduce the 
agenda; anybody can introduce a topic into the agenda; also villagers can talk to any of 
the leaders in the committees or hamlets and the leader will take it to the Village General 
Meeting. Also, we have a complaints box in which people can write their opinions… we 
take all of the opinions to the general meeting for clarification and decisions” (Q34-
Chairman P2, 09.04.2014). 
As stated above, women can be excluded from attending meetings. Similarly, another 
group excluded from meetings and leadership positions are pastoralists. They do not 
usually attend meetings, unless a conflict has occurred, and it is very common for farmers 
to refer to them as “very criminal”: “we attend [meetings] if we are informed, but much 
of the time we do not go. We only go if there are livestock conflicts with farmers. But for 
development issues we do not attend because people will raise claims complaining about 
us as livestock keepers” (Q69-Pastoralist man M1, 05.05.2014); “Very few attend 
meetings, especially pastoralists but farmers attend” (Q97-Pastoralist leader M1, 
17.05.2014). The reason is that often pastoralist trespass on farmers’ land and let their 
cattle feed on the harvest. For this, they have to pay fines, usually in cash. Many village 
assemblies have lists containing the names of pastoralists who are considered “the most 
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criminal”. Despite this, in M1 a young Maasai was the secretary of the Village Land 
Committee.  
As well as the limitations regarding women and pastoralists participating in meetings, and 
therefore in decisions that the villages may make about giving away land to investors on 
a large or small-scale, it was also common for the villagers to complain that their leaders 
did not call the meetings in a timely manner or did not inform them appropriately. This 
could cause strong reactions among the villagers. For instance, during the fieldwork, I 
observed one of the meetings, which only around 60 people attended. There is a 
requirement that says that if at least half of the villagers are not present, the meeting 
should be postponed. The leaders wanted to hold the meeting, but the villagers 
complained about the quorum. They complained that the hamlet leaders had not informed 
them about the meeting adequately, and the meeting was postponed for one week. The 
village had a population of over 1,000 villagers. They explained that they had not 
expected 500 people, but at least something over 100. The villagers shouted and 
complained strongly to the leaders (fieldwork notes, 01.4.2014). Meetings can be 
postponed a week, but the same thing could happen again. 
Another source of frustration among the participants with regard to the meetings was the 
lack of required members. A village assembly cannot be celebrated without a VEO. The 
VEO is an employee of the district. He or she is the representative of the district executive 
officer in the village and also the secretary of the village council. The VEO is a link 
between the district and the village and is paid as a district official. M1 had had no VEO 
for several months and the meetings could not take place. The issue also raised concerns 
among the villagers: “the law states that we are supposed to have meetings four times per 
year. But they did not call a meeting regularly; they could only call one a meeting in a 
year. Then, they decided to give land to investors without the villagers’ agreement” (Q82-
Farmer man M1, 11.05.2014). This was not an uncommon issue in the villages and 
corresponds with the capacity that villages have to develop all of the roles attributed by 
the law, as will be explored below when documenting issues regarding formalisation. A 
senior staff member in NGO3 also expressed this concern: “Many times they [rural 
villagers] say that village assemblies are not held accordingly to the law or meetings are 
not held. They ask: “If the VEO does not call the meeting, what should we do?” (OEI8-
Senior program manager NGO3, 29.05.18). 
During village meetings decisions about investment and giving away land are presented 
to the rest of the villagers and decisions are made by voting. Other issues that influence 
137 
 
the decisions in meetings have to do with the influence and somehow the manipulation 
that local leaders can experience from officials from higher levels of the government: 
“Yes, [our leaders protect our land] although sometimes they are misled by the higher 
level, because even in the investment here [in P2] they were given the wrong information 
and they were also negatively affected by the project” (Q48: Farmer man P2, 17.04.2014). 
The chairman of P2 explained how they had experienced certain pressures in two days 
and how they had been convinced by the promises their received from an MP representing 
their district to give land for the jatropha project in P2 and the other 11 villages:  
They [district officials] came two times, they brought the investor and a member of the 
parliament promoting the investment at the village meeting. And they already had the power 
from the central government, and they already knew and had a picture of the land they wanted; 
because people we are not informed, they told us they wanted that particular land and people 
would benefit… So people… without knowing whether the investment would result in a profit 
or loss for them and because they had been told they would provide employment, and build 
schools, entrepreneurs would be given loans and also you would be involved in the products… 
when they asked for the general consensus from the people all of the people agreed on it… 
They used another trick… asking the village secretary to give them a summary of the meeting 
and they took it. And that summary had the names and signatures of all of the people who had 
attended the meeting and agreed on the investment. But later on we came to realize that we had 
lost land without knowing it, and began to regret it but we could not do anything. If land has 
been taken away by the investor, he has been given the title deed for ninety-nine years and it 
cannot be cancelled until the president decides to do so” (Q34-Chairman P2, 09.04.2014). 
Later on, the leaders tried to make the investors accountable, but the higher levels of 
government made that task difficult, as one of the villagers in P2 explained when referring 
to individual land affected by the project. It did not only involve village land, as was 
initially agreed: “They went to the village land and put a beacon to indicate the investor’s 
boundary, but later the investor squeezed his boundary with another beacon. When I saw 
the second beacon I asked the village chairman and we went to that place to see it and we 
saw that the investor had squeezed the beacon and the chairman promised to call a 
meeting and he invited the investor to ask him why he had put another beacon to squeeze 
the boundary. But the investor said that he was not responsible for the beacon because it 
had been placed there by the professional land officers who did the survey. Our leaders 
told him the villagers were resisting that beacon, and he agreed to pay compensation for 
that … The whole procedure was not good because there was no agreement” (Q49-Farmer 
man, 17.04.2014). 
6.3 Formalisation of tenure 
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The second source of security of tenure for villagers, as pointed out above, is the title 
deed. Almost unanimously, the villagers participating in the interviews expressed that 
they wanted a tittle deed in the form of a CCRO. Even pastoralists, whose land tenure is 
communal, demanded formalisation in the form of obtaining a CCRO. Joireman (2011) 
highlighted that everywhere that she conducted research in Africa, people always 
expressed positive views about gaining more security for their land through legal deeds. 
However, it is unclear whether formalisation per se will create a virtual cycle of 
development in rural areas driven by an invisible hand, as indicated by De Soto’s thesis 
(2000). During the workshop attended at Dar-es-Salaam, the practitioners highlighted 
how the title alone would not protect villagers, as issues of power and inequality were 
still predominant. In any case, demands for legal titles according to the law were 
widespread among the rural villagers and one of their main demands (see Table 14). 
Table 14: Participants’ responses in regard to wanting to have a CCRO (hati miliki) 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
  Yes 71 95.9 100.0 
 Depends on family 3 4.1  
Total 74 100.0  
Source: author's fieldwork, Feb-June 2014 
 
6.3.1 The issue of land certificates 
The previous section documented participants’ views on how they could improve their 
land tenure security, with a focus on the role of the local government and the village 
meetings. Overall, the villagers legitimated their leaders as a source of security. This 
could be considered a source of social legitimisation for security of tenure. Knight (2010) 
states that land tenure is secure when it is legally and socially legitimate.  
Thus, it can be inferred from the participants’ responses that they legitimise the authority 
of the village government and their leaders. Also, statutory laws, such as the Land Acts 
of 1999, recognise the authority of leaders, and further construct a structure of committees 
with different functions within the village government. In this way, the decentralised 
state–in this case represented by local government- acts according to Locke’s theory (in 
Joireman 2011) on property rights; attributing to the state authority as supervisor and 
guarantor of ownership. 
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On the other hand, law emanates primarily from customs and traditions. This gives 
legitimacy to statutory law (Knight, 2010). As reviewed in Chapter 2, one of the most 
fervent attempts in Sub-Saharan Africa has been to translate traditional and customary 
laws into formal and statutory laws; an  effort that resulted in waves of land reforms across 
the region in the late 1990s (Alden Wily 2003a, Boone 2007, Pedersen 2012). The land 
reform of 1999 in Tanzania is an example of those efforts. Such a reform, as explored in 
Chapter 4, mainly highlighted the role of local governments and their committees in a 
decentralised process. One of the traits of decentralisation is that local governments have 
the legal administrative capacity to issue title deeds under certain conditions. The main 
conditions are that the village is required to have a Village Certificate, and the appropriate 
offices and storage space, which will be discussed below.  
The Village Certificate 
As described when analysing the new Land Laws of 1999 in Chapter 4, the previous 
requisite for the village to be able to issue CCROs was that they had to have their own 
Village Certificates. The Village Certificate should reflect the boundaries with other 
villages, with general land, and with reserved land.  In fact, it is unusual for villages to 
have them, but they are increasingly being demanded, as demands for CCROs increase.  
When the village is surveyed and its boundaries are marked, the authority (Land 
Commissioner) will issue a certificate according to section 7 (6-12) of the land use law, 
1999. This is a very important document, which should be kept and protected by the 
village government, which has the mandate to control the land. 
The village land certificate becomes the ownership right of the village to manage the land 
and to defend it from others, to mark and place boundaries, to plan different uses for the 
land, to give ownership to villagers and other institutions, and to continue giving land by 
customary practices, but keeping records of all the land distribution and giving them to 
the district.  
The land certificate of the village is given by the President of Tanzania, and the village 
government owns it on his behalf. The certificate allows villagers to live in the village 
and to access village land following customary laws. The Village Land Certificate is 
prepared by the District Land Officer using form n16 of the village land law no5. The 
district has to draw the maps and place boundaries and the certificate has to be signed by 




The certificate then has to be sent to the Commissioner so that (s)he can sign it. One copy 
of it will remain at the Ministry of Land and two copies will be sent back to the District, 
one of which will remain in the district, while the other will remain in the village. If there 
is a change in the village boundaries, the Commissioner must be notified. The 
commissioner will then annotate all of the changes on the certificate that remains at the 
Ministry. 
The relevance that the title has for rural villagers has evolved significantly, particularly 
since the beginning of the century. It was found during the fieldwork that all of the 
villagers were aware of the title and its effectiveness as collateral in financial institutions. 
They explained how they had heard about it from others, from the radio or from TV, or 
from their leaders.  Without a village certificate, villages cannot issue CCROs.   
An explanation of how these certificates were not considered relevant by villages, and the 
evolution and incorporation of the custom into written law was provided by a village 
chairman: “We became independent in 1961, and matters relating to law we came to know 
about in the 2000s, so many years have passed in between, and people have given away 
their land without knowing and without following the laws, without any written 
document, there are many things that have happened in the villages... I remember in 1974, 
the government, after introducing Ujamaa Villages, also introduced the village title deed, 
which many people did not understand. This meant that every village was registered but 
that registration did not mean that land belonged to the villagers… villagers, we did not 
understand the meaning of the title or even the value of it. The government used the 
village certificate as a way of putting the village land into a title deed but the villagers 
themselves did not understand what that meant and did not do it” (Q34-Chairman P2, 
09.04.2014). 
The chairman also talked about the relevance of the title and compared it to the practices 
of the colonisers: “today people demand education on land rights, land ownership, title 
deeds, and boundaries…People have realised that without a title deed their land can be 
taken away. The first people to know the importance of land in the village were the 
missionaries.. when the missionaries came they started occupying land for churches, even 
land for burials. Burial land for Christianity is not easy to destroy because they already 
have the title deed, and even their churches have it. So people came to realise that if you 
have land and you have a title deed it is not easy to lose your land. But getting a title deed 
is a big problem… they have created difficult procedures to confuse you, because those 
who are responsible they just lie to us” (Q34-Chairman P2, 09.04.2014). In this interview 
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excerpt, the chairman of P2 explained what the literature has considered many times in 
regard to the impact of colonisation on land rights and the division of land with statutory 
legal ownership and land that was owned customarily by local people (Berry 2002). The 
second part of his quote will be explored in detail below, when considering the challenges 
that rural villagers and their leaders face in the institutional processes of obtaining 
CCROs, or customary title deeds.  
The villagers’ customary certificate of occupancy 
There is a relationship between the perceived relevance of land in Tanzania: “we didn’t 
know about the importance of the land” (Q34-Chairman P2, 09.04.2014), and the 
demands for obtaining CCROs –hati miliki in Swahili. Both, the increased importance of 
land and the need for CCROs were usually mentioned during the interviews. As shown 
in Table 14 above, only three participants were not completely sure about wanting a title 
deed, and in all three cases this was because they were still living with their parents. The 
three interviewees were women; two of them were less than eighteen years old and the 
other one was a single women living on her family land. These three women relied on the 
decisions made by their families, as they did not own the land.  
Title deeds are a new and different source of tenure security for villagers, compared with 
the security that their local leaders provide. Villagers legitimize title deeds by trusting the 
statutory law.   
As stated in the literature review, titling has been a contested topic among development 
scholars and practitioners for decades. De Soto (2000) claims that the inexistence of title 
deeds in most parts of agricultural societies impoverishes those already in weak positions; 
land ownership is a hidden asset that, when statutorily recognised, provides farmers with 
capital to be able to flourish. However, economic or institutional power is not considered 
relevant in those theories. The same chairman in P2, among others, explained how income 
can create a gap between those who can obtain title deeds and those who cannot, creating 
a new source of exclusion, which is not fully addressed by De Soto (2000):  “the 
government and rich people are the ones that can own the land. People with normal 
incomes are the ones that can’t own the land. Villagers do not own the land because they 
do not have the title deed” (Q34-Chairman P2, 09.04.2014). 
Thus, better off nationals or foreigners have power over impoverished villagers when 
accessing titles for their land, and this brings winners and losers in these processes, which 
has been widely acknowledged in the literature (Nyamu-Musembi 2006, e.g.: Boone 
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2007, Peters 2009). Despite this, De Soto’s discourse has permeated rural societies 
through the media and the discourses of NGOs and CSOs.  
Demands among villagers for CCROs are often and notably accompanied by the claim 
that they will be able to use the CCRO as a collateral for loans in financial institutions: 
“if I have it [hati miliki] I can get a loan” (Q7-Farmmer Man P1, 20.03.2014); “People 
here need … rights to own land, so they can use it as collateral” (Q1-Chairman P1, 
18.03.2014). Participants in the focus groups also used the same terminology: “Here 
people ask for the customary right of occupancy and ask for it at many Village 
Assemblies…Most people ask for the CCRO because they can ask for a loan” (Focus 
group 1 participant, 03.04.2014); “The title is very important because now there is a lot 
of development, in the coming years all the financial institutions will deny a loan without 
the title” (Focus group 1 participant, 03.04.2014). I had not expected to hear this in 
apparently isolated places distant from academic papers or WB reports. However, this 
concept was also used by NGOs: “First of all, they (villagers) need to have land and the 
certificate of occupancy. The benefit of the certificate is that people can go to financial 
institutions and get loans” (Q44-General Secretary NGO2, 15.04.2014).  
However, when the villagers were asked about the repayment of loans or interest they 
seemed more confused in their answers and many only stated that they would not ask for 
much. Thus, they also knew of the possibility of losing their land if they were not able to 
repay their credit, and expressed surprise and disbelief regarding that fact. The possibility 
of loans creating more landless people has been discussed by scholars, such as Manji 
(2006, in Pedersen 2016, 107) or Sud (2014b). Also, peasants’ associations have warned 
about the pervasive effects of debt among peasants, leading to loss of land and even 
suicide. La Via Campesina (2018) reports that more than 300,000 peasants have 
committed suicide over the last fifteen years because they could not repay their debts.   
Thus, despite claims about surfacing dead capital, the issuing of land certificates can lead 
to a process of exclusion and has the potential to further increase the gap between rich 
elites and investors who are better positioned to acquire land that is already cheap and 
who are able to pay for the issuing of certificates, which on the other hand, will increase 
the price of the land.  
Thus, the gap can be pervasive in a twofold way: lack of access to security of tenure 
through lack of access to enough resources for formalisation, and lack of access to even 
more expensive land after the title has been issued. Villagers are very willing to get titles, 
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but are unable to do so due to their impoverished conditions, particularly young people: 
“Here some (young people) do not have money to pay for the land” (Farmer man QV87, 
2014). Many villagers cannot afford the current prices of the land (this price is the 
administrative fee that villagers have to pay to the village government): “Land is sold for 
about 5,000 TSh/ac (£1,73/ac) and I have a wife and children so I cannot afford to take 
care of the family and buy land” (Q82-Farmer man M1, 11.05.2014). 
In debates about formalisation, the consequences of such processes have been discussed 
in regard to who these processes exclude (e.g: Nyamu-Musembi 2006, Peters 2013, 
Pedersen 2016), or what new disputes they may trigger in regard to land demarcation. 
Some scholars point out that titles and land surveys can be a solution to long term 
unsolved conflicts (e.g. Boone 2007, Joireman 2008, 2011, Toulmin 2008), while others 
state that they can trigger them (e.g. Locher et al. 2012). Despite this, the villagers 
participating in the interviews felt that titles would help them to know their boundaries 
and solve boundary conflicts. Therefore, their claims for better boundaries and title deeds 
were a claim for further regulation, despite the sources that highlight how these processes 
will further exclude them: “It is important because with boundaries you are clear about 
which is your area, and it also prevents conflicts among neighbours. It prevents people 
from taking part of your land. Now I have trees and plants as boundaries, but I would 
prefer beacons” (Q23-Farmer man P1, 27.03.2014); “Boundaries avoid different conflicts 
between neighbours, like taking the land from other people. For instance, people plant 
trees, taking more land than what is theirs. I'd like to have beacons as boundaries” (Q20-
Farmer woman P1, 27.03.2014); “People are not clear sometimes about their boundaries 
and they are only expressed by words. It would be better to put up some strong signs” 
(Q12-Hamlet leader P1, 21.03.2014). 
As pointed out above, formalisation also requires a certain amount of resources and 
infrastructure. The process is done in Tanzania at multiple levels, as we saw before. 
District 1 pushed through a process to issue deeds in the district. Many districts aim to do 
that, and the central government also aims to find funding to issue more titles. This is a 
difficult process and always requires the cooperation of villages. Ultimately, the law 
establishes that villages have the capacity to issue their own titles under certain 
conditions: secure offices with locked cabinets, proper windows, etc. This is often done 
with the cooperation of districts, and districts can hold copies of the titles. Many villages 
are building new offices. Well-equipped offices are a pre-requisite for villages to be able 
to issue titles: “We are not issuing [the title] in that office because it is not good and it 
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does not have good windows and doors and the titles could be destroyed... The villagers 
want an office; the offices are not good enough to keep all the documents there. We want 
a village office especially for taking care of the titles, so if the parents die and the children 
come for the documents… if they have lost the original ones the children can ask for the 
document and that will remain in the office” (Participant in Focus Group 1, 03.04.2014). 
At the village assemblies, the villagers agreed to build these new offices. In all of the 
villages visited they were in the process of building them. In P2 they had agreed to build 
the office with part of the compensation they received from the investor. However, the 
issuing and conservation of title deeds require the village authorities to have the relevant 
capacity. They do not fully know the procedures; as stated before they have limited 
education, at times not even primary level. The state of the village offices’ archives at 
present is illustrated in Illustration 12; obviously, the training, office equipment and 
infrastructure required are a constraint to the possibility of issuing titles locally in a very 
economically deprived environment and the requirements for local governments and even 
district governments surpass the capabilities of their staff and infrastructure. In many 
instances, NGOs and CSOs are the ones providing the education to the village and district 
officials, who are unaware of the law and its procedures. 





This decentralised formalisation process in Tanzania is full of challenges, as described by 
a staff member of a CSO: “A good example is in Mbeya region in Mbozi district. They 
are a good example; they are getting the certificates and issuing them to the people. They 
started three years ago and people are getting loans from financial institutions… We will 
be glad to do the same here, but we are not getting enough support from the district 
council… this is something that is new to them and not easy... We are encouraging every 
village where we have taught this Land Act 5, advising them to push the district by 
themselves. Our main concern is to make people aware of the law, of act number 5” 
It has been claimed that the process of formalisation in Tanzania is one of 
‘decentralisation’, due to the fact that the local communities at last have responsibility for 
issuing titles. However, they need to be supported by the district and other authorities. All 
of them lack an understanding of the law and they do not have available funds. Many 
NGOs are working on helping to provide the titles, something that is expensive as it 
requires the surveying of all of the land. These constraints, together with the villagers’ 
demands for more security and protection of their land in order to ‘exclude’ others, are 
leading to what the access rights literature has coined ‘informal formalisation’ (Pedersen 
2016). Faced with the inability to access government resources and the required offices, 
villages have started to develop their own manuals and rudimentary titles and lists of 
people who have demanded land and those who have been granted land (Illustration 13). 
Furthermore, many have started to ask for informal documents when they make land 
transactions: “My work is to provide land and plots to the people as well to issue receipts 
to the people who are given land or have bought plots from the village” (Secretary of the 
Village Land Committee in Stendi, KS-97); “The land belongs to us, we bought it and we 




Illustration 13: People that had been allocated village land and the waiting list in M1 
 
Source: Field data, May 2014 
Villages have started to develop their own manual systems over the last couple of years. 
They provide a hand written document when they allocate village land to any individual.  
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Picture 1: Receipt for village land allocation to a woman 
 
      Source: Field data, May 2014 
Together with the manual records, as shown in the previous sections, villagers demand 
the acquisition of the title deed not only as protection for their land, but also to make their 
land even more valuable: 
If you have it [the title deed] you can hold the land forever, protect it and sell it for the price 
that you want (Q20- Farmer woman, P1, 27.03.14). 
Investors’ certificates 
The certificates that investors obtain are called Certificates of Occupancy. COs can be 
issued only in General Lands and this is why there is the need to change from Village to 
General Land when a deal involves land that belongs to villagers. These certificates were 
given to the foreign large-scale farms documented by the fieldwork. In P2, the Jatropha 
farm was granted a 99 year certificate. More recently, in 2016, due to pressure from 
NGOs, a new land policy approved declared that CO titles cannot be granted for longer 
than 33 years.  
As explained above, it is easier for investors and foreigners to obtain a CO than it is for 
communities to obtain their CCROs or the village certificates due to economic 
constraints. All of the investors that participated in the interviews had those certificates 
or were in the process of obtaining them. The result was demarcation through beacons of 




Meassuring land for investors can also bring about problems at the moment of surveying 
of the land. Staff from NGOs and also District officials who were interviewed explained 
how the problems often occurred because the leaders were not sure how much land they 
were giving away. They did not measure the land, they did not have a clear picture of 
how big it was and this led to problems later: “[V]illagers do not understand the reality 
or the measurements. If you agreed on three acres, it’s three acres, but the villagers will 
tell you instead: “from here to that tree”. Then, when the surveyors come, the measures 
may be even bigger than the 50 acres that they are allowed to sell by law” (OEI8: Senior 
program manager NGO3, 29.05.18). This is one of the reasons why M2 rejected the initial 
plans to survey their village by RUBADA, because after the initial verbal agreement, 
when the district officials came with the maps, they disagreed with then. 
6.3.2 The Land Use Plans 
In order to issue an LUP, the district council has to form a joint committee for the 
development of the LUP. The committee will be formed of 6-8 members from different 
sectors such as agriculture, livestock, natural resources, and community development. 
The committee prepares a system for implementation of the LUP in the villages of the 
district.  
The development of the LUP needs resources that are given by the district. However, 
many districts lack funds for their implementation. Districts are advised to implement an 
LUP in a few villages due to the funding restrictions. Districts can also cooperate with 
other institutions to conduct such projects. 
The second step is the implementation of the LUP in the villages.  First of all, the 
participation and mobilisation of the village is needed to implement the plans. To do so, 
a team of experts work in cooperation with the villagers, village government and village 
land committee.  
The second stage is to evaluate collectively the aims of the village, the importance of the 
land in the village, the population, the size of the village, and the animals and social 
services in the village. Such an evaluation is done by the village government. This 
information is communicated to all of the villagers and is contained in a report that is 
accessible to them.  
The third stage is to prepare a community action plan. This plan is not part of the LUP, 
but is a timetable of all of the necessary actions for the conclusion of the LUP. The 
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community action plan puts together all of the activities and the time they will take to 
implement as well as who is responsible for them. It also assigns every task to an 
individual or group of individuals.  
The fourth step is to strengthen the capacity building of all of the village institutions. 
These comprise the village government, the village general assembly and the different 
committees. The aim is to provide them with the appropriate capability to conduct their 
responsibilities properly while developing the land use plan at the local level. Section 55 
of the local government law established the need to conduct village meetings. Such 
meetings carry the authority to agree or disagree on the distribution of land according to 
village land law n5, 1999 section 8. 
As explained before, all of the land in Tanzania is divided into three categories: village, 
general and reserved land. However, according to the wishes of the president, land can 
change categories at any time.  
When the process of the LUP for the village boundaries to be marked with the agreement 
of the District Committee on LUP. The Land District Office then makes a list of the 
villages, differentiating by: 
 Villages that have been surveyed and boundaries drawn up; a map has been 
drawn of them and there are no boundary conflicts. They are ready to obtain the 
Village Land Certificate. 
 Villages where the boundaries have been recognized but which have not been 
surveyed and there are no boundary conflicts. The map can be prepared by using 
modern technology (GPS) and afterwards the Village Land Certificate can be 
prepared.  
 Villages where the land has been surveyed and boundaries have been drawn but 
there are boundary conflicts. First the conflicts need to be solved and the 
boundaries need to be established. 
 Villages that have not been surveyed and have land conflicts. First, all of the 
conflicts need to be solved. 
The main duty of the village government is to defend the village land and recognise the 
village boundaries in order to get the Village Land Certificate. In order to accomplish 
this, the village government should communicate with other neighbouring villages. If the 
conflict is over reserved land, they need to communicate with the relevant authority. The 
parties need to work together and agree on their boundaries. 
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Different actors are involved in supporting villagers financially and technically in the 
issuing of LUPs. Somehow, LUPs are more important than CCROs in determining the 
boundaries of the village, and the different categories of land within the village. It is 
supposed that when land has been considered for farming or cattle, it should be used only 
for that purpose. LUPs are thus bylaws. NGOs help in the issuing of LUPs. National and 
international donor agencies and government agencies are also involved. The LUP 
influences the amount of land available and its use, and can be one of the most excluding 
processes. Confrontation on the LUP was observed in M2.  
The procedures are not different, I mean the written procedures and the guidelines on how to 
implement the LUP are all the same… coming from the Commission. But, you are conducting 
the LUP for whose benefit? With us and MGP, we are not going to benefit from the LUP; we 
need nothing from the land of the villagers, what we need is the people themselves to benefit 
from that land. We need to end land conflicts in the area, that’s our intention. We will be happy 
to see that the villagers live their lives and benefit from their land. That is our main objective. 
When conducting LUP we want to make sure that all the procedures have been followed; 
including rising awareness of the people. People have to be aware of why to conduct the LUP. 
After they know and agree they select the Village LUP Committee, which is formed of villagers 
selected from villagers in the assembly meeting. The assembly appoints the committee and 
approves them (OEI8: Senior program manager NGO3, 29.05.18). 
 
6.4 The impact of formalisation  
 
6.4.1 Formalisation and villagers’ land rights 
An example of the negative impact was found in District 1 and was explained by the 
District Lawyer; documents were also shown to me. When he was asked about the 
people’s demands in the district, the lawyer explained: “The land to be surveyed. This 
will make people happy” (Open interview-District 1 Lawyer, 25.03.2014). This concurs 
with the findings of this research regarding formalisation. However, he explained how 
they had provided CCROs to 1,000 people in the District:  
We have two examples of that. We have surveyed and given titles to 4 villagers in Kisarawe 
(Kitanga, Viseguesa + 2 other), affecting more than 1.000 people. The programme is still 
operating and it started in 2013. We want to avoid squatters. The project is being implemented 
by (Company X).52 This company is a private company whose mission is to survey and provide 
                                                 
52 All the information on this work is anonymised  
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title deeds. As an exchange they keep part of the land surveyed. They are supported by donors. 
The agreement they have with (District 1) is  
63% of the land for the land owners 
37%: for the company and other purposes as follows: 
15% services: schools, health centres.. 
4% infrastructures: roads, water, electricity 
12% to District Council profit 
8% shareholders of Company X53 
The villagers have participated extensively in the project. It will finish in June this year. At the 
beginning the villagers were a little bit reluctant about it, but now they are very happy with it. 
The lawyer talked very openly about this and he showed the document to me. In this 
transaction the villages had lost control of 37% of their land in exchange for the issuing 
of CCROs. Part of that land was the land where they already had their schools and medical 
dispensaries.  
6.4.2 Formalisation and village land 
Pressures over land are increasing, as has been repeatedly stated in the literature. Peters 
(2004) refers to pressures such as “pervasive competition and conflict over land in sub-
Saharan Africa” (2004, 269), while Toulmin (2008) remarks on “the rising demand for 
land around urban centres and for large-scale cultivation of biofuels” (2008, 10). The 
claims that these pressures need to make land rights more secure for villagers through 
formalisation will have an impact on the flexibility of customary land rights. 
As explained above, traditionally the way of acquiring the land was by use. When land 
was not used, it was available for another person to use. When the processes of 
formalisation described above and documented by the research, either rudimentary or 
fully official and according to the law; the picture that emerges is a static one. Through 
LUPs villages draw a picture of their reserved land, farming land, livestock keeping land 
and settlement land. As explained, once a year or more, villages allocate land to villagers 
form the farming land still available to them. If the land they allocate changes from 
flexibility of use to a CCRO, the picture is clearly static. Furthermore, decisions on how 
to distribute the land and to whom will still be controversial and the communal land will 
at some point be fully ‘enclosed’.  
In this context of increasing pressures over land, villagers are becoming more aware of 
how land is becoming scarce and difficult to obtain and, thus, their demand is to have 
more land as they are increasingly aware of the challenges that land scarcity will impose 
                                                 
53 The contents were explained during the conversation, but the figures were copied from the document that the lawyer showed to me 
during the interview.  
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on their livelihoods. Participants in one of the focus groups discussed this topic, as did 
participants during the interviews: “The communal land in all 3 villages is about to finish. 
In this ward there is no communal land left. Also in [P1] people are complaining that the 
land is being given to investors… the case is with the Ministry because they want the land 
back. This is an example where the land is going to finish… people wouldn’t complain 
that much if there was plenty of land. In our village you can find a forest, but it belongs 
to someone now, so there is no empty land here” (Focus Group 1 participant, 03.04.2014). 
Interviewees associated the commodification of land with a threat to their livelihoods and 
that of their neighbours at the same time. They were aware that the increasing population 
and the growth of urban areas would affect land availability: “Land is finishing so people 
should stop selling the land. The consequence of selling would be that people would not 
have land to cultivate (Q92-Farmer young woman M2, 15.05.2014); “I need more land 
because in the future the population will increase and there will be scarcity of land” (Q89-
Pastoralist man M1, 14.05.2014); “Land has become property nowadays and the 
population is increasing as well as investors because in previous days we used to divide 
the land among ourselves but now big land is taken away by investors” (Q67-Farmer man 
M1, 05.05.2014). 
The villagers realised this changing perception and that their norms had changed: “before 
people gave land for free, but after realising the value they do not give it for free any 
more” (Q35-Farmeer man P2, 09.04.2014). Another way it changes, as has been pointed 
above in the widespread demand for formalization –even basic manual formalization with 
unofficial titles. Trust is threatened as economic value is added to the land: 
One of my priorities is that everyone should have access to their own land. Village land should 
be distributed to villagers for free. That was the case in the past, but in 2002 we decided not 
give more land for free because people were selling it instead of cultivating or living on it. We 
made this decision in a village meeting in 2002 (Q22-Farmer woman P1, 27.03.2014) 
Selling the land is a very bad act. Even the communal land is being sold, so we lose our 
resources (Q10-Farmer woman P1, 21.03.2014). 
From 2008 it started to increase, there are no reasons for that, just money reasons. Many people 
sell the land that they have inherited. Then, where are their children going to live? (Q38-Farmer 
woman P2, 10.04.2014). 
This is happening because those in power have become a broker by allowing people to sell 
their land even without following the procedures. The law states that the bared and bush land 
belongs to the government and it is not supposed by individual but unfortunately they bend the 
laws and it is sold as an individual land (Q43-Task Force chairman P2, 11.04.2014). 
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We found that people were coming from Dar and bribing the local government and the people 
to give them land… we told the government that something has to be done to solve that. The 
Government should explain to the local government and people not to sell the land, because 
some people sell it and then they have nothing. People sell the land to those who have money, 
and then they end up without anything; sometimes they have children and they end up without 
anywhere to go and they need to ask to stay there … to the people they have sold their land 
to…in the end they will become slaves in their own land. They have to encourage people and 
explain to the local government to encourage villagers not to sell their land to people who have 
money… some of them are corrupt (Q44-Task Force secretary P2, 15.04.2014). 
In the face of this, villagers have started to ask for more land and have used the topic that 
they have learnt from the top-down discourses of ‘future generations’. In M2 they were 
resisting investors strongly and were more aware of the land scarcity they faced. This 
could be due to different reasons. M2 was a new village that had split from KS. They had 
rejected investors’ projects and they sell the land much expensive to villagers than the 
neighbouring villages. Each acre costs 20,000ths, which is paid to the village government. 
Each village has the authority to charge an administrative cost for the hectares and in 
some cases to allocate land for free.54 Demands for more land and for preservation of the 
existing land, therefore, are one of the consequences of land competition, and villagers 
frame their demands in these two strands: more land allocated to them, requests to not 
sell the land, and increasing securitisation of their land through formalisation: 
Now the price of 1ha55 is 1,000,000tsh in this village, although in some places there is 
200,000ths/ha because still interior.56 The value of land in those villages is becoming higher 




                                                 
54 One example of this was the program “Shoulder to Shoulder” implemented in Puga, where the village allocated land to young 
people with grade degrees.  
55 1 hectare is approximately 2.5 acres 
56 This is due to distance to commercial cities and urban centres.  
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 Negotiating land grabbing in Tanzania 
5.  
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter answers to the research question of what are the different ways in which 
people negotiate land grabbing. Negotiation is the process by which stakeholders achieve 
agreements where not everybody is totally happy, but no party should feel that has lost 
everything during the negotiation. Some scholars believe in a win-win negotiation (Crina 
and Petrescu-Mag 2017) .  
National elites, international investors and the government are the leading actors in land 
grabbing. The actions of these powerful actors erode the negotiating or bargaining 
capability of those at the bottom (Vermeulen and Cotula 2010, De Schutter 2011, Amanor 
2012a), and, at the same time, hamper their rights.  
As Borras and Franco (2013, 1724) advocate, approaches that bring light into the different 
interest within the community and their actions consenting or contesting land deals have 
remained unexplored, even though Chapter 3 of this thesis has displayed literature that 
with a focus on negotiating and stakeholders and actors in the current transformations of 
land use and land control (e.g. Sud 2014b, De Maria 2019). 
They defend a methodological procedure to systematically build up research that is sound 
and valid. The goal of this type of approach is to highlight the political reactions of those 
most affected by land deals. Their inquiry aims to disclose “how those most affected 
actually perceive and react to these largescale land deals and why” (Borras Jr. and Franco 
2013, 1724). However, the political reactions are not always widespread or intelligible 
enough, as the same scholars have pointed out: “the individual and collective political 
reactions of people and peoples affected by land deals cannot be taken for granted” (2013, 
1724). Some people may consent even when it may not be in their best interest at the end 
(Li 2014b). 
The concept of negotiation with a focus on each stakeholder power and interest as 
explained by Teklemarian et al.  (2015).  
Integrative perspectives to the actions of stakeholders in land grabbing open up 
alternatives, and even on a small-scale can bring about contributions to different 
literature. Despite the sometimes unperceived reactions, the analysis is still relevant in its 
political perspective. Agrawal (2003) highlights the necessity of going beyond merely the 
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management of institutions and recognises that “[g]reater attention to the dynamics of 
resistance and domination is likely to help explicate better the relationship between 
property and politics” (Agrawal 2003, 257). Without attention to politics, he asserts, it 
will not be possible to address poverty and underdevelopment, or environment 
degradation (Agrawal 2003, 258).  In this understanding, rights are understood as 
emerging from struggles between those who want to control and regulate, and those 
subjected to that control (Agrawal 2003). 
In their approach “from below”, Borras and Franco (2013) have identified three major 
terrains of contestation that are relevant to analyse the political struggles in which local 
people are involved: “poor people versus corporate actors, poor people versus the state, 
and poor people versus poor people” (Borras Jr. and Franco 2013, 1730).  
Different stakeholders have been found to participate in processes of negotiating land 
grabbing in Tanzania. Those have different interests –or needs, and hold different 
capacity to influence the negotiation. One group of actors act at the top, however, they 
may rather have low interest on land, but high degree of power to influence changes in 
land.  ‘Top-down’ actors have traditionally been identified as national officials and better-
off elites, the government and investors (Berry 2002, Kandel 2016). Kandel (2016) refers 
to them as “the accumulating group”, as they “accumulate land from above” (Berry 2002, 
651). 
Other stakeholders in the land grabbing transformations are activists and farmers and 
local land owners or users. Those last ones are the most vulnerable group:“the groups 
most vulnerable to dispossession… the poor, women, the elderly, widows, youth… 
orphans, and the disabled or ill”. Mander (2005, 237) offers a more inclusive description: 
“groups whose rights are systematically denied”. There are gaps in both groups, in regard 
to economic power, control over institutions, and level of formal education. Those gaps 
create vulnerability, but as Berry (2002, 656) demonstrates, they do not render 
communities and their allies unable to reshape or transform property and political 
relationships through their reactions to land accumulation.  
The chapter will document the top down actors involved in land grabbing and the different 
cases that constitute reactions ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ to land grabs in the 
Morogoro and Pwani regions. Two categories of reactions will be documented: resistance 
and non-resistance reactions. That is to say, there is not a homogeneous reaction to land 
grabbing (Hall et al. 2015, Kandel 2015); some reactions are more visible than others 
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(Borras Jr. and Franco 2013), and some are more political than others (Kandel 2015). 
Some reactions also have more involvement from NGOs than others, which triggers 
dynamics between actors at the bottom-up level, which provide useful insights into the 
role of NGOs and the expectations they may evoke among those they try to protect.  
7.2 Stakeholders with power who may or may not have high interest on the land 
7.2.1 The national elite 
This group is mainly comprised of a “politically well-connected elite [that] has been 
actively acquiring land for commercial and speculative purposes, often through a 
combination of legal and coercive measures” (Kandel 2016, 295). There can also bee elite 
who can facilitate the proper regulatory practices for land accumulation to take place, but 
they may not have an interest in the land themselves (Teklemariam et al. 2015)Berry also 
explains how “[s]tate officials, merchants, and their kin and clients used their wealth and 
influence to "grab" land” (Berry 2002, 651).  
In the case of Tanzania, according to a member of staff from a local CSO programme in 
District 1: “leaders, educated people - public officers, government workers, ministers and 
politicians are the ones who are struggling (fighting) seriously to acquire big chunks of 
land disregarding the ordinary people. In fact, grabbing land, seriously, grabbing big 
chunks of land results in a shortage for the general public. Big people are grabbing land 
seriously…They are aware of the benefits of having land, because land, haha, without 
land, there is no economic development” (Member of the executive committee and land 
monitor, 15.04.14).  
Land conflicts and disputes can be non-violent, but they can also have violent 
consequences (Kandel 2016). Berry (2002) describes the assaults on large-scale farms in 
Zimbabwe in 2000 that led to the land redistribution reform in the country. Berry explains 
how “[a]cross the continent, competition over land intensified in the late twentieth 
century, leading to rising land values, increasingly commercialized patterns of land 
acquisition, concentration of land holdings, prolonged litigation and, … sometimes to 
assault and even murder” (Berry 2002, 638). Her conclusions show how ‘top-down’ 
dispossession can trigger violent and non-violent conflicts and their relevance for 
everyday life, politics and socio-economic relationships in Africa. 
Processes of accumulation, such as that described in the excerpt from an interview above, 
have also been considered processes of social differentiation and intra-class formation 
based on income differences (Peters 2013, Tomkinson 2016). For instance, according to 
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the Executive Officer of a paralegal organisation in District 2: “people now have realised 
the importance of land and those who are the rich ones are trying to own big areas of land 
and the poorer ones can’t access even small pieces of land because they are poor. That is 
another problem. It is a big problem and you find that in a village, for instance, somebody 
is owning even 200 ac and there are the poorer ones having half an acre, and they go to 
plant maize or anything else and they have to hire the land from others. It’s a real 
problem” (Q59-Executive director NGO1, 29.04.2014). 
Kandel (2016) has referred to this national elite group as the ‘accumulating group', 
although it is possible to expand this definition to include a wider range of actors such as 
international investors and the state, which have, a priori, been the main actors considered 
by the land grabbing literature (e.g. McMichael 2012, White et al. 2012).  
7.2.2 International foreign investors 
This group will have high level of interest and high level of power, even though 
sometimes they may not be able to influence the regulatory framework, national 
bourocratic elites will be willing to facilitate land commodification for them. The recent 
literature on land grabbing has attributed less relevance to domestic processes of social 
differentiation, and has focused primarily on the role of international investors and large-
scale land deals (e.g. Cotula et al. 2011, Borras Jr. and Franco 2012, Smalley and Corbera 
2012, Hall et al. 2015).  
Investors’ main interest is to have a sound governance context where their investments 
and contracts will be fulfilled and protected, without much opposition and contest; where 
they can be assured of their tenure rights and where acquisition processes are fast and 
flexible. An independent investment consultant in Tanzania explained during an 
interview how the procedures for acquiring land titles can take up to two years and how 
this discourages investors, who, on the other side, want to have a good relationship with 
farmers in most cases, as they know that conflict with farmers is detrimental to their 
activities: “there are some cases where villagers invade the farm and destroy everything” 
(OEI10-Ministry of Land Officer, 09.06.2014). During the fieldwork two large-scale 
international land deals were found in the two districts studied, as well as a third one 




7.2.3 The role of the government 
In the pursuit of economic development, the government is often acquiescent and favours 
investors. According to the consultant interviewed, “some investors are very rigid [with 
villagers] because they have the support from the government…big investors show up at 
the government, if you show up, the government will consider you” (OEI10-Ministry of 
Land Officer, 09.06.2014). A land official at the Ministry of Lands and Human 
Settlements declared during an interview that “they [investors] are warmly invited to 
come to Tanzania” (OEI11-Ministry of Land Officer, 09.06.2014).  
In this processes of acquiescence, the state is a grabbing actor that aims to identify 
unoccupied land for investment purposes, based on the national interest of economic 
development (Alden Wily 2003b, 10, 2010). This was reinforced after the Land Laws of 
1999: “Those two laws have given the President the power to control the land on behalf 
of the people” (NGO3-Anonymised 2013, 6). According to OI6: “The government is 
owning land on behalf of all Tanzanians. Even if a certain piece of land is yours, the 
government may shift you to another piece of land, if your land is ‘influential’, if it is 
beneficial for the public interest”.  
7.3 Stakeholders with lesser power but high levels of interest on the land.  
7.3.1 Local villagers and land owners.  
In 1996, Li considered the powerful political value of communities as a concept in 
development practice and academic literature in “promoting policy shifts and new 
programme directions” (Li 1996, 505).  However, she also pointed out the fact that a 
‘community’ framework “would leave out many of the world’s poorest rural people, who 
are distressed migrants, to marginal areas with little or no community cohesion… 
[and]…[w]omen can also find their specific interests submerged by a community focus” 
(Li 1996, 505).  
At the end of the 2000s, focusing on environmental politics, Agrawal  and  
Sivaramakrishman  (2000)  challenged some identity categories such as ‘local 
communities’, suggesting that  such  a concept can be considered a  ‘mere  category’  that  
can  “flatten  the  complexity  of  phenomenon  that  are imagined …  but  also  limit  the  
possibility  of  enriching  the  study  of  environmental  politics  with  new  theoretical  
insights”  (Agrawal and Sivaramakrishnan 2000, 9). However, similarly to Li (1996), 
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Agrawal  and  Sivaramakrishman  (2000, 9)  have  acknowledged that the concept’s  
“utility  for  drumming  up  support  is  evident”. 
More recently, within the land grabbing literature, the debate over whether the community 
can be considered a homogeneous group has resurfaced. For instance,  Borras and Franco 
(2013) contest the concept of local community, stating that a myriad of different dynamics 
and interests are represented within the “community”. They claim that this homogeneous 
connotation tacitly implies that “the local communities affected (or potentially affected) 
by…land deals exist in homogeneous spaces, and that at stake for the people who inhabit 
these spaces are very similar (if not identical) interests, identities and aspirations for the 
future” (2013, 1724). In order to avoid these assumptions, like Li, they also suggest 
having a “closer look at what and who, exactly, is the community” (Li, 1996, 505, 
emphasis added).  
Mander (2005, 237) proposed a framework based on three dimensions of analysis of 
rights and their denial that can be used to solve this conundrum. Mander’s framework is 
based on the needs of the poor, or most vulnerable. The focus on the needs and rights of 
the most vulnerable aims to highlight their “active  agency  …  in  assessing  their  own  
needs  and  finding  their  own  solutions  to  their  own  problems”  (Mander, 2005, 233).  
It also considers that by defining needs we automatically enter into a political process. 
The framework supports solidarity with those who are more disadvantaged and struggles 
“from below”. A framework based on needs helps to analyse different levels of rights’ 
denial, and at the same time is useful to present an heterogeneous approach to the different 
demands of rural villagers. This framework challenges power and structural injustice, 
which lead to the denial of rights (Mander 2005, 235).  
Mander’s (2005, 237) framework is thus defined by identifying:  
1) the “groups whose rights are systematically denied” –here my research has focused on 
different groups within the community but always considering the potential perils of 
homogenisation and acknowledging differences among individuals. For instance, despite 
the fact that much of the literature has focused on the denial of land rights for women, 
during the focus groups and interviews with women in the four villages studied, they 
claimed that there was no impediment for them to access land through village procedures, 
on their own, whether buying it or inheriting it;  
2) the “content of rights that have been denied, such as the right to livelihood, to dignity, 
to choose an occupation, to shelter and so on” and  
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3) the “right to good governance, in relation both to the denied groups and the substantive 
content of the rights that are sought to be enforced” –this right aims to highlight the 
pervasive nature of some of the state actions; however, to highlight entitlements, the 
involvement of the state in struggles is essential. Thus, this RBA, “require[s] both an 
analysis of what has led to the conditions of people’s deprivation and dispossession, what 
their rights are and how these have been denied, and of the political processes for them 
to be able to access and claim these rights” (Mander 2005, 240).  
In regard to the most vulnerable groups, Kandel’s (2016) analysis of the struggles in post-
conflict Uganda suggests that “the groups most vulnerable to dispossession are – with the 
potential for overlap – the poor, women, the elderly, widows, youth who have lost fathers, 
orphans, and the disabled or ill” (Kandel 2016, 275). Based on my research respondents’ 
socio-economic background and their stories, I found that farmers, pastoralists, women, 
and youths are the most relevant categories to analyse in regard to land dispossession in 
the context of land grabbing in Tanzania; without disregarding Kandel’s inclusion of 
vulnerable groups. Widows, elderly people, orphans and ill people were included within 
the interviewees. ¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia. below uses this 
analytical structure to show the land rights denial of different groups found during the 
fieldwork in Tanzania. It represents the rights that are denied and the needs laid out by 
those most affected by land grabbing. 
Table 15: Matrix of community actors in land struggles 
Groups Struggles 
Content of the 
rights denied. 
What are their 
demands? 




The importance of, 
and need for, land is 
increasing due to 
demographic and 
economic reasons. 
Increase in the value 
of the land: “In 1990 at 
P1, 1ac was 10,000 
TSh, now it is 700,000 














Protection of their 









Source: author's fieldwork, Feb-June 2014. 
Lack of information 
and awareness.  
Unclear and unknown 





and seeds.  
Pastoralist 
The same as farmers. 
Conflict with farmers 
for the land. 
Reserved areas where 
they could previously 
fed their cattle 
The above, but in 




processes in the 
villages and at other 
levels of 
government. 




Very often.  
Women 
The same as farmers. 
Family situations and 
rules make women’s 





tenure security and 
decision making. 







The same as farmers 
and pastoralists 
Pastoralist women 
have no right to access 
or own land or any 
other economic means 
like cattle or money by 
tradition. 
The same as 
farmers, but they 
cannot inherit or 
own anything. They 
cannot attend 
meetings and have 
restricted rights to 
attend school by 
tradition. 
They struggle to 
claim any right.  
Almost always.  
Youth 
Particular impact of 
increase in prices, the 
current young 
generation is the one 
most affected 
Available village land 
tends to be of least 
fertility and far away 
from the village. They 
have to hire land.  
Access.  









However, local people oftentimes consent to land grabbing. And why do people consent? 
This can be explain by the interest that local people hold in developing their village, 
region and even nation. In order to gain acquiescence from villagers, assembling land 
always brings with it promises of development (Pearce 2012) from corporations and more 
powerful actors. As Li puts it: “villagers are driven into the arms of the corporations as 
the only source of the infrastructure they so desire. Without roads, villagers argue, they 
cannot become full national citizens and modern subjects: no road means no schools, no 
school teachers, no motorbikes, no cell phones, indeed none of the attributes they 
associate with ‘normal’ village life. Signing over their land is the price they have to pay 
for the road. Hence the abandonment of remote populations and the end of development 
planning understood as ‘nation building’ are part of the farmland investment assemblage” 
(Li 2014a, 600). 
 
Farmers  
Farmers were the largest group found in the villages during the fieldwork. They usually 
combined farming activities with other economic activities, such as selling food or 
driving motorbikes that are used as taxis –see ¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la 
referencia.. On the other hand, it was common for pastoralists to engage in farming for 
self-consumption but also as cash crops. This was particularly common among the Iraqw, 
who were agro-pastoralists. In the two villages studied in the Pwani region there were 
only farmers and no pastoralists. As a focus group participant in district 1 stated: “The 
main reason why there are no many cows and goats here is due to water problems and 
because people do not like to do pastoralists’ activities here” (FG1 participant, 
03.04.2014). However, pastoralists were found in other areas of the Pwani region, closer 
to the hills, but they had only recently arrived. In the two villages studied in the Morogoro 






Table 16: Interviewees’ economic activities57 
Economic activity 
(subsistence and/or cash) 
Village 
Total P1 P2 M1 M2 
 Farmer 13 10 10 8 41 
Pastoralist 0 0 3 1 4 
Pastoralist and farmer 0 0 1 2 3 
Farmer and small business 1 2 2 7 12 
Small business 0 0 0 1 1 
Teacher 0 1 1 0 2 
Farmer and moto driver 1 1 2 1 5 
Farmer and temporary worker 0 1 0 0 1 
Total 17 17 19 22 75 
Source: Fieldwork data, Feb-June 2014 
The farmers in the Pwani region were mainly from the Zaramo ethnic group and harvested 
cassava, maize and rice, while in Morogoro the groups were more diverse, with 
predominantly Luguru people. Their main harvest comprised sesame and maize, while 
rice and cassava were not so common. 
Pastoralists  
The main well-known group of pastoralists in Tanzania are the Maasai, they are 
indigenous from northern parts of the country, primarily the central north and the 
northeast. Despite the Maasai pastoralist culture, during the fieldwork exercises they were 
found in the cities, participating in local and national government and working as senior 
staff in NGOs. The idea that the “Maasai have in most cases rigidly maintained their 
identity and traditional way of life” and move “constantly in search of water and pasture 
for their livestock” (Ndembwike 2008, 81), perpetuates the concept of a homogeneous, 
ahistorical, timeless and static group.  
Besides the Maasai, the Barbaig and Iraqw are other pastoralist ethnicities that 
participated in this study, as they have been affected by land grabs. Within those groups 
some differences were found. The Maasai and Iraqw are probably more integrated with 
the farmer communities, bearing in mind that the Iraqw are traditionally agro-pastoralists. 
However, agriculture is something that the Maasai also engage with. One Maasai women 
stated: “I like to engage in agriculture and I have planted maize” (Q94-Maasai young 
                                                 
57 Interviewees in semi-structured interviews in the villages during fieldwork. Excludes leaders, officials, investors and NGO staff 
interviewed. Also excludes focus group participants and open-ended conversations carried out during fieldwork observation.  
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women M1, 17.05.2014). The Maasai also engage in other economic activities. One of 
the men interviewed was the owner of the only guest house in M1, a business that he ran 
alongside other activities.  
Gaining access to the Barbaig people was more difficult and they seemed to live more 
independently from the other villagers. However, the Barbaig, Maasai and Iraqw were 
part of daily life in the villages; they were present in groups with other young men in the 
local bars, playing darts or watching football on the TV. 
One of the concerns of the pastoralists was migrants from other areas of the country. It is 
very easy that this results in conflicts with farmers for land.  
Women  
Where there is a difficult context in terms of livelihoods, women have traditionally been 
found to be one of the most vulnerable groups (Chant 2006). Within the most recent land 
grabbing literature, there has been a call to incorporate a gender based framework into 
research and practice when studying land grabs and land scarcity (Daley 2010, 
Kachingwe 2012, Zetterlund 2013). This is acquiescent with scholars who have 
highlighted the need to incorporate a gender-based approach in order to advance women’s 
right to access land (e.g. Agarwal 2001, 2003, Whitehead.A and Tsikata.D 2003).  
The need for a gender based analysis also became apparent during the fieldwork 
observation experiences. One such experience occurred during an interview with the 
chairman’s wife in one of the villages. When she arrived at the place where the interview 
was taking place –the village office, which was under construction –she entered the room 
in a rush and approached the translator-assistant in a secretive way, talking to him almost 
in a whisper before taking her seat. Then, she looked at me as if waiting for the translator 
to speak her words: “she says if we can go to the government and tell them to force the 
men to put the name of their wives in all the documents” (fieldwork observation, 
12.05.2014). This women was highlighting women’s particular vulnerability in regard to 
formalisation and land ownership.  
However, out of all of the groups above, women pastoralists were the ones that faced the 
biggest denial of their rights. An Iraqw women stated: “The law of my tribe does not 
allow women to own land and my husband will never agree. I would like some land 
because in my tribe the husband can marry a second wife, because traditionally this is 
acceptable, and he may abandon you so if you have land you can engage in agriculture 
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and take care of the kids…..I also work as a tailor, but I have to give all the money to my 
husband, the money is controlled by men” (Q102- Iraqw woman M2, 18.05.2014).  
Thus, traditionally, pastoralist women cannot own anything, cows or land, and everything 
they earn has to be given to their husbands, sons or fathers: “It is not possible for a woman 
to own a cow. I would like to own one, but it is not allowed. When you give birth, you 
are given some cows for your children and you can have some control over those cows, 
but the cows are for the kids. And if the husband dies, the cows go to the children (…) 
Maasai women are committed [to a husband] even before they are born. They can get 
divorced, and in that case the woman goes back to her father’s house, but it is not 
common, although nowadays there are more divorces” (Q94-Maasai young women M1, 
17.05.2014). A middle-aged Barbaig pastoralist stated during a conversation at M2 that 
he would not give any land or cows to any of his daughters, even if they were single 
(Fieldwork notes, 19.05.14). These excerpts and observations highlight the particular 
vulnerability of pastoralist women around access to any economic means that will enable 
them to achieve subsistence and have the ability to make their own decisions about their 
livelihoods. This is one of the reasons why pastoralist women seem more compliant with 
to changes in traditions and shifts towards agriculture practices: “When I need land for 
cultivation I hire it (…) I rather prefer to settle in a place” (Q94-Maasai young women 
M1, 17.05.2014).  
The scholarship has often claimed that women’s rights are more protected within the 
realm of statutory law. For instance, Boone (2007), Toulmin (2008) and Joireman (2011) 
have argued that statutory law can empower women and secure their land rights. 
Institutional and statutory measures have been undertaken in Tanzania to promote these: 
“traditionally women are not supposed to own land according to Zaramo customary laws. 
But now, we explain to them that even their daughters can inherit land when they die, 
according to the law” (Q45-CSO’s program coordinator NGO2, 15.05.18). However, a 
change in the law will not necessarily result in a change in practice. One Iraqw woman 
stated: “It is very difficult, because the government can say that men and women are 
equal, but the government does not live in the house, and what happens in the house the 
government does not know or it is different to what government may say. So, there is 
nothing to do with this situation” (Q102-Iraqw woman M2, 18.05.2014).  
These women’s experiences show how some gender based rules embedded in their 
tradition can lead, among other things, to the denial of their land rights, making them a 
particularly vulnerable group. However, a word of caution is needed as the vulnerability 
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of women also needs to be disaggregated, in the sense that Chant (2006, 2007) has 
expressed in her criticism of the feminisation of poverty,58 where “women are either 
presented as a homogeneous mass, or are differentiated solely on grounds of household 
headship” (Chant 2006, 203). This does not shed light on the most relevant aspects for 
women’s denial of rights at the grassroots level.59 A gendered approach needs to highlight 
aspects of control over decisions that affect women’s lives beyond the issue of access to 
resources (Chant 2006, 203).  
In this regard, how women do not struggle to access land, but may struggle to make such 
decisions that will impact their lives is analysed in chapter 7. A focus on the denial of 
opportunities and choices for a meaningful life (Fukuda-Parr 1999) or capabilities 
(Robeyns 2003) has proved more efficient in bringing about change, together with 
moving on from debates over access to resources to debates about “ultimate disparate 
freedoms” (Sen, 1975 in Robeyns 2003). The examples above may help to provide some 
insights into those disparities, for instance, intra-household disparities, or disparities in 
accessing decision making responsibility positions in local, district or central 
governments.  
Youth  
There was a general concern about “future generations” among the villagers. And despite 
changing trends to move to the city: “the younger generation is looking for direct 
employment and not agriculture, only old people, who had grown up in the land realizes 
about the high importance of land. But not the younger generations, very few young 
people work on the land” (Q45-CSO’s program coordinator NGO2, 15.05.18), young 
people in the villages still are choosing to become farmers as one of the main economic 
activities for their livelihoods: “Land is very important, everybody even youth wants land 
for agriculture because it is now becoming a sector for providing employment” (51). “I 
would like to get land for settlement and expand agricultural activities” (Q92-Young 
woman M2, 15.05.2014).  
As demonstrated in ¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia., younger 
villagers experienced difficulties as fertile land was scarcer and prices had increased. 
Very often they had to borrow land that was previously available to them for free: “we 
have to borrow the land for rice because there is no more of that land available” (Q92-
                                                 
58 The feminisation of poverty refers to “three of its most common tenets [which] are that women represent a disproportionate 
percentage of the world’s poor, that this trend is deepening, and that women’s increasing share of poverty is linked with a rising 
incidence of female household headship” (Chant 2006, 202). 
59 Chant (2006,2007) focuses on the general concept of poverty; here the lack of control over resources is what is more important.  
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Farmer young woman M2, 15.05.2014); “I cultivate the land of my in-laws, 0.5ac. We 
are also borrowing 1ac and pay 40,000 TSh per year” (Q91-Farmer young man M2, 
15.05.2014). A young couple also explained how they borrowed land, and paid for it with 
their produce –rice in this particular case - but sometimes they ended up not paying 
anything if the harvest had not been good: “We cultivate 2ac that we rent. Sometimes we 
do not have to pay for the land; it depends on the harvest we make. If it is good, we pay, 
if it is not, we do not pay. We rent the land from friends from my husband… we want to 
have our own land, not to rent, because we want to cultivate our own land” (Q96-Farmer 
young woman M1, 17.05.2014). 
These experiences of younger villagers highlight the challenges they experience in 
accessing land that was once free and plentiful, but nowadays is expensive and limited: 
“Land is sold for about 5,000 TSh and I have a wife and children, so I cannot afford to 
take care of the family and buy land” (Q82-Young man M1, 11.05.2014). As Kandel 
(2015) has suggested, this group’s social reproduction can be threatened and transformed 
to be dependent on “a combination of agricultural wage labour, cultivating informally 
borrowed land, and other economic activities” (Kandel 2015, 640). For instance, a village 
leader explained how “[a]griculture has helped many youth here who engaged in 
cultivating cassava as a business (cash) crop to buy a motorbike, which they use as 
transportation for people60 and therefore increase their income” (Q51-WEO in P2, 
18.04.2014). A young women also explained: “I would like to be a farmer but I would 
not like to live in a village. I would like to live in town, especially Dar-es-Salaam, and do 
business like to be a shopkeeper (Q92-Farmer young woman M2, 15.05.2014). 
However, many of the young people interviewed were dependent on their parents’ land, 
where they had 1 or 2 acres allocated that they could control. All of them wanted land for 
themselves, but claimed that there were fertility problems –as shown above - and that 
price was a major impediment: “I want to be independent as a family, not to live with the 
parents. I would like to own my land without interferences (Q92-Farmer young woman 
M2, 15.05.2014); “I live in my parents’ house. My father has given me 2ac that I can 
control by myself, but I would like to have land because I do not have my own land” 
(Q103-Farmer young man M2, 19.05.2014). 
These young villagers’ experiences had caused some reactions in the villages, and they 
had different programmes to allocate land to young people. For instance, in P1, the village 
                                                 
60 The term “boda-boda” is used to describe this motorbike-taxi business, which is illegal and prosecuted in the main city centres, but 
extensively used in both urban and rural areas.  
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assembly had a programme in the past called “Shoulder to shoulder” to provide young 
people with land for free. Nowadays they provide graduates with land for free, but this is 
after they have completed their university education, which is not very common among 
young villagers. The concern of villagers for future generations –a concept that they used 
frequently -  was observed when they explained their LUP; when planning for the land 
use, villagers bear in mind to reserve land for the future –very often they are advised by 
CSOs and NGOs to develop the LUPs, and this is how they gain the vocabulary and the 
concern.  
Thus, the land scarcity created by land grabbing and competition over land has impacted 
deeply on younger villagers, as demonstrated by the data gathered during the fieldwork. 
They were also the main group where visible and active, violent reactions towards land 
grabs were recorded during re interviews and observations: “The village gave land to a 
woman and then she did not develop it. The land had beacons, but young people… we 
wanted to go there and remove the beacons. We wanted the land for ourselves and we 
did. She wanted to build a school but after four years she had done nothing. The leaders 
did not inform us and we wanted to distribute the land to young people. I was the one 
who led the youngsters, although I did not encourage them to take off the beacons” 
(Q104-Farmer young man M2, 19.05.2014) (104); “If you want to decide on land issues 
you have to be a member of the land committee. I participated in the development for 
young people and we demanded changes, such as a tractor because it is very difficult and 
slow to work with the hand held” (Q40-Farmer man P2, 10.04.2014). 
7.3.2  The role of NGOs and CSOs interventions 
The role of CSOs and local and national NGOs (NGOs hereafter) in local struggles over 
land grabbing is of great relevance for the results of this work. As explained in Chapter 
3, research conducted by Kanji et al. (2002) in land rights in Mozambique shows that 
there exists a “considerable confidence and trust in NGOs, in particular, as a vehicle of 
communication between local people and governmental authorities” (Kanji et al., 2002, 
18), as  one of the main roles attributed to this group. Also, NGOs can have an impact in 
local conflicts and their resolution by providing information and education to villagers 
and aligning themselves with those whose rights are more denied. The relationship 
between investors, the government and rural villagers could not be fully understood 
without focusing more attention on the role of NGOs.  
169 
 
Some scholars have attributed two basic roles to NGOs: advocacy and service delivery 
(Deacon et al. 1997, Lewis and Sobhan 1999, Lewis 2007). Service delivery addresses 
“the basic needs of disadvantaged people” (Mander 2005, 233). Deacon et al. (1997) 
highlighted long ago the “work of non-governmental organisations in addressing issues 
of global redistribution and development”. They claimed the role of NGOs as agents that 
contribute to a global social policy, and therefore actors focused mainly on service 
delivery.  
Studying NGOs’ management, Lewis (2007) believes that NGOs’ role is challenged by 
their functions and strategies, which he identifies as: 1) the delivery of services to 
communities in need; 2) efforts to catalyse social, economic and political change –i.e. 
advocacy. Samuel understands advocacy as “a set of deliberate actions designed to 
influence public policies or public attitudes in order to empower the marginalised” 
(Samuel 2010, 186). Samuel’s definition highlights the political nature of their role. And 
3) an attempt to create ‘synergies’ through cooperation with other agencies and the 
creation of partnerships. This cooperation can be developed as a “relationship between 
local and international NGOs [that] is often akin to that of local NGOs with donors. Many 
local NGOs rely on international NGOs for funds” (Kanji et al., 2002, 20). But also local 
and international NGOs create partnerships, based not only on funds but in the exchange 
of capacity and ideas (Kanji et al. 2002, Pickard 2010, Elbers 2012, Ashman 2015). 
All of these roles were found to be active in the NGOs working in the field of land rights 
in Morogoro and Pwani. Four roles, however, were observed to be the focus of NGOs: 
Education and information, legal advice and support, advocacy, and the creation of 
partnership and alliances within their country, both regionally and internationally. Those 
roles, however, were not clear cut, and could overlap with one another. For instance, it is 
possible, and was documented by the data, that while training communities, NGOs might 
find cases of dispossession, such in the cases studied in the Morogoro region, and then 
they may shift to an advocacy role in the sense of trying to mobilise a mass base (Pickard 
2010), or put in place an international media campaign, such as in the case of P2: : 
“Sometimes these issues [of land dispossession] come up during the training” (OEI8: 
Senior program manager NGO3, 29.05.18).  
Education and information 
This section will focus on the issue of educating and distributing information to 
communities. During fieldwork in Tanzania, I found that this is one of the main activities 
that national and local NGOs developed within communities. Through their training they 
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aim to improve villagers’ awareness to give them the choice of informed consent: “We 
say, “this is your land and your decision, and if you decide to give it, you must be 
informed” (OEI8: Senior program manager NGO1, 29.05.18).  But NGOs also often train 
government officials at the district or regional level on the land laws and policy. This is 
one of the main service delivery activities that NGOs provide.  
NGOs at the national and local levels perform training in order to fulfil this aim regularly. 
However, when cases of land grabbing arise that are relevant internationally because 
large-scale deals have been agreed with international investors, international NGOs tend 
to be more involved, sometimes in cooperation with local and national NGOs: “In 2012 
we got a lot of training from different NGOs for almost a year… Sometimes we were 
invited to the district office for 3 days. We also went to [different district] where we met 
different people who were fighting for land rights from Kenya, Botswana, Mozambique, 
Uganda, Zambia and people from different regions with land problems’ issues. There we 
got different experience of land matters from different countries, and how they were able 
to solve them. Sometimes they were coming to our villages…this had some effects 
because people became very angry after realising that they had lost the land” (Q34-
Chairman P2, 09.04.2014). These experiences of the participants in training after training 
suggest that the training does trigger awareness among villagers who may realise too late 
that their land has been compromised.  
¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia. below summarizes the activities 
bserved during fieldwork in the villages studied with the focus on the temporality of those 
activities. There is a continuous flux of cooperation that constitute partnerships and public 
advocacy, as described by Lewis (2007) or Samuel (2010). There are also more 
conjectural and strategic activities as in the case of the referred Task Force in P2. The 
table also shows with an arrow how these activities often initiate at the international level, 
although they require the feedback of local networks, such as land monitors and 
paralegals that will be documented later.  
Table 17: continuous and strategic interventions and cooperation between NGOs 
Continuous thread of cooperation  Temporary strategies 
International land rights concerns due to land 
grabbing in local realities 
 Land grabs agreed by villagers in local realities 
bring attention of international actors in the 
network  





International funds from donor bodies such as 
EU or individual countries 
International campaigns: International media such 
as BBC 
Capacity building and partnerships: 
International NGOs look for partners in 
developing countries and fund and train them. 
Also monitor them.  
Training and creation of self-management groups: 
ex: Task Force 
Some projects are more supported than others, 
depending on the international agenda. 
Complains to local government, meetings, letter 
writing, meetings with national authorities and 
ministry of land 
National and local NGOs and CSOs receive 
training and funding for their local projects in 
village and train individuals. The most useful 
tool: paralegal. Paralegals become respected 
in their village and have relevant roles in the 
protection of land rights. 
Success in compensation, communities gain 
knowledge on land rights and have strong trained 
individuals. However, without the support of the 
international NGOs their position is weaker. 
Villagers complain the temporality and short live 
of these interventions.  
Source: Fieldwork observations, Feb-June 2014 
Research and advocacy 
Baseline studies are the first contact that NGOs have with villages: “most of the time 
before we start a programme we conduct a baseline survey. We go to them, we talk to 
them and try to find out their needs before we start our programme” (Q59-Executive 
director NGO1, 29.04.2014). Baseline studies exemplify how research is the first relevant 
step towards land rights awareness. After conducting such baseline studies, NGOs decide 
on their strategies and they might change they course of action. One of the staff members 
performing such studies explained in an interview how what they found in one village 
concerning an incipient large-scale investment made them decide to pursue training in 
different villages. Sometimes these studies are called ‘Fact Finding Missions’, especially 
if the organization has received information about a potentially threatening issue. 
Empowerment and awareness through education 
“Awareness empowers people”, one of the interviewees, a professor of land rights, stated 
when explaining the history of one of national NGOs in the country. Its founders were 
lawyers; one of them was very influential in the development of the new land acts and an 
overall respected person at the national level for his work with marginalised people. The 
initial goal of the organisation was to help impoverished people to get access to the court 
through their services. But they soon realised that the cases were too much and the court 
processes were too slow and “they changed their strategy and went about creating 
awareness; awareness is more important than court cases to protect land rights” (OEI1-
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Land Rights Professor at Tanzanian higher education, 19.02.204). “Civic education, on 
the law and on the policy, gives the power to the people” the professor concluded.  
A senior programme staff member of the mentioned NGOs stated in an interview: “The 
most important thing is to raise awareness of the local communities about their land rights. 
What can they do, what does the law say? Because, you cannot say it for everything but 
you can say that our land laws are good, compared to other pieces of legislation. Villagers 
are empowered by the law to decide whether to agree or to not agree with investment 
decisions. Which is good, because the necessities of the majority should be considered” 
(OEI8: Senior program manager NGO3, 29.05.18). Thus, he identified awareness and 
empowerment through education on the land laws.  
The concept of empowerment has become controversial among practitioners who believe 
that it can be easily substituted by a toolkit of techniques less rooted in power struggles 
(Batliwala 2010). This is closely linked with the role of NGOs in bringing about 
meaningful change. However, for many villagers the presence of NGOs and their training 
gives them opportunities to discuss their issues and reconsider their decisions. A staff 
member working at the grassroots level in seminars stated that villagers demanded 
education and information: “Actually knowledge, they really demand knowledge. 
Sometimes, when you train or after you have trained, someone comes to you and tells you 
“where were you before? Someone came here and did this and that was not ok”. For 
instance, they may say that someone came and asked for land and they gave but they 
weren’t sure and “the process wasn’t as you have explained and we cannot revert it now 
and we want to revert it” “We understand now that it was not the proper way” So, issues 
of knowledge are very, very demanding” (OEI7-Senior program manager NGO3, 
29.05.18).  
As stated before, NGO professionals not only educate villagers but also government 
officials in the laws and policies: “The main problem is first ignorance of the people, they 
are totally ignorant of the law; they do not know, even leaders at the district level, they 
do not know, and the law, it’s almost 15 years now” (Q45-CSO’s program coordinator 
NGO2, 15.05.18). One of the interviewees explained their activities concerning training 
on land rights: “We train in seminars of 25 people for four days. In our training sometimes 
we form groups to discuss something. We also conduct cultural activities, such as theatre 
performing on land rights issues in public spaces, so all of the villagers go there to see 
what is going on. Those groups doing some performance show how to obtain the 
certificates. It is a play, like in a theatre! …. This is very good because people have the 
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grasp of it. Some actors play the man with the money that approaches the poor villager to 
bribe them” (Q44-General Secretary NGO2, 15.04.2014). Other organisations also use 
public debates in open spaces in the villages in which anyone in the village can participate 
and raise concerns and questions.  
Land rights training workshops 
The workshops are carried out on different days. First, the NGOs train village leaders, 
and sometimes they also train District Officials, because very few of them are fully aware 
of the land laws. Members of NGOs and interviews carried out with some district officials 
supported that point. After the village leaders have received training workshops are 
organized for 25 villagers as stated above. The villagers participating in the workshops 
receive allowances to cover the costs of travelling to the meeting and to compensate them 
for their working day. The training has four main components: 
- Historical background on land in Tanzania with a focus on before-after 
colonialism 
- Policy and Land Law strategy in the village 
- Conflict resolution at a village level 
- Administration of resources at the village level 
Training is conducted by two staff members of the NGO or a partner organization and it 
lasts for one whole day. The mandate for the villagers after the training is to inform their 
neighbours about what they have learnt. Leaders also have the mandate to train during 
upcoming village assemblies. After training in two villages, short interviews with 
participants in the training were carried out. During these interviews they were asked 
what they had learnt and what the most important thing was for them after the training. 
They replied that they had gained knowledge about the title deed and the processes 
affecting the village land committee:  
Now I know more about land management and the procedures to give titles to investors. Even 
our leaders were distributing land without following procedures simply because they did not 
know the procedures and laws (Interview after training 7, 04.06.2014). 
I have learnt about the LUP and the title deed and how to get loans. Now I can supervise my 
father’s property better. I have also learnt how the Europeans acquired land in Tanganyika 
(Interview after training 2, 03.06.2014). 
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Now I know the procedures to get customary land rights…I will now also inform my 
community (Interview after training 1, 04.06.2014). 
Public debates 
Public debates are displayed in open areas of the village: “big grounds where most of the 
villagers can come” (OEI8: Senior program manager NGO3, 29.05.18). To organize these 
debates organizations cooperate with district council officials who “take the message to 
the villages, and leaders will inform in village assemblies that we are coming for public 
debate” (OEI8: Senior program manager NGO3, 29.05.18). During the debates, the 
villagers participate and raise many questions (Fieldwork observation, 03.06.2014 and 
04.06.2014). 
Paralegals 
Jointly with the land rights training in seminars and the other activities described, the 
NGOs also train paralegals in the villages as illustrated in ¡Error! No se encuentra el 
origen de la referencia.. They create with them links to the villages they have been 
training: “we also train and have our rural paralegals who do the work on the rural61 
instead of us, so they can work together with the village councils … we train them, 
because we can’t go everywhere, so we have people from the rural in every district and 
we train them so they can also go and train others in their area and also assist in dealing 
with conflicts … they report to us and whenever they have problems we assist them to 
solve the problem … we are strengthening them by giving them more education, so they 
can do their work better for justice for the poor, especially in rural communities” (Q59-
Executive director NGO1, 29.04.2014).  
Paralegals are selected by the villagers and by the village council. The NGOs usually 
require a gender balance for the training of paralegals and seminars. Some of these 
paralegals have become much respected among their communities, although this depends 
sometimes on the individuals. In the case of P1, the chairman was elected because of his 
involvement in land rights issues: “As part of being chairman I am a land monitor and 
Leader and Secretary on land issues. Before being a chairman I became leader on land 
issues because I was trained by [NGOs1] on land issues in Dar-es-Salaam. In each village 
there are two land monitors; these land monitors have to report to me every three months 
and I report to [NGOs1] in case of problems”. Some interviewees in the other villages 
referred to him spontaneously during the interviews: “Other Europeans and NGOs have 
                                                 
61 The interviewee here refers to the rural areas and the people living there by the expression “the rural”. 
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visited us, but they never came back, here local people trust people such as P., they help 
more than others to preserve our land rights” (Open ended interview-Chairman in District 
1). 
Training paralegals has been found to be one of the most relevant and successful strategies 
that NGOs working on land rights are using. The interviewee in NGO2 explained: “I 
remember a certain village chairperson was thrown away because people complained that 
he was misusing land, he was not following the procedures. Because we have mobilised 
people, and they knew the process of land ownership, who should be concerned about 
land ownership, where they should apply, how much land, etc. So, the village chairperson 
did not follow the regulations, so they complained and he was advised to resign” (Q59-
Executive director NGO1, 29.04.2014). 
In some instances, it is possible that education and training in the law is empowering rural 
villagers to protect their land. However, education does not always lead to awareness; as 
the experience of villagers with investors increases and they can gather more information, 
they are able to protect themselves more from undesired consequences. This does not 
mean that they reject investment projects, but that through those experiences they have 
increased knowledge that helps them to demand more guarantees:  “We do not resist 
investors, we want them, but they need to follow the procedures. We want them to qualify 
for the land. When they apply for the land they say that they will cultivate it, but later 
they do not do anything with it” (Q11-Leader woman P1, 21.03.2014). 
The strategy of education and its use aims to raise awareness and empower people, as 
expressed by the quotes above. Empowerment has been a contested concept in the 
development literature (Batliwala 2010, Cornwall 2010). Once considered a strong 
approach to development, the empowerment goal was to strategise to challenge ideologies 
that reproduced social inequality, in order to address unequal access to economic and 
natural resources (Batliwala 2010, 115).  
As explained, however, the concept of empowerment has been reduced to a series of 
blueprint solutions that evoke participation and ‘people centred’ development, education 
being one of the strategies. But, the experiences gathered through the observations and 
interviews show that training informs people about the “importance of the land” and 
educates them to “not give away the land”: “We did not know about the importance of 
the land. Now we know a lot because we have been trained on land rights from different 
organisations. We gave the land, but we didn’t know the effects of that, and that many 
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people would start to complain. Now they know about land rights and the importance of 
land…After the leaders were educated and they started to inform people, the villagers 
started to complain about the farm. They wanted their land back or enough compensation. 
After the NGOs came we learnt that we hadn’t participated in the whole process, that’s 
why we got angry. We received that support from different NGOs” (Q34-Chairman P2, 
09.04.2014). 
Advocacy through the LUPs 
One of the main concerns of NGO3 was the LUP. They considered that certain agencies 
of the government had put pressure on the issue of the LUP in order to reserve land for 
investors. “Some people go to implement the LUP but make requirements for villagers, 
like asking for one area for investment. There is no regulatory authority to regulate this 
issue, because everybody is funding the LUP: RUBADA, Mkuravita, the Commission for 
Land” (OEI8: Senior program manager NGO3, 29.05.18).  
Through the documents that were accessed at the district offices during the fieldwork, it 
could be seen that the LUP funders and implementers were different donors’ agencies, 
international, local and national NGOs and government agencies. This shows that there 
are a number of different actors with different interests implementing and developing the 
LUPs. The LUP is also exchangeable; the village can decide to change the previous ones. 
In M2, RUBADA changed the LUP of 2008 in order to include land for an international 
investor. NGO3 staff members interviewed during fieldwork asserted that depending in 
some opaque interests the “LUP did not come from the people, it’s a top-down 
development directed by RUBADA or by investors” (OEI8: Senior program manager 
NGO3, 29.05.18). Their aim, as the three NGOs assessed here, is to inform the villages 
so that they can better and independently develop their own LUP, assisting them to do so. 
LUP are more politically challenging than the formalisation of the land with certificates 
as LUPs draw the maps of every type of land, and as can be seen in this quote above and 
the disputes with LUP in M2 that will be documented in the following chapter, different 
















 Discussion and conclusion 
8.1 Small and large-scale land grabbing 
8.1.1 Introduction  
This section will draw on the findings that demonstrate land dispossession and land 
grabbing in the Morogoro and Pwani regions of Tanzania, which are documented in 
particular in chapter 5. One of the main findings of this research is the need to re-evaluate 
scale within the land grabbing dilemas. The findings highlight some  image and 
understanding  of the limitations of the concept of land grabbing as portrayed in the 
literature that emerged after the Global Food Crisis in 2007-2008 (Vermeulen and Cotula 
2010, Anseeuw et al. 2012, White et al. 2012, Hall et al. 2015). As reviewed in the 
literature, corporate land deals, transnational land-deals, large-scale land deals, the global 
land rush and the global land grab are some of the concepts that have been used by 
different scholars to refer to the phenomenon that is widely known as land grabbing.  
8.1.1.1 Macro understandings of land 
Those scholars are represented partly, although not completely, by the Land Deal Politics 
Initiative created in 2011 as a “global platform to generate solid evidence on the 'global 
land grab' phenomenon through detailed, field-based research” (LDPI, online). The LDPI 
is a network of academics and practitioners, which includes the IDS (UK), the ICAS 
(Canada), the ISS (Netherlands), PLAAS (South Africa) and the Polson Institute for 
Global Development (US). As part of this network, White et al. (2012, 619) define land 
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grabbing as “the large-scale acquisition of land or land- related rights and resources by 
corporate (business, non-profit or public) entities”. These entities are usually foreign to 
the host country or a conglomerate of entities based in different countries, whose 
ownership is difficult to trace (Cotula 2012). The land grabbing literature focuses on 
“foreign governments, sovereign wealth funds, state-owned enterprises from new 
(BRICS and other powerful middle-income countries) and old players (OECD countries), 
private actors such as agribusiness and agrifood companies, corporate players interested 
in developing biofuels, as well as private institutional investors such as banks and a 
plethora of mutual, pension, hedge and private equity funds” (Baglioni and Gibbon 2013, 
1559) as the main actors in the recent acquisitions of land.  
Although this study agrees with all of these features, the image portrayed of land grabbing 
as large-scale and foreign is insufficient to explain the drivers and consequences of land 
accumulation and dispossession in the regions studied, which can be extended to the cases 
of Tanzania, Sub-Saharan Africa and most developing countries with rural economies, as 
recent research has also demonstrated (e.g. Peluso and Lund 2011, Baglioni and Gibbon 
2013, Edelman 2013, Kandel 2015, Pedersen 2016). For instance, Peluso and Lund 
(2011) go beyond the global land rush and talk about the “new frontiers of land control” 
as a wider agrarian change that affects agrarian environments and also goes beyond the 
global land rush, as portrayed by the land grabbing literature. In the view of these authors, 
the landgrabbing literature is able to portray the new features of large-scale investment, 
but this is only part of a changing context with new actors, processes and powers that only 
demarcate the beginning of new relationships regarding land control (Peluso and Lund 
2011, 669).  
This research follows that line of thinking and considers, as a result of the findings, that 
in order to have a complete explanation of land grabbing, a small-scale perspective on the 
debate should be included; but a perspective that goes beyond farming and agriculture is 
also needed in the line of thinking of Peluso and Lund (2011).  
The following sections will analyse the results in the light of the dimension of scale and 
provide some explanations of the drivers of both types of land grabs and why it is 
necessary to bring both of them together in order to present a full picture of the 
phenomenon known as land grabbing, as part of an ongoing process of agrarian change.  
179 
 
8.1.2 Land grabbing literature and scale 
This dimension –scale - despite being less explored, has not been totally overlooked by 
the land grabbing scholars who have contributed to the literature that has emerged since 
2008. Even when the debate has not focused too much on “cut-off points in terms of size 
of holdings” (Baglioni and Gibbon 2013, 1560), it has focused on “explor[ing] the rapid 
growth of large-scale land deals in recent years” (White et al. 2012, 619), while stating 
that “‘large versus small’ in fact may not be the most crucial point in envisaging farming 
futures”, as they claim that large-scale farming with the features of small-scale farming 
could be optimal for agrarian environmental justice (White et al. 2012, 626). 
As described in this thesis, scholars such as Amanor (2012a) and Peters (2013) have 
advocated the need to include a perspective that assesses the role of domestic actors as 
drivers of land dispossession on the continent. Competition over land, Amanor (2012a, 
731) points out, “results in dispossession of less successful smallholders “from below” 
by commercial smallholders, and from above by large estates vertically integrated into 
agribusiness marketing chains”. For Peters (2013), the phenomenon contributes to the 
“dynamics of social transformation” in which domestic actors are important as these 
dynamics refer to class formation and inequality.  
Fewer studies on land grabbing have considered the issue of the small-scale or local 
dynamics of social transformations. Baglioni and Gibbon’s (2013) study deals with the 
issue of scale; however, it focuses much of its attention on the large-scale perspective. 
For them, the difference between scales relies more on the intensity of capital investment. 
They redefine small-scale as relevant for the commoditisation of land but less intensive 
in capital and the employment “of permanent wage workers” (Baglioni and Gibbon 2013, 
1560 emphasis in original). Kandel (2015), on the other hand, focuses on the differences 
between large-scale, and mid- or small-scale dispossession in the context of Uganda. His 
perspective falls into the dynamics of social change and social reproduction in the line of 
thinking of Peters (2004, 2013). He concludes that mid- and small-scale transactions will 
have a more significant and long-term impact on stability in Sub-Saharan Africa than 
what has been considered as large-scale land grabbing because dispossession is mainly 
carried out by national and local elites.  
To tap into the differences, ¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia. below 
summarises the type of land grabs described in Chapter 5 of this thesis, supporting the 
view that local, small-scale land grabbing should be incorporated into a broader 
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understanding of what is nowadays a fast-paced level of land dispossession (Edelman 
2013). The issue of scale is not as relevant as the size of the land, although size helps to 
differentiate the different actors involved and the drivers of accumulation. The relevant 
issue in contemplating scale is that the ongoing changes at the local level are affected by 
the dynamics of scale and that the discussion cannot be focused on international actors, 
but must consider that, as in Peter’s line of thinking, “the land question in contemporary 
Africa has to be linked to the dynamics of social transformation and inequality at multiple 
levels - global, regional, national, sub-national”. The phenomenon is thus the scale of 
dispossession, and not so much the scale of the farms. And that dispossession happens 
both because of ongoing issues of dispossession at the local level and as a result of the 
global dynamics of land accumulation.  
Table 18: Land dispossession by scale 
Large-scale deals Mid-scale and small-scale deals 
Biofuel farm in P2 
 
Yemeni cash crops farm 
M1 and M2 
 
Mixed national and 
international enclosure in 
M1 
National investors acquiring up to 50ac in all villages, 
either developing or not developing the land.  
 
Illegal unscrupulous investors acquiring the land and not 
developing it in P1, less than 200ac 
 
Selling land for development purposes, to the church or 
NGOs in all villages, less than 50ac 
 
Selling land to people from urban areas or because of the 
need for cash: less than 10ac in all villages 
 
Grabbing neighbours’ land through fake demarcation, 




Traditionally, small-scale farming has been associated with subsistence or near-
subsistence family farming, low mechanisation and a high intensity of labour. For these 
rural families agriculture is usually their primary source of livelihood (Naranjo 2010, 1). 
This dominant view of farmers has been widely explored in peasant studies (Scott 1998, 
Patel 2006, Naranjo 2010). Usually, peasant studies support pro-peasant agriculture 
where the term “usually signifies household farming organized for simple reproduction, 
notably to supply its own food (“subsistence”). Often added to this basic definition are 




Large-scale farming has traditionally been associated with modernised and mechanised 
agriculture and less intensive labour, and involves either donors’ aid or private 
investment, or a combination of both, with the aim of bringing economic development to 
countries with extensive rural sectors that are usually underdeveloped and poor, 
particularly in Africa. This type of farming has its roots in colonialism (Berry 2002, Peters 
2004, Amanor 2012b, Baglioni and Gibbon 2013), and is usually analysed through the 
lens of the political economy of agrarian change as a contrasting dichotomy to small-scale 
farming.  
Small-scale acquisitions can have advantages. Three such advantages are detailed below: 
1. For instance, as the results show, small-scale farming is not only done by families for 
subsistence agriculture, but also by some local small-scale investors, who use it to sell to 
local markets in rural or urban centres. The following explanation given by one of the 
village leaders reveals that complexity: “There is a good investor though, an Arabic 
investor. He is cultivating the land, has contributed to the activities of the community and 
has provided some jobs. The village is happy with him. He only owns 5ac of land, though” 
(Hamlet chairman P1, 08.03.2014). This indicates that the reality of small-scale farming 
is more complex nowadays and responds to the integration of peasants into the capitalist 
system: “as a result of class formation there is no single “class” of “peasants” or “family 
farmers” but rather differentiated classes of small-scale capitalist farmers, relatively 
successful petty commodity producers and wage labour” (Bernstein 2010, 4). 
2. Woodhouse (2012) also considered this new understanding of small-scale, beyond 
subsistence agriculture, a reality of small-scale producers who can be relatively successful 
selling to their local markets . Another example was provided by an investor who owned 
50ac of land in the same village. The chairman of P1 village referred to these investors 
during the interview: “there are two investors that we like because they contribute more, 
they have less land but they helped with the new school. They are a big help to the village” 
(Open interview-Chairman P1, 23.03.14). These success stories concur with 
Woodhouse’s view that,  “farming investment establishes an important capacity for 
private investment in agriculture, irrespective of any formal ‘development’ project or 
programme to promote it” (Woodhouse 2012, 782).  
3. And, as the positive examples above show, there is scope for “entrepreneurial small-
scale agriculture becoming responsive to market opportunities and investing to achieve 
significant productivity growth” (Woodhouse 2012, 782). One in which, even small-scale 
farmers engage, particularly the youngest ones: “We sell the production to rich people 
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from Dar. It’s easy to find someone that wants to buy our production. I want more land 
so I can produce more to sell” (Q33-Young man farmer in P2, 08.04.14);  “[I want] to 
have a car for the village, because many people need transport for their crops [to sell in 
Dar]” (Q40-Young man farmer in P2, 10.04.2014). 
However, some negative outcomes were also documented in regard to small-scale farms, 
despite these positive accounts. They are detailed as follows: 
1. In many cases it was found that the land had not been used to develop agrarian 
economic activities. As reported in ¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia., 
there were some cases of illegal acquisitions or even legal ones where nothing had 
happened to the land for years, but the ‘small-scale’ investors had kept the land for future 
speculation. Such examples were provided in all of the villages, but to illustrate, an 
example in M2 village was recalled where the villagers had agreed to give land –less than 
50ac as permitted by law –in return for jobs and village development but the land had not 
been developed: “They came to the village and requested the land and promised that they 
would help us to develop some projects in the village. So we agreed to give them land 
and after they got that land, they did not develop the land for six years. None of their 
promises were fulfilled, even when we approached them. But we gave them a summary 
where it was indicated that if they did not develop the land for three years we would take 
the land. We have been calling them to discuss that land. If they cannot develop that land 
we’ll take it, but they do not show up and people are afraid to take that land because they 
say rich people have power and they can sue us. So no measures have been taken so far. 
Their land is 50 acres each” (Q73-Farmer woman in M2, 10.05.14). 
2. Other complaints have been raised where land has not been developed, and not only 
that, more problems can arise when the land has been accumulated by less transparent 
means, such as in P1: “they have been scaring and threating people saying “we’re going 
to kill you”. Investors feel they are more powerful. They threaten people when people get 
into their farms and cultivate the land. They do that because they are not developing the 
land” (Q22-Farmer woman in P1, 27.03.2014). Sometimes the violence can trigger 
threats: “they are showing guns” (Fieldwork conversation- Chairman P1, 23.03.2014).  
And at other times it can trigger racist violence: “Mr.A insulted us and told us that “these 




This opens up the scope for a different understanding of not small-scale events as 
promoting agriculture and small capital investments and agrarian change into agrarian 
labour relationships embedded in capitalism dynamics; but derives the discussion to 
dispossession and accumulation at mid- and small-scale, as Kandel (2015) suggested, and 
not for productive reasons but speculative ones.   
Kandel (2014, 2015) concludes that small-scale processes of dispossession will have a 
more significant and long-term impact on stability in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the 
particular case of his research in the Teso region of Uganda, he sustains that: “Capital 
investments from local actors currently occur only on a small-scale … they are 
substantively important because they are indicative of fundamental political economic 
change within the region” (Kandel 2014, 152). As discussed in the previous section, 
small-scale processes are indeed changing economic relationships in the case of Tanzania, 
not as much as capital investments, but as small-scale accumulation62 (Kandel 2014). 
8.1.3 Large-scale farms discussions in the land grabbing literature 
Despite the dynamics observed due to small-scale dispossessions and accumulation, it is 
also very important to acknowledge the relevance of the large-scale land dispossession 
caused by the global land rush (Peluso and Lund 2011, Edelman 2013). This section will 
address three issues: the impact of large-scale farms in agrarian transformation, the 
debates that question if they are real and to what extent, and a comparison with small-
scale dispossession.  
First, large-scale debates have also tapped into the capital investment issue in comparison 
to small-scale farms. In this case, the issue of size is related to the scale of the capital 
investment and this should be the measure of scale –the scale of capital. However, this is 
not totally adequate to explain the consequences for the rural villagers in Tanzania of 
large-scale land deals or land grabbing. Actually, in many cases, the area of land is so 
large that investors lack the economic capacity to develop all of the land, and therefore 
part of it remains unused. A consultant explained this situation during an interview: “If 
the land acquired is very big, it would be negative…I know a case in Arusha where the 
investor acquired big land, now he is not developing anything and the villagers are 
complaining. There is a conflict there. The land is too big and the investor cannot work 
on all of it. This is becoming a dispute. If you do not develop the land this is what causes 
                                                 
62 For a discussion on the differences between the actual relevance of capital investment in regard to scale see Edelman (2013). 
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disputes. If you use it, no problem, but if you do not use it, communities may use that 
land” (OEI9-Investment Consultant, 29.05.2014). 
The experience explained by the consultant is explained by the literature in the work of 
Edelman (2013). He points out that, “some portion of the land being grabbed is no doubt 
held for speculative purposes and will never be developed. But for that part that is 
acquired for cultivation, the amount of capital required to bring some of the extensions 
… into actual production is likely to be beyond the capability of even the largest 
transnational corporations” (Edelman 2013, 497). Disputes arise in Tanzania when the 
land is not being used, and the communities have lost their ability to control it: “I have 
never found any investment that the people are happy with. Because, why do you have to 
transfer this land from village land to general land?” (OEI8-Senior program manager 
NGO3, 29.05.18) 
Secondly, we need to focus on critiques of the literature on land grabbing that have 
challenged the relevance of the large-scale deals or even their existence or trajectory (e.g.: 
Oya 2013, Kandel 2015). For instance, Oya challenges the methods of aggregating the 
“land rush” presented by different NGOs, the media and academics and claims that 
databases created on the issue are an instance of “false precision” (Oya 2013, 503). Also, 
some have claimed that many of the data documented belong to already existing state 
ranches. This was not found in the three cases studied in Morogoro and Pwani, where the 
farms were new developments.  
However, the observations and information gathered during the fieldwork make large-
scale dispossession and large-scale deals not only a relevant issue in the villages studied, 
but also one that is real and measurable. Thus, the impact of large-scale deals cannot be 
overlooked by what has been considered figures that representing only “messy hectares” 
(Edelman 2013) or “false precision” (Oya 2013) in the case of Tanzania.  As Edelman 
has also put it “the increase in land deals in recent years is doubtless real” (Edelman 2013, 
497) even if the data is only “indicative”; in the case of Tanzania, the data seems rather 
illustrative for the period studied. 
Thus, despite the criticism of the land grabbing literature figures, three sources of such 
information were consulted during the fieldwork exercises: the Tanzanian Investment 
Centre, NGO data, and information gathered from district and village registries (LUPs 
and my own observations, such as that in Illustration 7 in Chapter 7, demarcating a new 
GPS boundary that transformed Village Land to General Land, which was made available 
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to an already known investor in the Morogoro Region; finally, information was also 
gathered during a workshop-discussion organised by an NGO in Dar-es-Salaam in March 
2014. 
The new Land Use Plans in M1 and M2 show the new boundary creating a new large-
scale farm. LUPs draw the maps of large-scale farms and/or the available land for small-
scale farming in the villages, as explained in the previous chapter. The LUPs in M1 and 
M2 have not yet been developed, but the village has already lost the land. A similar case 
has happened in the Pwani region, where the farm development has gone even further and 
the investor has already developed a jatropha farm, which failed after the rise of biofuel 
investments waned. Despite the failed investment, and the confusion over the new 
activities of the farm after the jatropha project collapsed, the land has not been returned 
to the villages affected by this almost 9,000ha deal, but the company has changed its name 
and the purpose of the investment. An observation that emerged during the fieldwork was 
that the research could have taken place in many locations around the country as there 
were many cases to explore. These places were affected by large-scale deals, 
demonstrating that these are not isolated cases but, rather, are widespread. 
The second source of information on agriculture investment was the TIC headquarters. 
¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia., ¡Error! No se encuentra el origen 
 la referencia. and ¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia. below show the 
information displayed only for the projects that the TIC situates in the SAGCOT region. 
SAGCOT was described in Chapter 6. Those projects have been registered and approved 
by the TIC, which means that they have been allocated land. As Oya (2013) and Edelman 
(2013) have pointed out, there is a need to be cautious about the figures, even when they 
come from official sources like the ones below.  
Table 19: TIC information by region63,64,65 
                                                 
63 This shows information about investors registered with the TIC in the period 2007-2014(March). Registered means that a project 
proposal has been received and approved by the TIC and land has been allocated for the project. 
64 Jobs refer to direct out growers and those generated by the investment. 




Table 20: TIC information by year 
 
Table 21: TIC information by country of investor 
Location No: Projects Jobs Value (US$ Mil)
Pwani 46 9,287    1,224.01               
Dar-es-Salaam 26 3,883    294.81                  
Iringa 22 12,066   216.71                  
Mbeya 10 2,587    67.56                    
Morogoro 37 22,249   558.18                  
Rukwa 3 222       34.49                    
Ruvuma 4 466       11.63                    
Grand Total 148 50,760 2,407.38              
Investment in the SAGCOT region
Year SN Jobs Value (US$ Mil)
2007 8 5,153            68.62                    
2008 21 2,012            78.86                    
2009 11 13,429          89.84                    
2010 14 3,006            447.22                  
2011 36 5,913            876.44                  
2012 35 3,715            464.32                  
2013 16 17,139          358.18                  
2014 7 393              23.89                    
Total 148 50,760        2,407.38              




Source: TIC, June 2014 
The tables above show the already approved and allocated land projects in the SAGCOT 
region, which were incipient at the time of this research. The data shows the origin of the 
investment and it is possible to observe that national investors are as relevant as 
international ones. Also, the data was gathered in June 2014, which is one of the reasons 
why the projects were fewer that year. 
Finally, the information on data about land deals for this research was gathered at a 
workshop led by an international NGO, where academics, practitioners, farmers’ 
organisations and farmers themselves talked about the rise in agribusiness in the country. 
Representatives of the government and agribusiness refused to participate in the event. 
The hectares here can be “messy”, as Edelman pointed out (2013), but they demonstrate 
a case of operational, operating and realised projects and some of them are seeking 
investors. However, such as in the case of M1 and M2, where the farm is a project with a 
prospective Arabic investor, the land has been transferred to General land and therefore 
Nationality Jobs Value (US$ Mill)
Belgiam 1          0.09                      
China 8,038    82.67                     
Cyprus 39         1.34                      
Denmark 137       3.91                      
Germany 155       3.19                      
Greece 11         0.64                      
India 8,863    123.00                   
Ireland -       39.16                     
Israel 50         0.60                      
Italy 12         0.35                      
Japan 13         11.40                     
Kenya 173       27.72                     
Luxembourg 105       8.14                      
Mauritius 161       46.09                     
Netherlands 519       24.66                     
Nigeria 27         0.52                      
Norway 1,706    30.55                     
Pakistan 131       1.65                      
RSA 2,605    178.93                   
Seychelles 347       4.39                      
Slovakia 210       17.30                     
Sweden 91         4.82                      
Swistzealand 76         0.50                      
Tanzania 15,210   1,441.11                
Thailand 161       5.04                      
Turkey 45         7.07                      
UAE 335       31.68                     
UK 10,478   174.17                   
USA 917       92.70                     
Zimbabwe 144       43.98                     
Total 50,760 2,407.38               
Investment in the SAGCOT region
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the villagers have lost control over that part. In some cases, the government uses land that 
is already general land, but it is likely that the farms will need to expand beyond general 
land, such as in all of the cases considered in this research. 
Projects can start, fail and change hands, as in the cases studied in P2, M1 and M2. 
However, it cannot be denied in that case that the land has changed hands already and the 
villages have lost control of that land: “If the area has already been taken it is difficult 
sometimes to overturn. For this process the village council has to meet and write to the 
commission and to the president through the district council, requesting that they revoke 
the title of an investor, and listing in their request why they think such land should be 
turned back to them, but this will also depend upon the interest of the president and we 
have never seen this happening” (OEI8: Senior program manager NGO3, 29.05.18).  
Whether projects fail or not, getting land back is only possible by illegal means such as 
occupying land that is not developed, as in the Zimbabwean case (Berry 2002), for 
instance. A situation that is already happening in smaller-scale projects, as demonstrated 
in P2, is that young people are occupying the land of non-developed projects. If, 
ultimately, the government decides to cancel deals made with investors and return the 
land to the villagers, which is not completely impossible (Pedersen 2016), this will cause 
the government of Tanzania to enter into international arbitration procedures, such as the 
one carried out by a sugar project in the Pwani region in 2017 (EcoEnergy 2017).  
Moreover, the failure of projects causes a feeling of being deceived among the villagers 
(Pearce 2012), who, as demonstrated by the results of this research, avidly participate in 
projects as waged-workers or outgrowers and benefit from the promised development of 
roads and electricity and overall economic prosperity. This deception is caused not only 
by large-scale investments but also by small-scale undeveloped ones. As explained by 
many women in P2, they were able to build houses when the farm was ongoing, not only 
because of the wages their families were getting, but also because they were able to sell 
more from their small businesses such as tailoring, street food and local shops. That 
disappointment was not compensated for by the return of their access to their land; now 
the only one benefiting from a speculative business with the land is the one who controls 
it (Li 2014a).   
8.1.4 Sub-Conclusion 
In the section above, I have tried to link together the discussions over the small-
scale/large-scale debate in the context of land grabbing. It is not possible to isolate one 
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from the other if we are to assess the impact of land relationships and land control in 
Tanzania. As Baglioni and Gibbon have pointed out, “the picture that emerges is one of 
a scramble and reshuffling, of significant but unstable restructuring of land access and 
control … [or] an unfinished process of capital restructuring” (2013, 1558).  As Peluso 
and Lund (2011) have highlighted, the land grabbing scholarship is relevant as it is able 
to pinpoint the traits of the undeniably large-scale land control that is happening 
nowadays –producing or speculating with nature. Thus, it is not possible to consider only 
land grabs as an international pervasive investment, as it is not possible to consider that 
the most pervasive dispossession is that which happens among unscrupulous local 
grabbers (Kandel 2015).   
The picture that emerges and the discussions over the scale of land or capital make the 
concept of land grabbing an “essentially contested concept”: a term that “combine[s]  
general agreement on the abstract notion that [it] represents with endless disagreement 
about what [it] might mean in practice” (Gallie in Cornwall 2010, 2).  
The general agreement seems to be that there has been a shift in regard to the drivers of 
land and capital accumulation at the global and local levels with the long term impact 
being social differentiation and agrarian change due to illegitimate or legitimate local 
‘land grabbers’;  
or to the amount of land reserved for large-scale investment or pure speculation, either 
with national or foreign capital;  
All of this will have an unquestionable impact on the supply of land that rural villagers 
will have available and that is being given away very easily and cheaply, even by 
themselves, which they may have never done (Li 2014b):  
“We say: “this is your land and your decision, and if you decide to give it, you must be 
informed” if the land changes from general to village, you will not recover the land again” 
(OEI8-Senior program manager NGO3, 29.05.18). 
This willingness to give away land so easily draws from their expectations of economic 
prosperity, which often end in unfulfilled promises, as the research has shown. However, 
with a loss of land control it then becomes very difficult, if not impossible - and from the 
drawing of a map onwards surely illegal - to revert.  
Land grabbing has become a buzzword, but also a fuzzword (Cornwall 2010): a 
vagueness surrounds everything around it and it is thus the object of scientific vagueness 
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and critique, but who is behind it? How much land or capital? And when is it going to 
start/end/succeed or fail? What is in the contract? Is it even real? In this fashion, land 
grabbing is changing the land rights of uninformed rural villagers by the second, as one 
member of a peasants’ association expressed in a workshop in Dar-es-Salaam in March 
2014: “this is dispossession by ignorance”. Land grabbing may be a fuzzword, but it is 
not a neutral one.  
8.2 Negotiating land grabs 
8.2.1 Stakeholders interests 
The research has focused in the interests/needs and power of different stakeholders within 
land grabbing processes. In Chapter 3 the thesis explored literature on the different 
dimensions of land and also on negotiations on land deals and the role of all stakeholders 
(Teklemariam et al. 2015). Negotiation is intertwined with the different meanings of land 
as land is been transacted and as Sud (2014a) points out there are new needs to govern 
the transitions of land and land use.  
Different stakeholders were indentified by the research and their needs and interests 
pointed out. The framework ant taxonomy that Tekemariam et al. (2015) have used is of 
interest here. They identified: 
 Objects: have low level of influence in the outcome of the land deal, but high 
level of interest in the land 
o This are mainly local land owners in the villages studied, land users 
and people affected by land deals. Pastoralists, women, youth may 
have lesser amounts of power and influence.  
 Players: high power and high interest, including the designers and real actors 
of deals that use the contexts set by the third group of leaders and context 
setters.  
o Local elites, bourocrats that exert their influence at Dar-es-Salaam, 
some can use violence some regulatory processes.  
 Leaders and context setters group: consists of stakeholders with low interest 
in the deals but comparatively high power in influencing the context of the 
deal.  
o This can be local, but also NGOs, activists, policimakers or 




 Crowd: low power and low interest relative to land deals 
 
Kanji et al. (2002) assessed the impact of NGOs on the land policy process in 
Mozambique and Kenya, using the Institute for Development Research framework with 
five key dimensions: (i) policy, (ii) private sector, (iii) civil society, (iv) democracy, and 
(v) individual. The IDR framework was used by Kanji et al. (2002) together with the 
work done by Davis and Coates (in Kanji et al., 2002, 23), “which suggests distinguishing 
between short and longer term indicators of change”. Kanji et al. (2002, 24) assess four 
areas of impact: (1) 'strengthened civil society organizations', (2) 'consultative 
government procedures and practice', (3) pro-poor changes in policy, regulations and 
legislation, and (4) direct benefits to and improvements in living conditions of poor 
groups. 
According to Kanji et al., NGOs “strengthen and expand civil society's capacity, 
organization, accountability & clout (power), expand members’ skills, capacities, 
knowledge, attitudes & beliefs; and increase overall social capital reciprocity, trust and 
tolerance” (Kanji et al., 2002:23). On the other hand, their impact on democracy means 
“increased democratic space, expanded participation & political legitimacy of civil 
society, as well as the accountability and transparency of public institutions” (Kanji et al., 
2002:23).  
However, other examples in the literature should support the two indicators used by Kanji 
et al. (2002) to assess the impact of NGOs, as explained in the conceptualisation of this 
variable:  
(1) 'Strengthened civil society organisations':  The Oakland Institute is a research centre 
and an international activist movement that is against land grabbing’. They support the 
creation of ties and local organisations in order to help communities defend their 
livelihoods. One example, found in the media reports, is the creation of the local network 
ALLAT in Sierra Leone. After a conference promoted and financed by The Oakland 
Institute and other partners, they created the ALLAT coalition: an “initiative that brings 
together persons affected by large-scale land deals, Civil Society Organizations and 
experts that monitor large-scale industrial investments in agriculture and its impacts on 
the rural population”.11 
                                                 
11   http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/pressreleaselaunchingactionlargescalelandacquisitiontransparencyallat 
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 (2) 'Consultative government procedures and practice': On the other hand, the examples 
explained in Kanji et al. (2002) in regard to Mozambique and Kenya illustrate how NGO 
networks have an impact on land policies. 
8.3 Formalisation of land and assembling of a resource66 
Land rights have been approached in a twofold way by the literature, as discussed in the 
literature review section of this work. On the one hand, “Western-legal views” represent 
the tradition that draws on Locke’s understanding of property rights and their enforcement 
by state coercion; this view highlights mainly the economic perspective of land rights. On 
the other hand, more “anthropological views” understand rights as embedded in a specific 
socio-cultural context. This perspective focuses its attention on the political and cultural 
underpinnings of land rights. These two understandings link with the universal vs. cultural 
relativism debate over rights. Scholars such as Mandani have overcome this dichotomy 
by approaching rights as emanating from struggles: “rights are defined by struggle, and 
rights struggles are born of experiences of deprivation and oppression” (in Nyamu-
Musembi 2002, 6). 
Institutional economists have also tried to overcome the dichotomy of formal vs informal 
land rights with their approach to informal institutions and its flexibility to manage 
problems of property in different local settings. This approach, however, is also focused 
on economic understandings of land rights, representing a partial reality. Agrawal (2003) 
highlights the necessity of going beyond merely the management of institutions and 
recognising that “[g]reater attention to the dynamics of resistance and domination is likely 
to help explicate better the relationship between property and politics” (Agrawal 2003, 
257).  
This study objects to the dichotomies created by ‘Western’ vs ‘anthropological’ 
approaches to land rights through the research carried out similarly to actor-oriented 
approaches or bottom-up approaches. In this regard, the first topic analysed focuses its 
attention on villagers, the most deprived and oppressed actors in the land grabbing 
scenario. Their conflicts and struggles lead to an understanding of what it is they feel 
entitled to and how they frame their demands. 
Freehold does not exist in Tanzania; thus, statutory law protects customary land rights 
and all of the ownership titles are subjected to the use of the land. As explained in Chapter 
4, there are two types of titles: CCROs and COs. CCROs are the titles that villagers can 
                                                 
66 Heading based in a the title of Li’s paper (2014) 
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obtain and they can be obtained for a specific period of time or without a timeframe. 
However, it is necessary that the land is developed and that the person lives in the village. 
In reality, this principle is not followed, as many conflicts arise when land that has not 
been developed is claimed by people from the village who are not living in the village –
this case was explored in M1. Conflicts with old owners of a plot of land that is not being 
developed are commonplace in villagers.  
Certificates of Occupancy (CO) are the titles that investors can obtain for general land 
that is not village land. Foreigners can only apply for this certificate and they will only 
be granted it for a period of time; the law established a timeframe of 33 years in the new 
Land Policy of 2016, due to the land grabbing debate in the country. The fact that COs 
can only be granted for village land means that, as studied above, whenever an investor 
demands land, if it conflicts with village land the land needs to be transferred to general 
land according to the law. This double classification of the land comes from colonial law, 
which stated that this land belonged to the people and could only be used with the 
agreement of the state. The owner of a CO is not an owner as such, but rather is considered 
a tenant, because (s)he cannot own the land forever (Land Right Manual, NGO3). 
National NGOs have considered that not having the land demarcated is detrimental to the 
land rights of the people and can benefit investors: “Because, if the land is not demarcated 
and investors need land, they are told to go to the villages, and if an LUP has not been 
made we do not know the land as it’s been reserved to them the TIC, who is the one to 
tell them where to go, do not have this information, on where the land is available. Instead 
of following this procedure, investors have been introduced directly to the villages. In the 
villages, the land is not demarcated, so even they do not know how much land they have 
and are giving away. Now the government, instead of exercising that role of developing 
the LUP, is asking the investor to do the land use plan” (OEI7-Senior program manager 
NGO3, 29.05.18). They also consider that more relevance is assigned to the legal 
ownership of the land rather than customary land rights; however, no-one was found 
among any of the groups who did not want to have a CCRO, either with their name on it 
or with the name of the whole family. 
However, more important than the CCROs are the Land Use Plans, as they are decisions 
on which uses will be assigned to the land. The use of land excludes one actor from 
another or one use of the land from another (Hall et al. 2011). As Li (2014) pointed out, 
“inscription devices –the axe, the spade, the plough, the title deed, the tax register, maps, 
graphs, satellite images, ancestral graves, mango trees – do more than simply record the 
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presence of land as a resource: they are integral to assembling it as a resource for different 





8.5 Concluding remarks 
This research draws on the land grabbing literature that emerged after the Global Food 
Crisis in 2007-2008. I have reviewed different understandings of land rights from a 
Western-statutory perspective as opposed to an anthropological and cultural 
understanding of those rights. Land reforms that try to impose one system over another 
are harmful for the land rights of vulnerable people because land reforms have political 
underpinnings, as has been highlighted by taking an anthropological approach to such 
reforms. I have also explored the literature on the formalisation of land rights through 
decentralised or centralised processes. Tanzania follows a decentralised and slow process 
of formalisation of land rights in title deeds called CCRO. The issue of CCRO is not 
enough to protect villagers’ land rights, as decisions on the use of land expressed in the 
Land Use Plan can be influenced to a large extent by economic interests.  
I have assessed the role of NGOs in regard to their advocacy and service delivery 
attributes. They are grassroots actors and subaltern voices that navigate international and 
local scenarios in a flexible way. In the field of land rights, their role of protecting rural 
villagers’ land rights has been proven to be very valuable. The chain of partnership, 
advocacy and training individual villagers to maintain local ties is an example of this 
flexibility and the multiple spaces they can access. They have been found to inform land 
rights by contesting land grabbing with strategies that can be long or short-term.  
The struggles over land grabbing found in this research are not only within large-scale 
land grabs, but also small-scale ones. As Baglioni and Gibbon have pointed out, “the 
picture that emerges is one of a scramble and reshuffling, of significant but unstable 
restructuring of land access and control … [or] an unfinished process of capital 
restructuring” (2013, 1558).  As Peluso and Lund (2011) have highlighted, the land 
grabbing scholarship is relevant, as it is able to pinpoint the traits of the undeniably large-




8.6 Summary of research findings 
1. The land grabbing cases documented exacerbate the denial of rights to an already 
vulnerable population. Income, gender and age have been found to have an impact on 
land rights. The most commonly excluded groups among the participants in the interviews 
are pastoralist women. Women, excluding pastoralists, are more excluded from control 
over land than from access. 
2. Land grabbing and scarcity also stir up conflicts among pastoralists and farmers. 
Pastoralists –men and women – have been found to be more excluded from decision 
making places such as village meetings and assemblies, and local governments.  
3. The role of NGOs is paramount in advocating rural villagers’ land rights. From the 
different activities they perform, the training of paralegals was found to be one of the 
more relevant ones to connect global and local understandings of land rights and 
struggles. 
4. Some of the advocacy campaigns that NGOs perform in cases of strategic contestation 
to land grabbing are valued by villagers; however, they are short term focused.  
5. Villagers do not oppose land investment – on a small or large-scale – but they demand 
more guarantees as their expectations have not been accomplished and most of the 
investors do not develop the land according to the promises they made to the villages 
where they settled. They are stakeholders with different needs, interests and bargaining 
power.  
6. The demarcation of farms is increasing the price of land, affecting both farmers and 
pastoralists that never had to pay for land before.  
7. Land management has become very relevant. Title deeds are requested by all of the 
villagers in the form of the statutory CCRO according to Tanzanian Laws. Despite 
debates about the formalisation of land rights, the research has found that LUPs are more 
politically relevant as assembling resources as they dictate the different uses of the land 
by different actors. 
8. Land grabbing has mainly been used to refer to large-scale land deals usually involving 
foreign capital. This research found that small-scale and national actors are paramount in 
dispossession. The land grabbing debate has to be framed from a perspective that 
considers land as part of agrarian and environmental change and the appropriation of 
natural resources.  
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9. Changing perceptions of land use and monetary prices have rendered land important 
for villages in a new way. The land cash value is substituting the traditional land use 
value.   
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8.7 Recommendations for future research  
1. This study has demonstrated the existence of land dispossession in Tanzania and a 
changing perception of land as an important asset. This has had an impact on the evolution 
of the land available in villages. As explained throughout this study, the land in the 
villages is distributed according to its use, and the villages have a stock of land available 
to allocate to villagers. The evolution and control of this stock of land constitute a relevant 
topic for further research. In the four villages, the village government was allocating part 
of the land to villagers, investors and different organisations, such as the church or NGOs. 
This stock of land was previously used flexibly because when land was not used it was 
made available to others. With the issuing of certificates, and even informal and manual 
registers, this flexibility is in jeopardy.  
2. A relevant topic for further research derives from the consideration of land as a 
“resource for global investment” (Li, 2014). Also, land is part of nature and belongs to 
agrarian environments (Agrawal and Sivaramakrishnan 2000, Bernstein 2010). A new, 
ecological approach to land ownership is therefore needed and research can contribute to 
this approach (Freyfogle 2003). In this line, common ownership has started to be 
vindicated as more relevant than private ownership as a global reassembling of nature due 
to a sense of ecological interconnection. In this sense, the legitimacy of “new land uses 
or intensify existing ones are legitimate only insofar as such rights do not undermine the 
common good” (Freyfogle 2003, 256). 
3. Research on the mechanisms of gender inequalities to control resources needs to 
continue. This cannot be isolated from the continuous efforts to find solutions to the 
impoverished and marginalised people who will be more affected by the challenges of 
the assembling of land and nature.   
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Annex 1: Interview guides by participant attributes  
Research question Research Objective 
Code 
Interview Questions 
Villager Interview Guide Leaders Interview Guide Practitioners Intervw. Guide 
 
What are local understandings 
of land rights and what rights 
do local communities demand? 
what local understandings of 
land rights are and what 




Acess to land (A) 
Ownership (O) 
Tenure security (TN) 









1. Do you have land? How much land do you have in total? 
How did you gain access to your land? (A) 
16. Do you need access to land? Why? (A) 
17. Do you think the land you have is yours or belongs to 
the government?     No, why? (TN) 
18. Overall, what does land mean to you? (AW) 
19. Do you have a customary right of occupancy deed? 
Yes/No Why? (O) 
     No: Would you like to have one? 
20. Do you know the procedures to apply for these titles? Do 
you know where to get information about them? (O) 
21. Do you think having boundaries of your land is 
important? Yes/No (O) 
22. Do you feel you can lose your land? Why? Who do you 
think can help you to protect your land? (TN) 
23. Do you know about land rights? Yes/No  (AW) 
If Yes: What do you know about land rights? 
If Not: Why not? 
24. Do you think it is important to know about land rights? 
Why? 
25. Do you know about land laws in Tanzania? Yes/No . If 
Yes, Mention those you know  (AW) 
26. Do you think it is important to know about land laws? 
Why? 
27. Do you know about compensation? Yes/No (C) 
1. Do you think it is important for villagers to have 
boundaries in their land? (a) Yes (b) No Why? 
(O) 
2. Do you think it is important for villagers to have 
title deed (a) Yes (b) No. Why? (O) 
3. What do you think about land ownership? Do 
people own land or the government? (TN)/(O) 
4. What do you think about land rights in Tanzania? 
(AW) 
5. What do you think about land rights in Western 
countries? (AW) 
6. What questions do people ask about land rights? 
(N) 
7. What necessities do villages demand in terms of 
land rights? (N) 




30.What do you think can be done to improve land 
rights in Tanzania? (N)/(AW) 
1. What do you think about land ownership? 
Do people own land, or the government? 
(O) 
2. What do you think about land rights in 
Tanzania? (AW) 
3. What do you think about land rights in 
Western countries? (AW) 
4. What do you think villagers need regarding 
land rights? (N) 
5. What are the more common questions they 
make? (N) 




7. What do you think they need? (N) 
 
31. What do you think can be done to improve land 















If Yes: What do you know about compensation? 
If Not: Why not? 
Who has explained you about these concepts? 
28. Have you ever received compensation? Are you happy 
with that? Why yes/no? (C) 
29. What does people in your village demand concerning 
land? What necessities do people have? Do you agree 
with them? Do you have a particular necessity or 
demand? (N) 
30. What do you think is better for you in order to protect 
your land? (N) 
39. What do you think should be done to improve land rights 
in Tanzania? (N) 
Do those engaged in land 
struggles frame their demands 
in terms of rights?  
 
Who is defining local 
priorities? Who is included and 
excluded in such debates? 
to identify the most involved 
people in the definition of land 
rights and necessities while 





Land rights struggles (S) 
Participation/Exclusion (P) 
Leadership (L) 
17. What problems concerning land issues do you have in 
the village or yourself? (S) 
18. Do you think land rights have been violated here? (S) 
Yes, what happened? 
No  
35. Are you doing anything to resist investors? (S) 
19. Where do you go to get help in case of problems with 
land? (L) 
20. Do you participate in defining your priorities, especially 
those related to land? (P) 
21. If you have a priority, is it taken into consideration for 
the local government? Yes/No Who takes into 
consideration (listen to) your priorities? (L) 
9. What kind of problems regarding land rights do 
you have here? (S) 
10. Have you heard about land conflicts in your area? 
Have they grown? (S) 
11. What do you think are the causes of these 
conflicts? (S) 
25.Are you doing anything to resist/promote investors? 
(S) 
12. How do you engage villagers in participation of 
the definition of needs and priorities? (P) 
13. How do you inform them in case you want to 
implement land programmes or activities with 
villagers? (P) 
14. What do you do for engaging everybody in your 
activities? (P) 
8. How do you engage villagers in 
participation of the definition of needs and 
priorities? How do you organize 
participation? (P) 
9. Who is more involved in defining priorities, 
especially those related to land rights? 
Can you give examples? (P) 
10. What are these priorities? Can you give 
examples? How are villagers involved in the 
establishment of such priorities? (P)/(N) 
11. Do locals participate in meetings? Who 
participates? Are meetings open to 
everyone? How do you advertise such 
meetings? (P) 
12. Do you have any program for educating 




22. Do you have meetings with local leaders discussing land 
issues? (L) 
23. Do you get enough information about when and where 
they take place? (P) 
24. If you don’t participate, who does participate? Do you 
think people in your village attend these meetings? 
Why? (P) 
25. Do you think your leaders take responsibility in 
protecting land rights? If not, who takes responsibilities? 
(L) 
26.  Are you afraid of expressing land problems you have in 
the village meetings? Why are you afraid of claiming for 
your rights? (P) 
15. Who is more involved in defining priorities, 
especially those related to land rights? (P) 
16. Can you give examples of land priorities that 
villagers proposes to be worked upon? (P)/(N) 
17. Do locals participate in meetings? Are meetings 
open to everyone? How do you advertise such 
meetings?  Give Examples of meetings 
concerning land rights and conflict resolution. 
(P) 
18. Do you have any program for educating them in 
their land rights and other civil rights? (P) 
 
13. Do you know about land conflicts? Have 
they grown? (S) 
14. What do you think are the causes of these 
conflicts? (S) 
 
21.Are you doing anything to resist/promote 
investors? (S) 
Have understandings of land 
rights changed over time, and 
particularly in the context of 
land grabs? 
to identify if any change 
concerning land rights over 
time has happened and what can 




Land transfers (LT) 
Investors Impact (I) 
Income (W) 
 
27. Are there investors in the village? When did you know 
for the first time about them? Who told you about them? 
What happened? What is happening now? (I) 
28. What do you think about them? (I) 
Good. Why? Good 
Bad. Why? 
29. What have been investors’ consequences for you? (I) 
30. Are investors contributing to the development of your 
village? How? (I) 
31. What influences have rich man in land rights and access 
to land? (W) 
32. Is people selling and buying land here? What do you 
think about it? (LT) 
33. How somebody’s income is affecting land ownership 
and access to land? (W) 
34. What are the consequences of this? (W) 
19. Do you think land transfers have increased? 
Since when? Why? (LT) 
20. What do you think about investors? (I) 
21. How do investors acquire the land? (I) 
22. Is there any negative effect on land ownership or 
access caused about investors? (I) 
Yes, why? What are those effects? 
No, can you tell anything good done by them. 
23. How somebody’s income is affecting land 
ownership and access to land? What are the 
consequences of this? (W) 
24. Do you think investors are contributing or 
improving land rights or are damaging them? 
How do they do that? (I) 
 
15. Do you think land transfers have increased? 
Since when? Why? (LT) 
16. What do you think about investors? (I) 
17. How do investors acquire the land? (I) 
18. Is there any negative effect on land 
ownership or access caused about investors? 
(I) 
Yes, why? What are those effects? 
No, can you tell anything good done by them. 
19. How somebody’s income is affecting land 
ownership and access to land? What are the 
consequences of this? (W) 
20. Do you think investors are contributing or 
improving land rights or are damaging 
them? How do they do that? (I) 
How are factors from the local 
to the global levels influencing 
local understandings of rights? 
to learn about local and global 
factors that may interact in the 
change of those rights, with 
especial reference to local and 
36.Can you mention any organization or individual that has 
informed you about your land rights? (GL) 
37.What did they train you about? Was this helpful? Why? 
What has changed for you? (NI) 
38.What are your opinions about NGOs and their role in 
protecting land rights? Do you have examples of that? (NI) 
26.Have you received training on land rights? Where? 
With which institution? (GL) 
27.What did you learned? Was this helpful? Why? 
What has changed for you? (NI) 
28.Do you think global land movements are relevant for 
promoting land rights in Tanzania? (GL) 
Yes, Why? 
23. Can you mention any village or district 
where you promote programmes for 
improving land rights awareness? What did 
you do? Was this helpful? Why? (NI) 
24. Did you learn something from villagers 
during such programmes? What? Has this 









NGOs Impact on LR (NI) 
Global-Local influences (GL) 
No, Why? 
29.What are your opinions about NGOs and their role 
in protecting land rights? Do you have examples of 
that? (NI) 
25. How has this help you to know more about 
the importance of land and land rights? Why 
do you feel that land is important? (NI) 
26. Do you have links with other organizations? 
Which? (GL) 
27. Do you think global land movements are 




28. Can you mention any of these movements? 
(GL) 
29. Any international NGO or CSO working 
with land rights? What is good/bad about 
them? (GL) 
30. Do they have enough impact? Why? (NI) 
31. Does this help you in your understanding 
and the understanding of your organization 
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